United States v. Jesucristo Lopez , 479 F. App'x 217 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________               FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-11508
    JUNE 14, 2012
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________            CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00158-KD-N-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JESUCRISTO LOPEZ,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                            Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (June 14, 2012)
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Jesucristo Lopez appeals his 87-month sentence of imprisonment,
    imposed after he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
    with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 846
    and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), and one count of attempting to smuggle weapons
    from the United States, in violation of 
    22 U.S.C. § 2778
     and 
    18 U.S.C. § 554
    (a).
    On appeal, Lopez argues that his sentence appeal waiver was not knowing and
    voluntary, and that the district court erred in applying a two-level guideline
    sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a dangerous
    weapon. We have already resolved the waiver issue by denying the government’s
    motion to dismiss on that ground. Therefore, this opinion only addresses the
    sentencing issue.
    We review a district court’s findings of fact under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for clear
    error, and its application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo.
    United States v. Pham, 
    463 F.3d 1239
    , 1245 (11th Cir. 2006). However, it is “not
    necessary to decide guidelines issues or remand cases for new sentence
    proceedings where the guidelines error, if any, did not affect the sentence.”
    United States v. Keene, 
    470 F.3d 1347
    , 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). To hold that an alleged guideline error was harmless, we consider
    whether: (1) the district court would have reached the same result if it had decided
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    the guideline issue the other way; and (2) the sentence imposed was reasonable
    under the factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), even if the guideline issue had been
    resolved in the defendant’s favor. 
    Id.
    Under § 2D1.1(b)(1), a defendant is subject to a two-level enhancement “[i]f
    a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary to this section provides as follows: “The
    enhancement for weapon possession in subsection (b)(1) reflects the increased
    danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. The enhancement
    should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that
    the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id. § 2D1.1 comment. (n.3(A)).
    Possession can be shown by demonstrating the defendant actually possessed the
    firearm or that he constructively possessed it. United States v. Villarreal, 
    613 F.3d 1344
    , 1359 (11th Cir. 2010). Constructive possession means that the defendant
    had “ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or control over the
    premises in which the object is concealed.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    As to the reasonableness of the sentence, the district court must impose a
    sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes”
    listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
    promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter
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    criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal
    conduct. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court
    must also consider, among other factors, the nature and circumstances of the
    offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences
    available, the applicable guideline range, and the pertinent policy statements of the
    Sentencing Commission. See generally 
    id.
     § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
    “The review for substantive unreasonableness involves examining the
    totality of the circumstances, including an inquiry into whether the statutory
    factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez,
    
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). The “weight to be accorded any given
    § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district
    court.” United States v. Williams, 
    526 F.3d 1312
    , 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). We will not reverse unless “left with the definite and
    firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
    weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
    of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey,
    
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
    omitted), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 1813
     (2011).
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    We conclude from the record that any error committed by the district court
    in imposing a two-level guideline enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) was harmless
    under the circumstances. The record demonstrates that the district court would
    have imposed the same 87-month total sentence of imprisonment even if the
    guideline issue had been resolved in Lopez’s favor, and his sentence would have
    been reasonable if his advisory guideline range had been calculated absent the
    enhancement. See Keene, 
    470 F.3d at 1349
    . Accordingly, we affirm Lopez’s
    sentence.
    AFFIRMED.
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