United States v. Ronald Ford , 479 F. App'x 221 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JUNE 20, 2012
    No. 12-10540
    Non-Argument Calendar            JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:94-cr-06003-DTKH-4
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                         Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RONALD FORD,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                         Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 20, 2012)
    Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald Ford, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion. Ford’s motion requested that
    his 324-month sentence, imposed for conspiracy to possess with intent to
    distribute cocaine base and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, be
    reduced in light of Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, which reduced
    the base offense levels corresponding to some crack cocaine offenses. On appeal,
    Ford acknowledges that he was ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction under
    controlling precedent, but argues that the history and policy behind the Fair
    Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
    124 Stat. 2372
     (2010),
    show an intent to grant district courts the authority to make sentence reductions
    greater than those previously authorized. Given the special nature of Amendment
    750, Ford maintains that there is substantial ambiguity as to whether the court had
    authority to reduce his sentence, and he requests that we resolve that uncertainty in
    his favor under the rule of lenity.
    We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions regarding the scope
    of its authority under § 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    ,
    1326 (11th Cir. 2008). Under § 3582(c), the district court “may not modify a term
    of imprisonment once it has been imposed except . . . in the case of a defendant
    2
    who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range
    that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). A modification is permitted only “if such a reduction is consistent
    with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 
    Id.
     The
    Sentencing Guidelines provide that a reduction in sentence as the result of a
    retroactively applicable amendment is not proper if the “amendment . . . does not
    have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G.
    § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). The Supreme Court has explicitly held that a district court may
    not reduce a defendant’s sentence below his amended guideline range, unless his
    original sentence was for a term below the guideline range. Freeman v. United
    States, 564 U.S. __, 
    131 S.Ct. 2685
    , 2693, 180 L.Ed.2d. 519 (2011); Dillon v.
    United States, 560 U.S. __, 
    130 S.Ct. 2683
    , 2691-92, 
    177 L.Ed.2d 271
     (2010).
    Effective November 1, 2011, Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines
    altered the Drug Quantity Table used to calculate the base offense levels
    corresponding to the possession of certain amounts of crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G.
    App. C, Amend. 750 (2011). Amendment 750 notes that it “does not lower the
    sentences[] for offenses involving . . . at least 2.8 kilograms but less than 4.5
    kilograms [of crack cocaine].” U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 750, Part C at 394.
    “The rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in
    3
    favor of the defendants subjected to them.” United States v. Santos, 
    553 U.S. 507
    ,
    514, 
    128 S.Ct. 2020
    , 2025, 
    170 L.Ed.2d 912
     (2008). “The simple existence of
    some statutory ambiguity, however, is not sufficient to warrant application of that
    rule.” Muscarello v. United States, 
    524 U.S. 125
    , 138, 
    118 S.Ct. 1911
    , 1919, 
    141 L.Ed.2d 111
     (1998). In order for the rule of lenity to apply, there must be a
    “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” 
    Id. at 138-39
    , 
    118 S.Ct. at 1919
    (quotations omitted).
    Here, the district court lacked authority to reduce Ford’s sentence under
    § 3582(c)(2), as Amendment 750 did not lower his guideline range. Furthermore,
    Ford is serving the minimum sentence available for his guideline range, thus, the
    district court could not have reduced his sentence any further. Freeman, 564 U.S.
    at __, 
    131 S.Ct. at 2693
    ; Dillon, 560 U.S. at __, 
    130 S.Ct. at 2691-92
    . Ford has
    not shown any “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” in any criminal statute, and the
    rule of lenity does not apply in this case. Accordingly, upon review of the record
    and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s denial of
    Ford’s motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-10540

Citation Numbers: 479 F. App'x 221

Judges: Tjoflat, Barkett, Kravitch

Filed Date: 6/20/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024