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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-11934
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cr-20836-PCH-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DERRICK N. MILLER,
Defendant – Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 26, 2019)
Before ROSENBAUM and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges, and PAULEY,* District
Judge.
*
Honorable William H. Pauley, III, United States District Judge, Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
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PER CURIAM:
Derrick Miller, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of his pro se motion for
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. In June 2017, a jury convicted
Miller of various drug trafficking and firearm offenses related to a series of drug
transactions between December 2, 2015 and January 10, 2016 out of
5645 N.W.
5th Avenue in Miami, Florida (the “residence”). In December 2017, several
months after trial, Wilber Davis signed an affidavit urging that Miller should not
be held responsible for anything found at or inside the residence. Davis’s affidavit
stated that when he was arrested in front of the residence on unrelated charges back
in November 2015, he asked Miller, who was present at the time of the arrest, to
house-sit until he returned, and that the bond enforcement agents that arrested him
gave Miller the keys to the residence for that purpose. Davis claimed that he had
been house-sitting for Lucien Terry, the owner of the residence, while Terry was
away. The affidavit also stated that while Davis was in a Florida state prison,
“agents came to visit [him] and questioned [him] about the 5645 residence.”
On appeal, Miller argues that Davis’s affidavit constituted newly discovered
evidence because Davis could not be located prior to trial, and because it contained
“clear and convincing support” for Miller’s defense at trial that he was merely
house-sitting at the residence when the police recovered the drugs and firearms.
Miller also argues that the government’s failure to disclose this evidence violated
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Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83,
83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and Giglio v. United
States,
405 U.S. 150,
92 S. Ct. 763 (1972).
The District Court denied his motion for a new trial on two grounds. First,
by filing his motion pro se, Miller violated Southern District of Florida Local Rule
11.1(d)(4). Because Miller was already represented by an attorney, Local Rule
11.1(d)(4) required him to submit any motions through that attorney. Therefore,
the District Court concluded that it should strike his motion without reaching the
merits. Alternatively, even if it were required to reach the merits of his motion for
new trial, the District Court found that the affidavit was not “newly discovered,”
and so it would have denied the motion on the merits anyway. We consider each
holding in turn.
I.
We review a district court’s application of its local rules for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. McLean,
802 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2015). “The
district court’s interpretation of its own rules is entitled to great deference, and the
challenging party bears the burden of showing that the district court made a clear
error of judgment.”
Id. (citing Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc.,
588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th
Cir. 2009). The court abuses its discretion when it applies an improper legal
standard, applies the law in an incorrect or unreasonable way, follows improper
procedures when making a decision, or makes findings of fact that are clearly
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erroneous.
Id. (quoting Citizens for Police Accountability Political Comm. v.
Browning,
572 F.3d 1213, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Local Rule 11.1(d)(4) provides:
Whenever a party has appeared by attorney, the party cannot thereafter
appear or act on the party’s own behalf in the action or proceeding, or
take any step therein, unless an order of substitution shall first have
been made by the Court, after notice to the attorney of such party, and
to the opposite party; provided, that the Court may in its discretion hear
a party in open court, notwithstanding the fact that the party has
appeared or is represented by an attorney.
S.D. Fla. L.R. 11.1(d)(4). Miller argues that at trial the District Court
allowed him to proceed as “co-counsel,” and so filing this motion on his
own behalf did not run afoul of Local Rule 11.1(d)(4). At trial, the District
Court briefly permitted Miller to examine one witness during his case-in-
chief, but ultimately revoked that privilege and handed the responsibility
back to Miller’s attorney. Although Local Rule 11.1(d)(4) allows the
District Court to hear a party in open court, even though he is already
represented by an attorney, it clearly prohibits a party from otherwise
“appear[ing] or act[ing] on the party’s own behalf.” S.D. Fla. L.R.
11.1(d)(4). The District Court, in its discretion, allowed Miller to be heard
in open court for the limited purpose of examining a single witness;
whatever authority it granted to Miller to proceed as “co-counsel” during his
trial for this limited purpose, it did not also authorize Miller to file motions
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on his own behalf. Permitting Miller to participate in his trial in this way
was therefore not contrary to the rule and did not give Miller permission to
file this motion on his own. The District Court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that Miller’s violation of Local Rule 11.1(d)(4),
alone, was a sufficient reason to deny his motion for new trial.
II.
Miller also argues that the District Court erred in denying his motion for a
new trial on the merits. We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence, including claims that the evidence was
withheld in violation of Brady or Giglio, for an abuse of discretion. United States
v. Vallejo,
297 F.3d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir. 2002).1 A district court may grant a new
trial based on newly discovered evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 33(b) only if the defendant shows (1) the evidence was discovered after
trial; (2) the failure to discover the evidence was not due to a lack of due diligence;
1
Although Miller did not cite Brady or Giglio as grounds for a new trial in his motion
before the District Court, he did argue that “the newly discovered evidence . . . shows that lead
Case Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Justin Spence, lied during Defendant’s
trial,” and that the facts contained in the affidavit were “not disclosed to the Defendant” and in
fact “deliberately concealed” by the government. It is well-settled that we must construe pro se
filings liberally. Winthrop-Redin v. United States,
767 F.3d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir. 2014); see
also Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520,
92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972) (noting that pro se
complaints should be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers).
We therefore will construe Miller’s arguments below that the government deliberately concealed
evidence and that a government witness committed perjury at trial as raising a Brady and Giglio
violation, respectively, which the District Court rejected.
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(3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is
material; and (5) the evidence is such that a new trial probably would produce a
different result. United States v. Jernigan,
341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)
(quoting United States v. Ramos,
179 F.3d 1333, 1336 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Motions for a new trial are highly disfavored, and district courts should use great
caution in granting them.
Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia,
13 F.3d 1464, 1472
(11th Cir. 1994)).
The affidavit that Miller claims is “newly discovered” describes the
circumstances of Davis’s arrest, for which Miller was present. Because he
witnessed the events described in the affidavit, Miller certainly had knowledge of
the content of Davis’s affidavit well before trial. In fact, Miller admits that he
“was aware of the content of the information Wilbur Davis provided in his
affidavit.” As such, Davis’s affidavit was not new evidence discovered after trial.
Miller argues that it is not the content of the affidavit, but Davis’s
willingness to testify, that was “newly discovered,” since Davis could not be
located before trial. But this argument is foreclosed by our precedent. In United
States v. DiBernardo,
880 F.2d 1216, 1224–25 (11th Cir. 1989), and United States
v. Metz,
652 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981),2 we rejected the argument that
2
In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit, including Unit A
panel decisions of that circuit, handed down before October 1, 1981.
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“newly available” evidence is synonymous with “newly discovered” evidence for
purposes of a Rule 33 motion for new trial. In Metz, the defendant argued that his
co-defendant’s exculpatory affidavit and post-conviction willingness to testify
constituted newly discovered evidence warranting a new
trial. 652 F.2d at 479.
We stated that “[e]ven though [his co-defendant] may have been unavailable to
testify at their joint trial because he invoked the Fifth Amendment, Metz himself
was not precluded from testifying in his own behalf” to the exculpatory facts, as he
had knowledge of the facts and assertions contained in the affidavit before trial.
Id. at 480. We affirmed that decision in DiBernardo when we held that newly
available, exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant did not constitute newly
discovered evidence because the defendant was well aware of the proposed
testimony before
trial. 880 F.2d at 1224.
It follows from Metz and DiBernardo that Davis’s affidavit does not
constitute “newly discovered” evidence warranting a new trial because, even if
Davis was not available to testify at trial, Miller was fully aware of the contents of
Davis’s affidavit and potential testimony before trial, and could have testified to
the exculpatory facts himself. Therefore, the District Court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Miller’s motion for a new trial on the merits.
Miller’s Brady claim fails for the same reason: he already possessed the
information contained in the affidavit before trial. To establish a Brady violation, a
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defendant must show (1) that the government possessed evidence favorable to the
defendant, including impeachment evidence; (2) that the defendant did not possess
the evidence and could not have obtained it with any reasonable diligence; (3) that
the government suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence
been disclosed to the defendant, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different. United States v. Wenxia Man,
891 F.3d 1253, 1276
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Vallejo, 297 F.3d at 1164); United States v. Hansen,
262
F.3d 1217, 1234 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Meros,
866 F.2d 1304,
1308 (11th Cir.1989)). Because we find that Miller already possessed the
information contained in the affidavit before trial, his Brady claim must also fail.
The government possessed no exculpatory evidence that was not also available to
Miller before trial. Therefore, there was no Brady violation.
Nor did the government violate Giglio. To establish a Giglio violation, a
defendant must show that the prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony or
failed to correct such testimony, and that the perjured testimony was material.
United States v. Stein,
846 F.3d 1135, 1147 (11th Cir. 2017). Miller claims that
Davis’s affidavit, which states that “agents” came to question him while he was in
prison, shows that the FBI agent’s testimony at trial that he did not investigate
Davis was perjured. That some unnamed “agents” questioned Davis while he was
in prison does not show that this particular agent questioned or investigated Davis
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or was even aware that any unnamed “agent” questioned Davis. Further, Davis’s
affidavit does not demonstrate in any way that the prosecutor knew of this alleged
questioning.
Stein, 846 F.3d at 1147.
Miller also points to a latent fingerprint report prepared by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), showing that the DEA examined Davis’s
fingerprints, in support of his claim that the FBI agent at trial falsely denied having
investigated Davis. 3 But the report alone does not show that the FBI agent or any
other member of law enforcement questioned or otherwise investigated Davis,
contrary to the agent’s testimony at trial. The report shows only that the DEA
examined Davis’s fingerprints as part of its own investigation. Because Miller
cannot show that the government knowingly used perjured testimony, there is no
Giglio violation.
Accordingly, the District Court’s order denying Miller’s motion for a new
trial is
AFFIRMED.
3
The government provided the fingerprint report to Miller and his attorney in discovery.
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