United States v. Joseph L. Autry, Jr. ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-13619
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cr-00022-BAE-GRS-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                              Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    JOSEPH L. AUTRY, JR.,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                            Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (July 11, 2012)
    Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Joseph Autry appeals his twenty-seven-month sentence, imposed after he
    pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    . This
    sentence was at the bottom of the applicable guideline imprisonment range of
    twenty-seven to thirty-three months. On appeal, Autry argues that his sentence
    was substantively unreasonable in light of the mitigation factors he presented at
    sentencing. Autry asserts that since any sentence of incarceration would have a
    significant impact on his family, his community, and the victims, only a downward
    variance to a sentence of probation would have been reasonable.1
    We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential
    abuse-of-discretion standard of review. United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    ,
    1188-89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We may “set aside a sentence only if we
    determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing judge, that
    the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.” 
    Id. at 1191
    . A sentence may only be
    vacated if we are left with a “definite and firm conviction that the district court
    committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
    1
    We do not have “jurisdiction to consider a defendant’s appeal of a discretionary
    decision of the district court to not apply a downward departure, so long as the district court did
    not incorrectly believe that it lacked the authority to apply a departure.” United States v.
    Winingear, 
    422 F.3d 1241
    , 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The district court here
    stated that the guidelines were “advisory only” and that it was “not bound to follow them.” Thus,
    to the extent that Autry argues that the district court erred by not granting a downward departure,
    we lack jurisdiction to consider the issue.
    2
    at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
    facts of the case.” United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1191 (11th Cir. 2008).
    The district court is required to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
    greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
    respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
    conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2). The district court must also consider the nature and
    circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
    kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy
    statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, and the need to provide
    restitution to victims. 
    Id.
     § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(5), (7).
    The party challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing that the
    sentence was unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United
    States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th Cir. 2005). Although we do not
    automatically presume a sentence falling within the guidelines range to be
    reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to be reasonable. 
    Id.
    We conclude that Autry’s sentence was substantively reasonable. His
    actions—including creating fictitious account statements and using clients’
    3
    investments to pay his own bills and debts—caused a loss of over $150,000 to the
    victims. By pleading guilty to just one of the fifteen charges and having the others
    dismissed, Autry had already received a substantial reduction in his possible
    sentence. The twenty-seven-month sentence was imposed at the lowest end of the
    guideline range. The sentence also promotes respect for the law and helps deter
    others from committing similar crimes. The district court considered Autry’s
    mitigation arguments and the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, then imposed a sentence
    not greater than necessary under the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly,
    we affirm the sentence as reasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-13619

Judges: Hull, Martin, Anderson

Filed Date: 7/11/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024