Alan Boyd Curtis v. USA , 479 F. App'x 255 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-14255 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 25, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 4:09-cv-00076-SPM-WCS
ALAN BOYD CURTIS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
JAMES ARTHUR HELLICKSON,
Assistant State Prosecutor,
RENE MARI BAVER,
Assistant State Prosecutor,
JOSEPH ANTHONY BULONE,
Alleged Judge,
EDWARD JUDY,
Detective PSCO, et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
UNITED STATES EMBASSY, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
(June 25, 2012)
Before HULL, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alan Boyd Curtis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Curtis’s
complaint arises out of criminal convictions and sentences that originally violated
the terms of an extradition agreement between the United States and Spain.
The district court dismissed Curtis’s complaint, but this court vacated and
remanded for further proceedings concerning Curtis’s sentences and the
extradition agreement. Curtis v. United States, 376 F. App’x 902 (11th Cir. 2010).
Curtis then filed an amended complaint against the United States, Pinellas County,
Florida, and the individual defendants. In this complaint, Curtis alleged fraud in
the inducement and breach of contract in connection with his extradition from
Spain; breach of the covenant of good faith; conspiracy; RICO violations arising
from the actions of two private defendants; cruel and unusual punishment in
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connection with the conditions of his imprisonment; and false imprisonment
arising from his seizure in France. The magistrate judge recommended that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). First, the magistrate judge found that because Curtis had been
resentenced to determinate terms, there was no violation of the extradition
agreement and thus Curtis’s claims based on the alleged violation were moot. The
magistrate judge then found that success on the remainder of Curtis’s claims
would necessarily invalidate Curtis’s convictions. Accordingly, such claims were
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Moreover, the magistrate
judge concluded that the individual judges and state prosecutors were immune
from suit. Finally, with respect to the claims challenging the conditions of
confinement, the magistrate judge found that the proper way to raise such claims
was in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the appropriate venue.
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report,1 over Curtis’s
objections to the court’s jurisdiction, and dismissed the complaint under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Curtis now appeals.
On appeal, Curtis argues that his complaint was improperly dismissed,
service of process was not given, relief may still be granted for fraudulent
1
This was the magistrate judge’s second report and recommendation.
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inducement, and dismissing the case for mootness would allow the government to
benefit from its wrongdoings. He also contends that immunity is improper
because the defendants’ actions were taken in bad faith, the defendants engaged in
official misconduct, and that our prior holding in this case on his first appeal bars
the application of Heck2 to his claims. Additionally, his extradition and the
connected criminal cases suffered from numerous substantive issues and
jurisdictional defects. Finally, the defendants engaged in a conspiracy that
constituted state action and resulted in a § 1983 violation.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that an in forma pauperis action
or appeal shall be dismissed at any time if the court determines that it fails to state
a claim for which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A district
court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo, viewing the allegations in the complaint
as true. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). “Pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys
and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
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“Dismissal of a moot case is required because mootness is jurisdictional.”
Sierra Club v. U.S. E.P.A., 315 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2002). “A case is moot
if no case or controversy exists for us to resolve: when the issues presented are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Bekier
v. Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051, 1054 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In considering whether a case is moot, we “look at the events at the present time, not
at the time the complaint was filed or when the federal order on review was issued.”
Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 2001).
Under Heck, a prisoner may not bring a damages claim challenging the
constitutionality of officials’ actions if a judgment in his favor “would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” unless he shows that his
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 487. “[E]ven
when the plaintiff does not seek such damages, his suit may be barred if, for
example, he must negate an element of the offense of which he has been convicted
in order to prevail.” Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)
(internal citation and punctuation marks omitted).
In this case, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Curtis’s
amended complaint. First, Curtis has abandoned his claims for RICO violations,
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cruel and unusual punishment, and false imprisonment by failing to raise them in
his appellate brief. Irwin v. Hawk, 40 F.3d 347, 347 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994).
Curtis’s claims premised on the breach of the extradition agreement were
mooted by the resentencing. Curtis was resentenced to consecutive terms of 30
years, 25 years, and 25 years. Thus, his sentence no longer violates the extradition
agreement and any breach has been cured. Although Curtis argues that remedies
are still available, remedies in contract law are intended to put the non-breaching
party in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 344 cmt. a. But when Curtis
was resentenced in 2010, the potential breach was eliminated before it was fully
effective, and Curtis did not suffer any cognizable harm. Accordingly, there is no
continuing case or controversy and Curtis’s claim of breach is now moot. See
Bekier, 248 F.3d at 1054.
Curtis’s remaining claims allege that the criminal sentences were invalid
because there was a lack of jurisdiction, the extradition was improper, and the
defendants conspired to unlawfully extradite, convict, and sentence him. Each of
these arguments “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence,” and his convictions and sentences have not been invalidated. Heck,
512 U.S. at 487. As a result, Curtis’s remaining claims are Heck-barred. Curtis
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contends that res judicata bars the application of Heck, but we expressly held that
any claims that would have gone directly to the validity of Curtis’s sentence would
be barred by Heck. Curtis, 376 F. App’x at 904 n.2. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s dismissal of Curtis’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
AFFIRMED.
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