State National Insurance Company v. Kevin White , 482 F. App'x 434 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •            Case: 11-15905   Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 1 of 13
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-15905
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00894-JDW-TBM
    STATE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    STAR INSURANCE CO.,
    Plaintiffs-Counter
    Defendants-Appellants,
    versus
    KEVIN WHITE,
    Defendant-Counter
    Claimant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 12, 2012)
    Before HULL, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    Case: 11-15905     Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 2 of 13
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff-Appellant State National Insurance Company (“State National”)
    appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee
    David White. A former administrative aide successfully sued Defendant White, a
    Hillsborough County Commissioner, for sexual harassment. Plaintiff State
    National filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to
    reimburse White for his defense costs under its insurance policy. The district
    court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, concluded that State
    National had a duty under the policy to reimburse White for his defense costs.
    After review, we affirm.
    I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    We review first the terms of the relevant policy and then the underlying
    litigation that gave rise to White’s claims for reimbursement of defense costs from
    State National.
    A.    The CGL Policy
    Plaintiff State National issued a commercial general liability (“CGL”)
    insurance policy to Hillsborough County, as the “named insured,” and its
    employees, including Defendant White, as “insureds.” The CGL policy contained
    an endorsement that provided public officials and employees liability insurance
    2
    Case: 11-15905     Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 3 of 13
    (“POELI”). Under the POELI endorsement, State National agreed to “pay those
    sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of a
    ‘wrongful act’ to which this insurance applies.” (Emphasis added.) The POELI
    endorsement also stated that State National had a “duty to defend any ‘suit’
    seeking those damages.” (Emphasis added.)
    The POELI endorsement, however, excluded, among other things, any
    claim: (1) “arising out of bodily injury, sickness, disease, death, or mental
    anguish”; and (2) “arising from the willful violation of any statute, ordinance or
    regulation.” (Emphasis added.)
    The CGL policy also contained a self-insured retention (“SIR”)
    endorsement, which provided that the “named insured” (Hillsborough County)
    would retain the sum of $350,000 as self-insured, “per occurrence and as respects
    combined insured damages and insured allocated costs and expenses of
    investigation, defense, negotiation and settlement applicable to such damages.”
    And the SIR endorsement also provided that State National agreed to pay “its
    otherwise applicable limit of liability” only if “any combined insured damages and
    insured allocated costs and expenses . . . exceed, per occurrence,” the SIR amount.
    B.    Underlying Ogden Litigation
    Alyssa Ogden, White’s former aide, sued White and Hillsborough County
    3
    Case: 11-15905      Date Filed: 07/12/2012     Page: 4 of 13
    alleging constitutional claims of gender discrimination, sexual harassment and
    retaliation based on the Equal Protection Clause and brought under 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
     and 1988 against both defendants. Ogden’s complaint also alleged state
    law claims of sexual harassment and retaliation, under the Florida Civil Rights Act
    (“FCRA”), against only Hillsborough County.1 For each count, Ogden’s
    complaint sought damages, including lost wages, benefits and other past and
    future compensation, reinstatement, compensatory and punitive damages,
    attorney’s fees and costs and other relief appropriate under federal or Florida law.
    The jury returned a verdict in Ogden’s favor, finding that she was subjected
    to unwanted sexual advances and sexual harassment and that she was terminated
    as part of the sexual harassment or because she rejected unwelcome sexual
    advances. The jury awarded Ogden a total of $75,000 in compensatory damages,
    representing $15,000 for medical expenses and $60,000 for mental anguish. The
    jury did not award any lost wages or benefits. The trial court’s judgment ordered
    that Ogden recover $75,000 from Hillsborough County and White. Ogden then
    sought over $200,000 in attorney’s fees. Hillsborough County settled with Ogden
    for $278,000, representing $75,000 to satisfy the judgment against Hillsborough
    1
    At the summary judgment stage, Ogden withdrew her retaliation claims under § 1983
    and the FCRA and subsequently voluntarily dismissed her remaining FCRA claims before the
    case was submitted to the jury.
    4
    Case: 11-15905    Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 5 of 13
    County and $203,000 for Ogden’s attorney’s fees. The judgment against White
    remains in effect.
    During the Ogden litigation, White paid for his own defense, incurring
    $157,730.31 in legal fees and expenses. Hillsborough County incurred
    $114,713.35 in legal fees and $98,275.83 in trial costs and related expenses, for a
    total of $212,989.18. Hillsborough County’s total out-of-pocket was $490,989.18,
    which included the $203,000 settlement for Ogden’s attorney’s fees, the $75,000
    judgment and its own $212,989.23 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
    Ultimately, State National paid Hillsborough County $65,989.18 under the
    CGL policy. This $65,989.18 amount was Hillsborough County’s total costs
    ($490,713.35), less the $75,000 judgment and the $350,000 SIR. When White
    sought reimbursement for his legal fees, State National denied coverage and filed
    this declaratory judgment action.
    C.    Declaratory Judgment Action
    Plaintiff State National’s two-count complaint sought a declaration that: (1)
    the POELI endorsement excluded coverage for the claims asserted against White
    in the Ogden litigation (Count I); or (2) even if some claims were covered, State
    National had no duty to reimburse White under the SIR endorsement because the
    $350,000 SIR amount was not exceeded (Count II). White filed a counterclaim for
    5
    Case: 11-15905     Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 6 of 13
    breach of contract against State National, seeking reimbursement for his defense
    costs in the Ogden litigation.
    After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The
    parties did not dispute that White was an “insured” under the POELI endorsement
    and that his acts giving rise to Ogden’s claims fell within the POELI
    endorsement’s definition of a “wrongful act.” However, the parties disagreed as to
    whether Ogden’s claims fell within the POELI endorsement’s exclusions for (1)
    claims “arising out of bodily injury, sickness, disease, death or mental anguish” or
    (2) “arising from the willful violation of any statute, ordinance or regulation.” The
    parties also agreed that State National’s “duty to defend” under the POELI
    endorsement was modified by the SIR endorsement to become a “duty to
    reimburse” White’s defense costs if the SIR amount was satisfied. The parties
    disputed, however, whether White could use only damages and costs directly
    attributable to “covered” claims to satisfy the SIR amount.
    In its first summary judgment order, the district court granted White’s
    summary judgment motion and denied State National’s summary judgment motion
    as to Count I. The district court determined that, even if Ogden’s state-law FCRA
    claims were excluded by the POELI endorsement as “claims arising from the
    willful violation of a statute,” Ogden’s constitutional claims under the Equal
    6
    Case: 11-15905     Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 7 of 13
    Protection Clause, even though brought pursuant to § 1983, were not.
    The district court further found that not all of Ogden’s claims in her
    complaint were excluded by the POELI endorsement as “claims arising out of . . .
    mental anguish.” The district court concluded that State National’s duty to
    reimburse White for legal fees under the SIR endorsement depended upon the
    claims alleged in Ogden’s complaint, not on the outcome of the litigation.
    Although the jury awarded Ogden damages only for medical expenses ($15,000)
    and mental anguish ($60,000), Ogden’s complaint had alleged other claims that
    did not “arise out of” her mental anguish, but out of her termination (i.e., her
    “tangible employment action” sexual harassment and retaliation claims), and her
    complaint had sought other relief, including lost wages, reinstatement and
    attorney’s fees and costs. Therefore, some of Ogden’s federal § 1983 claims were
    covered by the POELI endorsement. As such, the district court concluded that,
    under Florida law, State National had a duty to reimburse White under the SIR
    endorsement if the SIR amount was exhausted.
    After supplemental briefing, the district court entered a second order
    granting summary judgment in favor of White on Count II and on White’s
    counterclaim. The district court determined that the SIR endorsement was
    7
    Case: 11-15905       Date Filed: 07/12/2012      Page: 8 of 13
    ambiguous as to what damages, costs and expenses—only those attributable to
    covered claims or also those attributable to non-covered claims—could be used to
    exhaust the $350,000 SIR amount. Construing the ambiguous SIR endorsement
    liberally in favor of the insured, as required by Florida law, the district court
    concluded that the entire $490,989.18 paid by Hillsborough County as a result of
    the Ogden litigation could be used to satisfy the SIR. Because the $350,000 SIR
    was satisfied by Hillsborough County’s payments, the district court determined
    that State National had a duty to reimburse White for his defense costs of
    $153,730.31. State National filed this appeal.2
    II. DISCUSSION
    A.     Coverage Under the POELI Endorsement
    On appeal, State National argues that Ogden’s § 1983 claims were excluded
    from coverage by the POELI endorsement’s exclusion for “willful violation of any
    statute.”3 We agree with the district court that Ogden’s federal gender
    2
    We review the grant of summary judgment, as well as the interpretation of an insurance
    contract, de novo. See James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 
    540 F.3d 1270
    , 1274
    (11th Cir. 2008). In this diversity case, Florida law governs as to the insurance policy. See
    Dempsey v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 
    717 F.2d 556
    , 559 (11th Cir. 1983).
    3
    On appeal, State National does not challenge the district court’s conclusions that: (1)
    some of Ogden’s claims for damages were not excluded by the mental anguish exclusion; (2)
    State National’s duty to reimburse under the SIR endorsement was determined by the allegations
    8
    Case: 11-15905        Date Filed: 07/12/2012      Page: 9 of 13
    discrimination and sexual harassment claims arose from violation of the U.S.
    Constitution and did not “arise from” a violation of a “statute.” Section 1983 is a
    remedial statute that “creates no substantive rights,” but merely provides a means
    to bring claims of constitutional violations, in this case the Equal Protection
    Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Barfield v. Brierton, 
    883 F.2d 923
    , 934 (11th
    Cir. 1989). The POELI endorsement unambiguously excluded only those claims
    arising from violations of statutes. Cf. Penzer v. Transportation Ins. Co., 
    545 F.3d 1303
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that phrase “arising out of a willful
    violation of a penal statute” in an exclusion “easily and logically can be read as
    limited to the statute giving rise to liability”). Under Florida law, insurance
    contracts are to be construed “in accordance with the plain language of the policies
    as bargained for by the parties.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 
    756 So.2d 29
    ,
    34 (Fla. 2000). If State National had wanted to exclude claims arising from
    constitutional violations, it could have easily done so. As drafted, the exclusion
    for statutory violations did not exclude Ogden’s equal protection claims brought
    pursuant to § 1983.
    in Ogden’s complaint and not by the jury’s verdict; and (3) State National’s duty to reimburse in
    excess of the SIR was triggered if any of the claims in Ogden’s complaint were covered under the
    POELI endorsement.
    9
    Case: 11-15905     Date Filed: 07/12/2012     Page: 10 of 13
    State National argues that because White’s underlying “wrongful act”
    violated a state statute, the FCRA, any separate federal claim arising from that
    same wrongful act is also excluded, “regardless of the legal avenue through which
    relief is sought.” We disagree. We recognize State National’s exclusion is for any
    claim “arising from the willful violation of a statute.” Under Florida law, the
    phrase “arising out of” in an exclusion means “originating from” or “flowing
    from” and requires some causal connection, but not proximate cause. See Taurus
    Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
    913 So.2d 528
    , 539-40 (Fla. 2009).
    Similarly, Ogden’s federal claims “arose from” White’s conduct toward, and
    termination of, Ogden, which she claimed violated the Equal Protection Clause.
    Her federal claims did not arise from her state FCRA claims.
    In essence, State National asks us to construe the exclusion to mean that the
    POELI endorsement does not apply to any claims arising from conduct that is also
    a willful violation of a statute. As the district court explained, “[a]t best, this
    argument suggests an ambiguity that must be construed against the Insurer[ ],”
    rather than in its favor. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 756 So.2d at 34 (explaining
    that ambiguous exclusionary clauses are construed strictly against the insurer).
    B.    Satisfaction of the SIR
    Alternatively, State National argues that the SIR can be satisfied only by
    10
    Case: 11-15905        Date Filed: 07/12/2012         Page: 11 of 13
    defense costs and damages for covered claims.
    The SIR endorsement provides that Hillsborough County retains, as a self-
    insured retention, $350,000 per occurrence “as respects combined insured
    damages and insured allocated costs and expenses of investigation, defense,
    negotiation and settlement applicable to such damages.”4 Further, State National
    agreed to pay if “any combined insured damages and insured allocated costs and
    expenses exceed, per occurrence” the $350,000 retention. The SIR endorsement
    does not define the phrases “combined insured damages” and “insured allocated
    costs and expenses.”
    State National contends that “insured” in these two phrases should be read
    to mean covered under the POELI endorsement, such that only damages for
    covered claims and costs and expenses related to those damages can satisfy the
    SIR amount. This is one possible interpretation of the SIR endorsement.5
    4
    State National does not challenge the district court’s determination that, because the SIR
    endorsement required Hillsborough County, as named insured, to retain $350,000 per occurrence
    and not per insured, if the SIR amount was satisfied as to Hillsborough County, it was also
    satisfied as to White.
    5
    The district court pointed out that State National’s interpretation may be unreasonable
    for two reasons. First, it is inconsistent with the district court’s earlier ruling that, under Florida
    law, an insurer’s duty to reimburse under a SIR endorsement, like an insurer’s duty to defend
    under a liability policy, is triggered if any alleged claim is covered. See, e.g., Baron Oil Co. v.
    Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 
    470 So.2d 810
    , 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (explaining that an
    insurer has a duty to defend the entire action if some alleged claims are covered and some are
    not, at least until the covered claims are eliminated from the suit). Second, it may not be possible
    or appropriate to apportion defense fees and costs between covered and non-covered claims
    11
    Case: 11-15905       Date Filed: 07/12/2012       Page: 12 of 13
    However, the district court noted another reasonable interpretation, that is,
    that the phrase “insured damages” means damages incurred by the named insured
    (or perhaps any insured), as opposed to those incurred by the insurer or a third
    party. The district court noted that this interpretation “is more consistent with the
    general purpose of the SIR Endorsement and the Policies as a whole,” to limit the
    exposure of Hillsborough County and its employees to $350,000 per occurrence.
    See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. J.S.U.B., Inc., 
    979 So.2d 871
    , 883 (Fla. 2007) (explaining
    that an insurance policy must be read “as a whole, endeavoring to give every
    provision its full meaning and operative effect”). Under this interpretation, the
    SIR endorsement could be satisfied by defense costs and expenses for both
    covered and non-covered claims incurred by Hillsborough County.
    Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the SIR endorsement is
    ambiguous as to which damages and costs count toward the SIR. See Travelers
    Indem. Co. v. PCR Inc., 
    889 So.2d 779
    , 785 (Fla. 2004) (explaining that language
    in an insurance policy is ambiguous if it “is susceptible to more than one
    given that Ogden’s § 1983 and FCRA claims were governed by the same standards of liability
    applicable in employment discrimination cases. See Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 
    232 F.3d 836
    , 843 n.11 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that § 1983 gender discrimination claim involves the
    same analysis as a Title VII disparate treatment claim); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 
    139 F.3d 1385
    , 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting same for FCRA gender discrimination claims). We
    need not address this question, however, because even assuming State National’s interpretation is
    reasonable, it is not the only reasonable interpretation and, thus, the SIR endorsement is
    ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured.
    12
    Case: 11-15905     Date Filed: 07/12/2012   Page: 13 of 13
    reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting
    coverage.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And, given that the SIR
    endorsement is ambiguous, the district court properly construed it in favor of
    coverage. See Auto-Owners, 756 So.2d at 34 (“[A]mbiguous insurance policy
    exclusions are construed against the drafter and in favor of the insured.”).
    Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that Hillsborough County’s
    $490,989.18 in costs and expenses incurred in the Ogden litigation, whether or not
    directly attributable to covered claims, satisfied the SIR amount and that State
    National was required under the SIR endorsement to reimburse White for his own
    defense costs and expenses.
    AFFIRMED.
    13