United States v. Leonardo Carson ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-12818 NOVEMBER 28, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00066-KD-C-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LEONARDO TREMAYNE CARSON,
a.k.a. Nardo,
a.k.a. Leo,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(November 28, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Leonardo Carson appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base (crack), and marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846, and possession with intent to distribute crack in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Carson argues four claims: (1) the district court
committed plain error and violated the Double Jeopardy Clause when it imposed a
separate sentence for each of the three conspiracy charges;1 (2) the district court
abused its discretion in admitting into evidence two exhibits concerning a
marijuana conspiracy involving Kurt Vollers and John Newton because the
evidence is hearsay, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial; (3) the district court
abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Wilbert Carson’s (Wilbert) suicide
attempts; and (4) the cumulative effect of the alleged errors denied him a fair trial.
I.
Where a defendant does not object to his multiple sentences below, we
review only for plain error. United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1239 (11th
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 186 (2010). We “correct a plain error when (1)
an error has occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected substantial
rights.” United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations
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Carson also challenges the indictment as multiplicitous. However he waived this issue
on appeal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(B) by failing to raise the issue
before trial. He can still object to the imposition of multiple sentences. See United States v.
Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 800 (11th Cir. 1984).
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and quotation marks omitted).
“An indictment is multiplicitous if it charges a single offense in more than
one count.” Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). Thus, a multiplicitous indictment
violates double jeopardy principles by giving the jury more than one opportunity
to convict the defendant for the same offense. Id. If counts in the indictment are
multiplicitous, separate sentences resulting from those counts are also
multiplicitous. See United States v. Mastrangelo, 733 F.2d 793, 800 (11th Cir.
1984).
“We analyze issues of double jeopardy under the test set forth by the
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76
L.Ed. 306 (1932).” Williams, 527 F.3d at 1240 (citation omitted). “[T]the
Blockburger test is one of statutory interpretation in which we examine the
elements of each offense to determine whether Congress intended to authorize
cumulative punishments.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, we must analyze the
statute that Carson was found guilty of violating to see if each offense “requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United
States, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182. Where the potentially multiplicitous
violations are all charged under a single statute, the key question “is whether the
legislature authorized separate punishments for separate offenses.” Ward v.
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United States, 694 F.2d 654, 661 n.13 (11th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). “When
Congress has authorized punishment for specific types of conspiracies, a
defendant may be prosecuted for each, regardless of whether the different
prohibited objects were the subject of but one conspiratorial agreement.” Id.(citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 337–41, 101 S. Ct. 1137, 1141–43
(1981)).
We therefore start by examining the statutory language to decide if the
multiple sentences against Carson are valid. Drug conspiracies are prohibited by
21 U.S.C. § 846, which states that “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy.” A conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute violates 21 U.S.C. § 841, which prohibits any person from knowingly or
intentionally possessing with an intent to distribute a controlled substance. The
language of § 846 makes it clear that Congress authorized punishment for
controlled substance conspiracies in the same manner as controlled substance
possession under § 841. The penalties prescribed for § 841 offenses correspond to
different quantities of different controlled substances, and list each drug in the
disjunctive. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (punishing equally the possession
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of 1 kilogram or more of heroin, 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, 280 grams or
more of crack, and 1000 kilograms or more of marijuana), with 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B) (providing a different penalty from § 841(b)(1)(A) for 100 grams or
more of heroin, 500 grams or more of cocaine, 28 grams or more of crack, and 100
kilograms or more of marijuana). The statutory language indicates that Congress
intended to impose multiple punishments for possession with intent to distribute of
different controlled substances. See also United States v. Davis, 656 F.2d 153,
156–60 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (holding that multiple sentences may be imposed
for “simultaneous possession” of different controlled substances under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)). Because Congress also intended for conspiracies to possess with intent
to distribute to be punished in the same manner as those prescribed in 21 U.S.C.
§ 841, the district court properly imposed multiple sentences against Carson for
each conspiracy that the jury found him guilty of committing. See Albernaz, 450
U.S. at 344, 101 S. Ct. at 1145.
II.
We review evidentiary admissibility determinations for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Underwood, 446 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2006).
We review a district court’s factual finding that a statement was made in the
furtherance of a conspiracy under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v.
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Bazemore, 41 F.3d 1431, 1433 (11th Cir. 1994).
Hearsay is a “statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted,” and is generally not admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 801, 802. However,
“inadmissible extrinsic evidence is admissible on redirect as rebuttal evidence,
when defense counsel has opened the door to such evidence during cross-
examination.” United States v. West, 898 F.2d 1493, 1500 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).
An out-of-court statement of a co-conspirator, made during the course and
in furtherance of the conspiracy, is not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
Before a co-conspirator’s statement may be admitted, however, the government
must prove that: (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) the conspiracy included the declarant
and the defendant against whom the statement is offered; and (3) the declarant
made the statement during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United
States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1549 (11th Cir. 1988). When determining
whether these conditions have been satisfied, the district court may rely on
information provided by the co-conspirator’s proffered statement, as well as
independent external evidence. United States v. Byrom, 910 F.2d 725, 735–36
(11th Cir. 1990). Finally, we “appl[y] a liberal standard in determining whether a
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statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy.” Santiago, 837 F.2d at 1549(citation omitted).
“Relevant evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid.
401. Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. However, relevant
evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”
Fed. R. Evid. 403. We have held that Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy”
whose “major function” is to exclude “matter of scant or cumulative probative
force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.” United States
v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted).
The district court properly admitted government’s exhibit 22, the alleged
drug ledger that Officer Carstarphen found in Newton’s apartment. Although the
ledger was initially excluded, defense counsel asked Officer Carstarphen if he had
seen “a car associated with [Carson] or anything” at Newton’s apartment. The
court’s ruling that use of the word “anything” opened the door to admission of the
drug ledger was not an abuse of the discretion, as the ledger was associated with
Carson and found at the apartment.
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The court properly admitted government’s exhibit 25, the text message
between Vollers and Newton, under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule. The district court’s ruling was supported by the content of the message itself;
the frequent phone calls between Vollers, Newton, and Carson; and the fact that
Vollers and Newton were dealing extremely large quantities of marijuana. Carson
argues that the high volume of phone calls between Vollers, Newton, and Carson
is due to the fact that the three men were teammates on the Dallas Cowboys.
However, this bare allegation does not show that the district court abused its
discretion in permitting government’s exhibit 25 into evidence.
Furthermore, the exhibits were not irrelevant, as they made it more likely
that Carson could obtain large quantities of marijuana to support the alleged
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, and were not so
prejudicial that they should have been excluded under Rule 403. Therefore, the
exhibits were properly admitted by the district court.
III.
We review the district court’s restrictions on cross-examination for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1370–71 (11th
Cir. 1994). The Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses. Pointer v. Texas,
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380 U.S. 400, 404, 85 S. Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965). The Confrontation Clause
“guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish.” Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (1987)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). The defendant’s rights under the
Confrontation Clause are satisfied when the “cross-examination permitted exposes
the jury to facts sufficient to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and enables
defense counsel to establish a record from which he can properly argue why the
witness is less than reliable.” Mills v. Singletary, 161 F.3d 1273, 1288 (11th Cir.
1998) (per curiam) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Once there is
sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause, the district court
may limit further cross-examination within its discretion. United States v. Diaz,
26 F.3d 1533, 1539–40 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that a defendant’s wish to
explore bias on the part of a prosecution witness “does not automatically void the
court’s ability to limit cross-examination”).
The district court properly limited the cross-examination of Wilbert by
excluding evidence of his suicide attempts, because the jury was able to evaluate
Wibert’s credibility and bias through other facts: his past drug conviction, prior
inconsistent statements about who was transporting how much marijuana from
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Texas, his plea agreement, and the testimony from Rosemary Carson that Wilbert
told her that the government was exerting pressure on him to testify. Therefore,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it disallowed evidence of
Wilbert’s suicide attempts.
IV.
Under the cumulative error doctrine, even if individual judicial errors would
not be sufficient to warrant reversal, the defendant may have been denied a fair
trial when the effect of all the errors is evaluated cumulatively. United States v.
Lopez, 590 F.3d 1238, 1258 (11th Cir. 2009). “In addressing a claim of
cumulative error, we must examine the trial as a whole to determine whether the
appellant was afforded a fundamentally fair trial.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Here, the district court did not err; therefore, there was no cumulative error.
AFFIRMED.
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