United States v. Salvador Ortiz-Merino , 627 F. App'x 861 ( 2015 )


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  •              Case: 15-11625    Date Filed: 09/30/2015   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-11625
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cr-80220-KLR-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    SALVADOR ORTIZ-MERINO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (September 30, 2015)
    Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    After Salvador Ortiz-Merino pled guilty to illegal reentry by a deported
    alien, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), the district court sentenced him to 12
    months’ imprisonment, an upward variance from the advisory guideline range of 0
    Case: 15-11625       Date Filed: 09/30/2015       Page: 2 of 6
    to 6 months. On appeal, Ortiz-Merino argues that his sentence is procedurally and
    substantively unreasonable. After thorough review, we affirm.
    We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which
    “merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
    
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    ,
    351 (2007)). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is
    unreasonable. United States v. Tome, 
    611 F.3d 1371
    , 1378 (11th Cir. 2010).
    In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we typically perform two steps.
    Pugh, 
    515 F.3d at 1190
    . First, we “‘ensure that the district court committed no
    significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
    the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
    § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
    to adequately explain the chosen sentence -- including an explanation for any
    deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)).1       The district court is not required to explicitly state that it
    considered the § 3553(a) factors, as long as the court’s comments demonstrate that
    1
    The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
    history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
    offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
    protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
    or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
    pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
    sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
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    it considered the factors when imposing sentence. United States v. Dorman, 
    488 F.3d 936
    , 944 (11th Cir. 2007).
    If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err, we consider
    the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
    discretion standard,’” based on the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 
    515 F.3d at 1190
     (quoting Gall, 552 U .S. at 51). “[W]e will not second guess the
    weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded to a given [§ 3553(a)] factor ... as
    long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light of all the
    circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 
    611 F.3d 855
    , 872 (11th Cir.
    2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted). We will not reweigh the
    relevant § 3553(a) factors, and will not remand for resentencing unless the district
    court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by
    imposing a sentence outside the range of reasonable sentences. United States v.
    Langston, 
    590 F.3d 1226
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 2009). Thus, a court may abuse its
    discretion when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant
    weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3)
    commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably.
    United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Moreover, a
    court should not focus on one factor “single-mindedly” to the detriment of other
    factors, and a court’s unjustified reliance on any one § 3553(a) factor may be a
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    symptom of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 
    454 F.3d 1285
    ,
    1292 (11th Cir. 2006).
    We may not presume that a sentence outside the guideline range is
    unreasonable, and “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the
    § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Irey, 
    612 F.3d at 1187
     (quotation omitted).      Extraordinary justification is not required, but the
    district court should explain why the variance is appropriate, and the justification
    must be sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. 
    Id. at 1186-87
    . A sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an
    indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    ,
    1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the sentence was reasonable in part because it
    was well below the statutory maximum). The maximum term of imprisonment for
    a defendant convicted of illegal reentry by a deported alien under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a) is two years. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a).
    Here, Ortiz-Merino has failed to show that his sentence is unreasonable. As
    for procedural reasonableness, the district court was not required to specifically
    discuss each § 3553(a) factor, and the record establishes that the court set forth
    enough to show that it had considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned
    basis for its decision -- specifically, it said that it had considered the parties’
    arguments, the guideline range, and the § 3553(a) factors. In imposing the upward
    4
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    variance, the court stressed that Ortiz-Merino’s number of illegal reentries was
    “extraordinary” and demonstrated a lack of respect for the law. The court also
    responded to Ortiz-Merino’s arguments that he (1) had usually voluntarily departed
    the United States, and (2) came to the United States because of troubling
    circumstances in Mexico.
    As for substantive reasonableness, the district court explained why the
    variance was appropriate and gave a sufficiently compelling justification for it:
    Ortiz-Merino’s record of 14 illegal entries and voluntary departures or removals
    prior to the instant conviction, which implicated several § 3553(a) factors,
    including the need to promote respect for the law and deter criminal conduct. The
    variance was also supported by Ortiz-Merino’s numerous driving offenses,
    including ten convictions for driving without a valid driver’s license, as well as his
    conviction for domestic battery and pending charge for aggravated battery.
    Although the district court placed significant weight on Ortiz-Merino’s repeated
    illegal entries, it did not focus on this factor “single-mindedly” to the detriment of
    others, and expressly noted that it considered the § 3553(a) factors as well as the
    parties’ arguments, which addressed a multitude of § 3553(a) factors. While the
    court may not have weighed Ortiz-Merino’s traumatic childhood experiences as
    much as he desired, its decision to weigh other factors more heavily was within its
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    sound discretion. Finally, the 12-month sentence was considerably below the 24-
    month statutory maximum.
    AFFIRMED.
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