Roger G. Canupp, Michael C. Donovan v. Liberty Behavioral Healthcare Corp , 447 F. App'x 976 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-10135              ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar          DECEMBER 1, 2011
    ________________________             JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 2:04-cv-00260-UA-DNF
    ROGER G. CANUPP,
    individually and on behalf of a Class of all
    persons similarly situated, et al.,
    llllllllllllllllPlaintiffs-Appellees,
    lllllllllllllllllllll
    MICHAEL C. DONOVAN,
    llllllllllllllllllMovant-Appellant,
    versus
    LIBERTY BEHAVIORAL HEALTHCARE CORP., et al.,
    lllllllllllllllllllDefendants,
    GEORGE H. SHELDON,
    Secretary of the Department of
    Children and Families,
    lllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (December 1, 2011)
    Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael C. Donovan, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    judgment approving a class-action settlement agreement in a conditions-of-
    confinement suit, brought pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , against the Florida Civil
    Commitment Center (“FCCC”). Donovan argues (1) that the FCCC is violating
    federal law by failing to provide an effective sex offender treatment program that
    would allow him to meet the requirements for release from involuntary civil
    commitment; (2) that the FCCC is providing inadequate mental health services
    that would allow him to meet the requirements for release from involuntary civil
    commitment; and (3) that the FCCC is violating his right to procedural due
    process through its use of punitive confinement.1
    1
    Donovan also argues that the FCCC is failing to accommodate residents with
    disabilities and that the court’s judgment fails to contain an oversight provision. Because
    Donovan raises these issues for the first time on appeal, we do not consider them. See Access
    Now v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining to consider issues,
    arguments or legal theories not raised initially before the district court).
    2
    We review a district court’s approval of a class-action settlement agreement
    for abuse of discretion. Leverso v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala., 
    18 F.3d 1527
    , 1531
    (11th Cir. 1994).
    Rule 23(e) . . . does not provide any standards for such approval. It
    is now abundantly clear, however, that in order to approve a
    settlement, the district court must find that it “is fair, adequate and
    reasonable and is not the product of collusion between the parties.”
    Cotton v. Hinton, 
    559 F.2d 1326
    , 1330 (5th Cir.1977). . . . In
    addition, our judgment is informed by the strong judicial policy
    favoring settlement as well as by the realization that compromise is
    the essence of settlement. See United States v. City of Miami, 
    614 F.2d 1322
    , 1344 (5th Cir.1980).
    Bennett v. Behring Corp., 
    737 F.2d 982
    , 986 (11th Cir. 1984) (footnotes and
    citations omitted).
    The following factors inform the court as to whether the terms of a class-
    action settlement agreement are fair, reasonable, and adequate:
    (1) the likelihood of success at trial; (2) the range of possible recovery;
    (3) the point on or below the range of possible recovery at which a
    settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable; (4) the complexity, expense
    and duration of litigation; (5) the substance and amount of opposition to
    the settlement; and (6) the stage of proceedings at which the settlement
    was achieved.
    
    Id.
     In considering the settlement, the court is entitled to rely upon the judgment of
    experienced counsel for the parties. Cotton v. Hinton, 
    559 F.2d 1326
    , 1330 (11th
    Cir. 1977). “Indeed, the trial court, absent fraud, collusion, or the like, should be
    3
    hesitant to substitute its own judgment for that of counsel.” 
    Id.
     Finally, the court
    should examine the settlement in light of the objections, and provide a reasoned
    response to those objections. 
    Id. at 1331
    .
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the settlement
    agreement as fair, adequate, and reasonable because it properly considered the
    factors enumerated in the standard set forth by this court, explained its findings,
    and addressed Donovan’s objections.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-10135

Citation Numbers: 447 F. App'x 976

Judges: Tjoflat, Edmondson, Kravitch

Filed Date: 12/1/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024