David Acosta v. James A. Gustino, P.A. , 478 F. App'x 620 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 12-10028 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 6, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cv-01266-GAP-GJK
DAVID ACOSTA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A. GUSTINO, P.A.,
JAMES A. GUSTINO,
TAYLOR & CARLS, P.A.,
PAUL T. HINCKLEY,
ERIC F. WHYNOT,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 6, 2012)
Before CARNES, WILSON and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Alaqua Property Owners Association (“Alaqua”) engaged defendants Paul
T. Hinckley, Eric F. Whynot, and Taylor & Carls, P.A. (the “Taylor Firm
Defendants”) to recover delinquent homeowner association maintenance assessments
from David Acosta. The Taylor Firm Defendants first mailed Acosta a letter
demanding payment of the assessments, interest, and other charges. But, the debt
remained unpaid so the Taylor Firm Defendants sued Acosta on behalf of Alaqua in
Florida state court to foreclose a lien on Acosta’s property or recover a money
judgment (the “State Action”). Alaqua later replaced the Taylor Firm Defendants
with James A. Gustino and his law firm (the “Gustino Defendants”) to litigate the
State Action.
While the State Action was pending against him, Acosta filed this suit in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. His amended
complaint alleges that the Taylor Firm Defendants and Gustino Defendants violated
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). The
amended complaint asserts additional claims against the Gustino Defendants for
violating the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e–1692g,
and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). The
Taylor Firm Defendants responded to the amended complaint by filing a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the counts of the amended complaint asserted against
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them. In the alternative, the motion asked the court to stay the action pursuant to the
Colorado River abstention doctrine pending the outcome of the State Action. The
Gustino Defendants also filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which adopted the
arguments in the Taylor Firm Defendants’ motion and asserted independent
arguments for dismissal.
The district court granted the Taylor Firm Defendants’ motion insofar as it
sought dismissal pursuant to the Colorado River doctrine and dismissed the case
without prejudice. The court denied all other pending motions as moot. Acosta
appeals, challenging this order. He presents only one issue that warrants our
attention. We must decide whether the federal and state proceedings are parallel for
purposes of the Colorado River abstention doctrine. Because we conclude they are
not, we reverse.
“We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal on Colorado
River abstention grounds.” TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1294 (11th
Cir. 1998) (citing Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. First State Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 882,
884 (11th Cir. 1990)). “A district court abuses its discretion if it misapplies the
law . . . .” Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Pages Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1332
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 238 F.3d
1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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First, we emphasize “the virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts
to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 1246 (1976) (citations omitted).
“The doctrine of abstention . . . is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty
of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it.” Ambrosia Coal &
Constr. Co., 368 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S. Ct. at
1244). Furthermore, “Colorado River abstention is permissible in fewer
circumstances than are the other abstention doctrines . . . .” Id.A threshold requirement for application of the Colorado River doctrine is that
the federal and state cases be sufficiently parallel. We ask whether the cases “involve
substantially the same parties and substantially the same issues.” Id. at 1330. If the
federal and state proceedings are not parallel, then the Colorado River doctrine does
not apply. See TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 592 (7th Cir. 2005)
(citing AAR Int’l, Inc. v. Nimelias Enters. S.A., 250 F.3d 510, 518 (7th Cir. 2001)).
Acosta argues that the district court erred by applying the Colorado River
doctrine because the State Action and his federal suit are not parallel. He asserts that
the two actions involve different parties because the federal action is against Alaqua’s
attorneys, not Alaqua. And, he maintains that the two cases present different legal
issues.
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The district court decided that although the parties are not identical in the State
Action and this one, they are substantially similar. The court acknowledged that
Alaqua is not a party to the federal action and Alaqua’s attorneys are not party to the
State Action. Nonetheless, it found the parties in the two actions are substantially
similar because the defendants in the federal action acted as agents for Alaqua in the
state action. When considering the similarity of issues between the cases, the court
said that the state court would decide whether Acosta’s alleged debt to Alaqua could
be lawfully collected. The district court thought it would decide whether the alleged
inability to collect the debt “rendered the Defendants’ collection efforts on behalf of
Alaqua unlawful.” (R.1-46 at 5.) According to the court, the enforceability of the
debt underlies the claims in both actions. Like the district court, the defendants admit
that the federal and state cases contain different claims, but they believe that the
overarching issues are the same.
There is no clear test for deciding whether two cases contain substantially
similar parties and issues. But, as we noted at the outset, the balance in these
situations begins tilted heavily in favor of the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction.
Thus, if there is any substantial doubt about whether two cases are parallel the court
should not abstain. See Huon v. Johnson & Bell, Ltd., 657 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir.
2011) (citing AAR Int’l, Inc., 250 F.3d at 520). Furthermore, “the decision to invoke
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Colorado River necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing
further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28, 103 S. Ct. 927, 943 (1983).
Here, the district court’s decision depends on its conclusion that if the State
Action were decided against Acosta, he would have no viable claims in federal court.
However, the key to the federal case is not only whether the debt was enforceable but
also whether the Gustino Defendants’ conduct when collecting that debt complied
with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. This raises some doubt about whether
resolution of the State Action would decide this case. Additionally, neither the
district court nor the defendants have cited any cases to support the district court’s
conclusion that the parties are substantially similar when “the defendants [in the
federal case] acted as agents for the plaintiff in the state case regarding all of the
activities of which [the federal plaintiff] complains.” (R.1-46 at 4.) This rule of
substantial similarity based on agency could capture a variety of different entities and
individuals and label them as “substantially similar parties.” We question whether
the notion of substantial similarity extends this broadly, and we are especially hesitant
to understand the phrase this way in the context of a narrow abstention doctrine.
Given our doubt about whether the state and federal proceedings are parallel,
we err on the side in favor of the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction and reverse the
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district court’s order dismissing the action. We need not reach the other issues
presented by the parties to this appeal.1
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
1
As an independent basis for abstention, the defendants ask the court to apply the
Brillhart/Wilton Abstention doctrine. The defendants did not raise this theory in the district court
and we decline to consider it. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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