Steven Phophet, Carmen Elena Prophet v. International Lifestyles, Inc. ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-12046
NOVEMBER 18, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cv-60152-UU
STEVEN PROPHET,
CARMEN ELENA PROPHET,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants,
CARMEN ALEXANDRA PROPHET, et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs,
versus
INTERNATIONAL LIFESTYLES, INC.,
VILLAGE RESORT, LTD.,
GREAT RESORTS, LTD.,
BLOODY BAY HOTEL DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees,
SUPERCLUBS PROPERTIES, LTD., et al.,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 18, 2011)
Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dr. Steven Prophet and his wife, Carmen Elena Prophet, appeal the district
court’s judgment granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens. The Prophets contend that the district court applied an incorrect legal
standard by failing to afford them the strong presumption that their chosen forum
was sufficiently convenient. They also appeal the district court’s judgment
dismissing their claims against one of the defendants based on lack of personal
jurisdiction. The Prophets concede that the record as it stands is insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over that defendant, but they argue that the district
court should have given them additional time to conduct jurisdictional discovery.
I.
The Prophets are residents of Pennsylvania. After viewing a “SuperClubs”
website that advertised various hotels, they chose to vacation at the Grand Lido
Negril Resort and Spa in Jamaica. During their visit Dr. Prophet was injured
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while exercising in the fitness center at the Grand Lido Negril. He was preparing
to lift a barbell on the “power rack,” a device that consists of stanchions on which
a barbell is positioned above the weightlifter’s head. He asserts that instead of
pins or angled hooks, which are generally used to hold the barbell in place, the
barbell precariously rested on flat metal pegs. It slid off the pegs, crushing his
face, jaw, and skull.
A local physician was called, and after examining Dr. Prophet he
determined that the injured man would need medical care at a place that was better
equipped than any facility in Negril. No ambulance was available, so the Prophets
took a taxi for the two-and-a-half hour ride to Montego Bay. Based on his medical
training, Dr. Prophet believed that his injuries were very serious, and he feared
that he might die from them before he could get the necessary medical care. After
receiving some treatment in Montego Bay, an “air ambulance” transported Dr.
Prophet to Miami. He later underwent surgery and other medical procedures in
the United States.
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the
Prophets filed a lawsuit against International Lifestyles, Inc., a corporation
organized under Delaware law with its principal place of business in Hollywood,
Florida. Lifestyles advertises hotel properties, including the Grand Lido Negril,
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on the SuperClub website that the Prophets viewed when selecting their
accommodations. The other defendants named in the Prophets’ lawsuit are:
Village Resorts, Ltd.; Great Resorts, Ltd.; and Bloody Bay Hotel Development
Corp., all of which are corporations organized under Jamaican law with their
principal places of business in Kingston, Jamaica.1 Great Resorts is a subsidiary
of Village Resorts, and Bloody Bay owns the Grand Lido Negril.
The Prophets claimed, among other things, that the defendants “negligently
installed and/or maintained fitness equipment at the Grand Lido Negril and/or
failed to inform [Dr. Prophet] about the lack of emergency care in the Negril resort
area and other terms of his stay that were material to his decision to travel to
Jamaica and stay as their guest.” The Prophets assert at this point in the
proceedings that a “large part” of their claims relate to the defendants’ failure “to
warn [Dr. Prophet] before he visited the Grand Lido Negril about the complete
lack of adequate medical facilities in the resort area in the event he was seriously
injured.”
The defendants moved to dismiss the Prophets’ third amended complaint
based on forum non conveniens. Bloody Bay also separately moved to dismiss
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The Prophets voluntarily dismissed four other defendants: Chi Hsin Impex, Inc., Body
Solid, Ivanko Barbell, and First Fitness. This opinion refers to the remaining defendants
collectively as “the defendants” unless context requires otherwise.
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based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted both of those
motions, and the Prophets appealed.
II.
We will reverse a district court’s dismissal based on forum non conveniens
only if it constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Wilson v. Island Seas Invs., Ltd.,
590 F.3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009). “‘A district court by definition abuses its
discretion when it makes an error of law.’” United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d
1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100,
116 S.Ct. 2035, 2047 (1996)).
We have explained that dismissal of a complaint based on forum non
conveniens is appropriate where:
1. the trial court finds that an adequate alternate forum exists which
possesses jurisdiction over the whole case, including all of the
parties;
2. the trial court finds that all relevant factors of private interest favor
the alternate forum, weighing in the balance a strong presumption
against disturbing plaintiffs’ initial forum choice;
3. if the balance of private interests is at or near equipoise, the court
further finds that factors of public interest tip the balance in favor of
trial in the alternate forum; and
4. the trial judge ensures that plaintiffs can reinstate their suit in the
alternate forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.
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Wilson, 590 F.3d at 1269 (quoting Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 578
F.3d 1283, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2009)).
In the present case the district court considered as a threshold issue what it
described as the Prophets’ “argument” that their choice of forum should be given
“great deference.” In addressing that issue, the district court emphasized that
dismissal based on forum non conveniens is not automatically barred when the
plaintiffs are American citizens who choose to file their complaint in a court in the
United States. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 256 n.23, 102 S.Ct.
252, 266 n.23 (1981) (“Citizens or residents deserve somewhat more deference
than foreign plaintiffs, but dismissal should not be automatically barred when a
plaintiff has filed suit in his home forum.”). In the Piper case, however, the
Supreme Court held that “[t]he District Court properly decided that the
presumption in favor of the [plaintiffs’] forum choice applied with less than
maximum force because the real parties in interest are foreign.” Id. at 261, 102
S.Ct. at 268. No one has alleged that the real parties in interest in this case are
foreign.
The district court noted that the Prophets relied heavily on this Court’s
decision in SME Racks, Inc. v. Sistemas Mecanicos Para Electronica, S.A., 382
F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 2004), which reversed the dismissal of a complaint based on
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forum non conveniens. We held in SME Racks that the district court had erred by
failing to consider “the strong presumption in favor of the domestic plaintiffs’
choice of forum.” Id. at 1103. The district court rejected the Prophets’ reliance on
SME Racks, concluding that the facts of that case were distinguishable because
those plaintiffs were suing a Spanish company for breach of contract and torts that
allegedly occurred in the United States. The district court observed that, by
contrast, the Prophets’ “injury occurred outside of the United States, and the
relevant premises and facilities and witnesses with first hand knowledge
concerning the same are located outside of the United States.”
After concluding that SME Racks was distinguishable on its facts, the court
concluded that the “holding” of an unpublished district court decision, Miyoung
Son v. Kerzner Int’l Resorts, Inc., No. 07-61171, 2008 WL 4186979 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 5, 2008), was “more applicable.” That decision upheld the enforceability of
a forum selection clause in an agreement signed during check-in at a hotel in the
Bahamas. Id. at *7. Only in the alternative did the court reach the forum non
conveniens issue. Id. It held that private interest factors weighed in favor of the
defendants. Id. at *9–10. On the public interest factors, it reasoned:
This case is distinguishable from SME Racks, because the “harm” did
not occur in Florida (or even in the U.S.). Instead, Plaintiffs are suing
(with one exception) Bahamian companies and individuals for
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conduct which occurred entirely within the Bahamas. Unlike SME
Racks, the presumption in favor of Plaintiffs’ choice of forum here is
not as strong because of the attenuated connection of this forum with
the events giving rise to the claims.
Id. at *10. The district court in the present case held that “in keeping with the
holdings of Piper and Miyoung, the Court will not afford Plaintiffs’ choice of
forum great deference.”
III.
This Court and the district court are bound by precedent requiring that “[a]
plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to deference, and there is a presumption in
favor of a plaintiff’s choice of forum, particularly where the plaintiffs are citizens
of the United States.” Wilson, 590 F.3d at 1269. That deference and that
presumption do not dissolve just because the plaintiff’s injury occurs outside of
the United States. See id. at 1266–67. We have “long mandated that district
courts require positive evidence of unusually extreme circumstances, and should
be thoroughly convinced that material injustice is manifest before exercising any
such discretion as may exist to deny a United States citizen access to the courts of
this country.” Id. at 1270 (quoting SME Racks, 382 F.3d at 1101 (quoting La
Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1308 n.7 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Burt v. Isthmus Dev. Co., 218 F.2d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 1955))) (quotation marks
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omitted)).
The defendants argue that the district court did not misapply that standard
and that in any event they have shown the unusually extreme circumstances and
the manifest material injustice necessary to meet the requirements for dismissal
based on forum non conveniens. We disagree.
Although it is true that denial of a motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens is not automatic simply because the plaintiffs are American citizens,
see Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 256 n.23, 102 S.Ct. at 266 n.23, it is also true that
the “presumption in favor of the plaintiffs’ initial forum choice in balancing the
private interests is at its strongest when the plaintiffs are citizens, residents, or
corporations of this country.” Wilson, 590 F.3d at 1270 (quotation marks
omitted). The district court must apply that strong presumption when weighing
the private interests, must require the defendants to present “positive evidence of
unusually extreme circumstances,” and must be “thoroughly convinced that
material injustice is manifest” to reach the conclusion the defendants’ convenience
overrides the plaintiffs’ choice of forum. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Because the district court did not apply that standard in this case, we reverse
and remand for that court to exercise its discretion by weighing the private and
public interest factors under the correct standard. See Advanced Estimating Sys.,
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Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that because the
abuse of discretion standard allows the district court a range of choice, the case
was being remanded to give that court the first opportunity to decide the issue
under the correct legal standard); see also Gray v. Bostic, 625 F.3d 692, 693 (11th
Cir. 2010) (Carnes, J., joined by Black, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en
banc) (“[I]f a district court has abused its discretion, the court of appeals should
not decide how to exercise the district court’s discretion; instead, it should remand
the matter so that the district court can exercise its discretion free from the error of
law.”); Collins v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 681 F.2d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir.
1982) (same).
IV.
The Prophets also challenge the district court’s decision to grant Bloody
Bay’s motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. They concede that
personal jurisdiction over Bloody Bay has not been established on the record as it
now stands, but they argue that the district court should have granted them more
time for jurisdictional discovery. “Discovery matters are committed to the
discretion of the district court; therefore, we review the district court’s decision to
terminate discovery under an abuse of discretion standard.” Lee v. Etowah Cnty.
Bd. of Educ., 963 F.2d 1416, 1420 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Bloody Bay presented evidence that it was incorporated for the sole purpose
of developing the land where the Grand Lido Negril resort was built and that it had
not engaged in any activity in Florida. The district court pointed out that the
Prophets failed to rebut that evidence even though they were on notice that Bloody
Bay contested personal jurisdiction and they had ample time to conduct
jurisdictional discovery. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying
the Prophets additional time for jurisdictional discovery. See Lee, 963 F.2d at
1420 (“The plaintiffs themselves are primarily responsible for any prejudice they
may have suffered from inadequate discovery.”).
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment
dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint based on forum non conveniens, and we
affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the claims against Bloody Bay
based on lack of personal jurisdiction. We remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED and REMANDED in part.
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