United States v. Victor Manuel Becerra-Rodriguez ( 2021 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 21-10930    Date Filed: 11/05/2021   Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-10930
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    VICTOR MANUEL BECERRA-RODRIGUEZ,
    a.k.a. Victor Manuel R Becerra,
    a.k.a. Victor M Becerra Rodriguez,
    a.k.a. Victor M Becerra,
    a.k.a. Victor Manuel Becerra,
    a.k.a. Victor Becerra-Rodriguez,
    a.k.a. Victor M Becerra-Rodriguez,
    a.k.a. Victor Manuel Becerra-Rodriguez,
    a.k.a. Manuel Rodriguez-Hernandez,
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930           Date Filed: 11/05/2021       Page: 2 of 10
    2                         Opinion of the Court                    21-10930
    a.k.a. Gualberto Cruz Clemente,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Alabama
    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cr-00081-CG-N-1
    ____________________
    Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Victor Becerra-Rodriguez appeals his conviction after plead-
    ing guilty to aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 1028A(a)(1). 1 On appeal, Becerra-Rodriguez contends the district
    court committed plain error -- under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3) -- by
    1 Becerra-Rodriguez raises no challenge to his conviction for illegal reentry
    after deportation or removal, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a). Nor does
    Becerra-Rodriguez challenge the length of his sentence.
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930         Date Filed: 11/05/2021     Page: 3 of 10
    21-10930                Opinion of the Court                          3
    failing to secure a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea.
    No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
    In May 2020, police stopped a car driven by Becerra-Rodri-
    guez. During the traffic stop, Becerra-Rodriguez presented a
    driver’s license that included a photograph of Becerra-Rodriguez
    but a name and date-of-birth belonging to another person (G.C.).
    Becerra-Rodriguez later told officers that he had purchased the
    driver’s license and a Social Security card (also in G.C.’s name) for
    $1,500.
    A federal grand jury charged Becerra-Rodriguez with illegal
    reentry after deportation or removal, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a) (Count One), and with aggravated identity theft (Count
    Two). In Count Two, the indictment explicitly alleged that
    Becerra-Rodriguez “did knowingly possess and use, without lawful
    authority, a means of identification of another individual . . . during
    and in relation to a felony violation [of] 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), knowing
    that the means of identification belonged to another actual person
    identified herein by initials G.C.”
    At the plea colloquy, the district court confirmed that
    Becerra-Rodriguez had seen a copy of the indictment; also, he had
    an opportunity to discuss the indictment with his lawyer. The dis-
    trict court before Becerra-Rodriguez summarized the charges
    against him. The court said that Count Two charged Becerra-Ro-
    driguez with “knowing that the means of identification belonged
    to another actual person whose initials were GC.”
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930       Date Filed: 11/05/2021    Page: 4 of 10
    4                      Opinion of the Court                21-10930
    Becerra-Rodriguez told the district court that he was plead-
    ing guilty of his own free will and because he was “in fact guilty.”
    The district court then questioned Becerra-Rodriguez about
    the circumstances of the offense. Pertinent to this appeal, the dis-
    trict court asked Becerra-Rodriguez whether Becerra-Rodriguez
    knew when he possessed the identification cards that the identify-
    ing information belonged to another person. In response, Becerra-
    Rodriguez asked to confer with his lawyer. This exchange then fol-
    lowed:
    [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, we
    knew that it did not belong to Mr. Becerra-Rodriguez.
    THE COURT: Okay. So you knew that the
    number wasn’t your Social Security number?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
    THE COURT: And did you present that docu-
    ment to someone to claim that you were in fact enti-
    tled to be in the United States?
    THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
    THE COURT: Are you satisfied with that fac-
    tual basis . . . ?
    [PROSECUTOR]: Yes, sir. We would add that
    the defendant gave a statement after he was
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930           Date Filed: 11/05/2021       Page: 5 of 10
    21-10930                  Opinion of the Court                             5
    confronted by the officers on the date in the indict-
    ment indicating he knew the means of identification
    did belong to a real person. So with that addition, I
    think that would be sufficient.
    THE COURT: Are you satisfied?
    ...
    [DEFENSE ATTORNEY]: Your Honor, I
    know that that’s listed in the discovery. But we had
    disputed that. However, he does admit that he did --
    and this is in evidence -- that he did give a date of birth
    which also belonged to the person listed on the Social
    Security card.
    Immediately following this discussion, Becerra-Rodriguez
    pleaded guilty. 2 The district court accepted the plea, finding that
    Becerra-Rodriguez’s guilty plea was “supported by an independent
    basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the of-
    fense.” The district court later sentenced Becerra-Rodriguez to 41
    months’ imprisonment for Count One and a mandatory consecu-
    tive 24-month sentence for Count Two.
    On appeal, Becerra-Rodriguez contends the district court
    erred in finding the factual basis sufficient to support his guilty plea
    2 Becerra-Rodriguez entered his guilty plea without a written plea agreement.
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930            Date Filed: 11/05/2021         Page: 6 of 10
    6                          Opinion of the Court                      21-10930
    on Count Two. Becerra-Rodriguez argues that the record fails to
    establish adequately that Becerra-Rodriguez knew that the identi-
    fying information charged in Count Two belonged to a real person.
    Because Becerra-Rodriguez raises this argument squarely
    for the first time on appeal, we review his argument only for plain
    error. 3 See United States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 
    794 F.3d 1278
    , 1285-
    86 (11th Cir. 2015) (reviewing for plain error the defendant’s chal-
    lenge -- first raised on appeal -- to the sufficiency of the factual basis
    for his guilty plea). Under the plain-error standard, the defendant
    must show (1) an error, (2) that was plain, and (3) that affected his
    substantial rights. 
    Id. at 1286
    . If the defendant makes that showing,
    we have discretion to correct the error only if the error “seriously
    affect[s] the fairness integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro-
    ceedings.” 
    Id.
    An error is “plain” if it is “clear” or “obvious.” United States
    v. Gonzalez, 
    834 F.3d 1206
    , 1218 (11th Cir. 2016). When a plain
    error is shown, the defendant then bears the burden of demonstrat-
    ing that the error affected his substantial rights. 
    Id.
     To show that a
    plain error affected substantial rights in the context of a guilty plea,
    a defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, but for the
    3 The government says we should decline to review the merits of Becerra-
    Rodriguez’s argument based on the doctrine of invited error. Because we can-
    not conclude reasonably that Becerra-Rodriguez induced or invited the district
    court to determine that a sufficient factual basis supported the plea, the in-
    vited-error doctrine is inapplicable. For background, see United States v. Love,
    
    449 F.3d 1154
    , 1157 (11th Cir. 2006).
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930        Date Filed: 11/05/2021      Page: 7 of 10
    21-10930                Opinion of the Court                         7
    error, he would not have entered the plea.” See United States v.
    Dominguez Benitez, 
    542 U.S. 74
    , 83 (2004).
    To obtain a conviction for violation of 18 U.S.C. §
    1028A(a)(1), the government must prove, among other things, that
    “the defendant knew that the means of identification at issue be-
    longed to another person.” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 646
    , 657 (2009). A defendant’s knowledge that the means of
    identification belonged to a real person may be proven using cir-
    cumstantial evidence. United States v. Gomez-Castro, 
    605 F.3d 1245
    , 1249 (11th Cir. 2010). We have said that “both the circum-
    stances in which an offender obtained a victim’s identity and the
    offender’s later misuse of that identity can shed light on the of-
    fender’s knowledge about that identity.” See United States v.
    Delva, 
    922 F.3d 1228
    , 1249 (11th Cir. 2019).
    We cannot conclude that the district court plainly erred in
    finding the factual basis sufficient to support Becerra-Rodriguez’s
    guilty plea. Becerra-Rodriguez testified that he knew the identify-
    ing information did not belong to him and that he used the infor-
    mation to claim falsely that he was lawfully in the United States.
    That Becerra-Rodriguez paid $1,500 for the identification cards and
    presented the purchased driver’s license for government inspection
    during a traffic stop further supports a finding that Becerra-Rodri-
    guez knew the identifying information belonged to a real person.
    See Gomez-Castro, 
    605 F.3d at 1249
     (concluding that evidence that
    the defendant paid $2,500 for a birth certificate and a social security
    card and then used those documents to apply for a United States
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930        Date Filed: 11/05/2021     Page: 8 of 10
    8                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10930
    passport, credit cards, and a driver’s license was sufficient to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew that the iden-
    tifying information belonged to a real person). Given the circum-
    stances involved in Becerra-Rodriguez’s acquisition of the identifi-
    cation cards and his later misuse of those cards, the district court
    committed no error that was “clear” or “obvious” in finding a suf-
    ficient factual basis existed.
    Moreover, Becerra-Rodriguez has failed to show that the
    supposed plain error affected his substantial rights. The record does
    show that Becerra-Rodriguez understood that his offense included
    as an element knowledge that the identifying information be-
    longed to a real person. At the plea hearing, the district court con-
    firmed that Becerra-Rodriguez had reviewed the indictment
    (which included the pertinent knowledge element) with his lawyer.
    The district court also advised Becerra-Rodriguez that the charged
    offense included an allegation that Becerra-Rodriguez knew “that
    the means of identification belonged to another actual person.”
    The discussion during the plea hearing about whether
    Becerra-Rodriguez knew that the identifying information belonged
    to a real person -- and Becerra-Rodriguez’s lawyer’s comment
    about an earlier dispute about the government’s attempt to intro-
    duce Becerra-Rodriguez’s post-arrest statement to that effect -- fur-
    ther demonstrates that Becerra-Rodriguez did understand that
    knowledge was an essential element.
    On appeal, Becerra-Rodriguez says he would not have
    pleaded guilty had the district court “required him to admit” that
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930        Date Filed: 11/05/2021     Page: 9 of 10
    21-10930               Opinion of the Court                         9
    he knew the identification belonged to a real person. But Becerra-
    Rodriguez never contends that he did not know of the offense’s
    knowledge requirement when he pleaded guilty.
    Becerra-Rodriguez has shown no reasonable probability that
    -- but for the alleged error -- he would not have entered his plea.
    Becerra-Rodriguez had adequate notice of the knowledge element
    when he pleaded guilty and told the district court under oath that
    he was “in fact guilty” of the charged offense. That Becerra-Rodri-
    guez never admitted expressly that he knew the identifying infor-
    mation belonged to a real person does not preclude a finding of a
    sufficient factual basis. See Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d at 1287 (up-
    holding a guilty plea under plain-error review when the defendant
    admitted only to “most” of the government’s factual proffer but
    told the district court under oath that he was guilty and signed a
    plea agreement stating he was pleading guilty because he was “in
    fact guilty”).
    We stress that -- on plain-error review -- Becerra-Rodriguez
    bears the burden of showing prejudice. Because Becerra-Rodriguez
    has presented no evidence establishing a reasonable probability
    that he would have declined to plead guilty absent the supposed
    error, Becerra-Rodriguez has failed to meet his burden. Cf. United
    States v. Innocent, 
    977 F.3d 1077
    , 1083 (noting that a defendant fails
    to satisfy his burden under plain-error review when he presents no
    evidence that the purported error affected the outcome; “[w]hen
    the record says little or nothing about the effect of the error, ‘the
    burden is the decisive factor.’”).
    USCA11 Case: 21-10930            Date Filed: 11/05/2021         Page: 10 of 10
    10                         Opinion of the Court                       21-10930
    AFFIRMED.4
    4 In his reply brief, Becerra-Rodriguez contends for the first time that the dis-
    trict court failed to inform him adequately of the nature of the charges against
    him, in violation of Rule 11(b)(1)(G). This argument is not properly before us
    in this appeal. See United States v. Whitesell, 
    314 F.3d 1251
    , 1256 (11th Cir.
    2002) (recognizing that “issues raised for the first time in a reply brief are
    waived on appeal”).