Christopher J. Kalishek v. Commissioner of Social Security , 470 F. App'x 868 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-15487               MAY 30, 2012
    Non-Argument Calendar           JOHN LEY
    ________________________           CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00714-SDM-AEP
    CHRISTOPHER J. KALISHEK,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                            Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 30, 2012)
    Before BARKETT, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Christopher Kalishek appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    Commissioner’s administrative denial of his applications for a period of disability
    and Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g). On appeal,
    Kalishek first argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) did not make
    detailed findings or seriously discuss whether his impairment met Listing 1.02A,
    regarding major dysfunction of a joint or joints, in the Listing of Impairments
    (“Listings”). He contends that he was not able to effectively ambulate, as required
    by Listing 1.02A. He argues that his position was supported by the medical
    evidence, including an opinion from his treating physician that was submitted to
    the Appeals Council after the ALJ had issued his decision. Secondly, Kalishek
    argues that the ALJ erred in finding him not credible because his testimony and
    statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his pain were not
    inconsistent.
    I.
    We review de novo the district court’s decision as to whether substantial
    evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Wilson v. Barnhart, 
    284 F.3d 1219
    , 1221
    (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    363 F.3d 1155
    , 1158 (11th Cir.
    2004) (quotation omitted).
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    Normally, we review the decision of the ALJ as the Commissioner’s final
    decision when the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of
    the ALJ’s decision. 
    Id.
     However, “when a claimant properly presents new
    evidence to the Appeals Council, a reviewing court must consider whether that
    new evidence renders the denial of benefits erroneous.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc.
    Sec., 
    496 F.3d 1253
    , 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2007).
    A person is disabled under the Social Security Act if they have the “inability
    to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
    determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
    death or which has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of not less
    than 12 months.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (d)(1)(A). The agency uses a five-step
    sequential evaluation process when determining whether a claimant is disabled.
    See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1520
    . First, if the claimant is performing substantial gainful
    activity, the claimant is not disabled. 
    Id.
     § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If not, then the
    Commissioner considers the medical severity of the claimant’s impairments at the
    second step. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, if the Commissioner
    determines that the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets or
    equals a listed impairment, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of
    the claimant’s age, education, or work experience. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d).
    3
    If not, at the fourth step, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s residual
    functional capacity and ability to perform past relevant work. Id.
    § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform any past relevant work, the
    Commissioner then determines, at the fifth step, whether the claimant, based on
    their residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience, can make
    an adjustment to other work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the Commissioner finds
    that the claimant can make such an adjustment, then the Commissioner will find
    that the claimant is not disabled. Id.
    The claimant has the burden of proving that an impairment meets or equals
    a listed impairment. Barron v. Sullivan, 
    924 F.2d 227
    , 229 (11th Cir. 1991). To
    “meet” a Listing, a claimant must have a diagnosis included in the Listings and
    must provide medical reports documenting that the conditions meet the specific
    criteria of the Listings and the duration requirement. 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1525
    (a)-(d);
    Wilson, 
    284 F.3d at 1224
    . To “medically equal” a Listing, the medical findings
    must be “at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed
    impairment.” 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1526
    (a); Wilson, 
    284 F.3d at 1224
    . If a claimant
    has more than one impairment, and none meets or equals a listed impairment, the
    Commissioner reviews the impairments’ symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings
    to determine whether the combination is medically equal to the criteria of any
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    listed impairment. 
    Id.
     An impairment that meets only some of the criteria of a
    Listing, no matter how severely, does not qualify. 
    20 C.F.R. § 416.925
    (c)(3). The
    ALJ’s finding as to whether a claimant meets a listed impairment may be implied
    from the record. Hutchison v. Bowen, 
    787 F.2d 1461
    , 1463 (11th Cir. 1986).
    Furthermore, while the ALJ must consider the Listings in making its disability
    determination, “it is not required that the [ALJ] mechanically recite the evidence
    leading to [its] determination.” 
    Id.
    Listing 1.02A defines major dysfunction of a joint or joints as being
    characterized by: (1) “gross anatomical deformity,” which includes subluxation
    (malpositioning of a bone), contracture, bony or fibrous anklyosis, or instability;
    (2) chronic joint pain and stiffness with signs of either limitation of motion or
    other abnormal motion of the affected joint or joints; (3) findings on “appropriate
    medically acceptable imaging” of either joint space narrowing, bony destruction,
    or anklyosis of the affected joint or joints; and (4) the involvement of one major
    peripheral weight-bearing joint, such as the knee, hip, or ankle, resulting in an
    inability to ambulate effectively, as defined in Listing 1.00B2b. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,
    Subpt. P, App’x 1, § 1.02A. The inability to ambulate effectively is defined as “an
    extreme limitation of the ability to walk,” or an impairment that “interferes very
    seriously with the individual’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or
    5
    complete activities.” Id. § 1.00B2b(1). The inability to ambulate effectively is
    also generally defined as having insufficient functioning of the lower extremities
    such that the claimant cannot independently ambulate without the use of a
    hand-held assistive device “that limits the functioning of both upper extremities.”
    Id. To be able to ambulate effectively, claimants:
    [M]ust be capable of sustaining a reasonable walking pace over a
    sufficient distance to be able to carry out activities of daily living.
    They must have the ability to travel without companion assistance to
    and from a place of employment or school. Therefore, examples of
    ineffective ambulation include, but are not limited to, the inability to
    walk without the use of a walker, two crutches or two canes, the
    inability to walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven
    surfaces, the inability to use standard public transportation, the
    inability to carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping
    and banking, and the inability to climb a few steps at a reasonable
    pace with the use of a single hand rail. The ability to walk
    independently about one’s home without the use of assistive devices
    does not, in and of itself, constitute effective ambulation.
    Id. § 1.00B2b(2).
    Normally, the opinion of a treating physician must be given substantial or
    considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. Crawford,
    
    363 F.3d at 1159
    . A treating physician’s report may be discounted when it is not
    accompanied by objective medical evidence or is wholly conclusory. 
    Id.
    Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
    affirm. This record reflects that substantial evidence supports the agency’s
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    conclusion that Kalishek did not meet Listing 1.02A because, in light of the
    medical evidence and Kalishek’s own testimony, the ALJ reasonably could have
    concluded that Kalishek could effectively ambulate. Furthermore, the additional
    opinions submitted by Kalishek’s treating physician after the ALJ had rendered its
    decision do not render the ALJ’s findings erroneous because the opinions were
    wholly conclusory and unaccompanied by any objective medical evidence.
    II.
    When a claimant testifies to subjective complaints of pain, the ALJ must
    clearly articulate adequate reasons for discrediting the claimant’s allegations of
    disabling symptoms. Dyer v. Barnhart, 
    395 F.3d 1206
    , 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Failure to articulate the reasons for discrediting such testimony mandates that the
    testimony, as a matter of law, be accepted as true. Cannon v. Bowen, 
    858 F.2d 1541
    , 1545 (11th Cir. 1988). However, if the ALJ clearly articulates adequate
    reasons for its finding, and there is substantial supporting evidence in the record,
    we will not disturb the credibility finding on review. Foote v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 1553
    , 1562 (11th Cir. 1995). An ALJ is allowed to consider a claimant’s daily
    activities when determining whether a claimant’s testimony regarding symptoms
    such as pain is not credible, as well as whether medication helped the claimant’s
    condition. See 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
    (c)(3)(i), (iv). Furthermore, the ALJ may
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    consider the claimant’s demeanor and appearance at the hearing in evaluating
    credibility. Macia v. Bowen, 
    829 F.2d 1009
    , 1011 (11th Cir. 1987). The ALJ’s
    consideration of the claimant’s demeanor, however, must not be the sole
    consideration in making a credibility determination. Norris v. Heckler, 
    760 F.2d 1154
    , 1158 (11th Cir. 1985).
    Because the ALJ clearly articulated reasons in support of its finding that
    Kalishek was not credible, and those reasons are supported by substantial
    evidence, we will not disturb the ALJ’s credibility finding.
    AFFIRMED.
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