Pamela Beasterfeld v. Commissioner of Social Security , 480 F. App'x 514 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    FILED
    No. 11-14161       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    Non-Argument Calendar    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JUNE 21, 2012
    ________________________
    JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00979-JSM-EAJ
    PAMELA BEASTERFELD,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                              Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                            Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 21, 2012)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Pamela Beasterfeld appeals the district court’s order affirming the Social
    Security Administration’s denial of her application for a period of disability,
    disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. She argues that
    the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions were not supported by substantial
    evidence because the ALJ did not include all of her limitations in the hypothetical
    posed to the vocational expert.
    I.
    We review a Social Security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
    decision is “supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal
    standards.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178 (11th Cir.
    2011) (quotation marks omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence, decide facts
    anew, or make credibility findings. See id. “Substantial evidence is such relevant
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
    Falge v. Apfel, 
    150 F.3d 1320
    , 1322 (11th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks omitted).
    An individual who files an application for Social Security benefits must
    establish that she is disabled using a five-step, “sequential” evaluation process.
    See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.912; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 
    357 F.3d 1232
    ,
    1237–39 (11th Cir. 2009). At step five, the only step at issue in this appeal, the
    2
    SSA bears the burden to show that a significant number of jobs exist in the
    national economy that the claimant could perform given the claimant’s residual
    functioning capacity, age, education, and work experience. See id. at 1239. An
    ALJ may make this determination either by applying the Medical Vocational
    Guidelines or by obtaining the testimony of a vocational expert. Id. at 1239–40.
    “[I]n order for a [vocational expert’s] testimony to constitute substantial
    evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question to the vocational expert
    which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.” See id. at 1240 n.7 (quotation
    marks omitted). “The hypothetical need only include the claimant’s impairments,
    not each and every symptom of the claimant.” Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
    
    496 F.3d 1253
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    II.
    In this case, the ALJ asked the vocational expert a hypothetical that
    included the claimant’s impairments. Based on that hypothetical the vocational
    expert concluded that, although Beasterfield would not be able to perform any of
    her past occupations, there was still a significant number of jobs in the national
    economy that she could do. The ALJ then asked the vocational expert how his
    conclusion would change if it were necessary for Beasterfield to be able to sit or
    stand at will, and the vocational expert said that it could reduce the number of
    3
    available jobs by one-third. Based in part on the vocational expert’s responses, the
    ALJ concluded that Beasterfield was not disabled and not entitled to a period of
    disability, disability insurance benefits, or supplemental security income.
    Beasterfield contends that the ALJ’s hypothetical was defective because it
    did not include the limitation that she could not walk for one block over rough or
    uneven surfaces. To the contrary, the inclusion of a sit/stand option in the
    hypothetical encompassed the restriction contained in that limitation. If
    Beasterfeld would be able to sit or stand at will, she would necessarily be able to
    stop and rest when the distance or texture of the ground made walking too
    difficult.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-14161

Citation Numbers: 480 F. App'x 514

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/21/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024