United States v. Kenneth Lee Stewart ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-11809 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar DECEMBER 9, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00069-MHT-CSC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KENNETH LEE STEWART,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(December 9, 2011)
Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
After pleading guilty, Kenneth Lee Stewart appeals his sentence for
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
At sentencing, the district court imposed a 60-month sentence, 27 months above
Stewart’s advisory guidelines range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Stewart argues that this upward variance is procedurally and substantively
unreasonable. After review, we affirm Stewart’s 60-month sentence.
I. DISCUSSION
We review the reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion using a
two-step process. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
We look first at whether the district court committed any significant procedural
error, such as miscalculating the advisory guidelines range, treating the guidelines
as mandatory, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain adequately the
chosen sentence. Id.Then, we examine whether the sentence is substantively unreasonable under
the totality of the circumstances, “including an inquiry into whether the statutory
factors in § 3553(a) support the sentence in question.” United States v. Gonzalez,
550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).1 “If the sentence imposed is outside the
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The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
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Guidelines range, [we] must determine that the district court’s consideration of the
3553(a) factors justified the variance.” United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085,
1116 (11th Cir. 2011). The defendant bears the burden to show his sentence is
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v.
Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006). “[T]he weight to be accorded any
given § 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district
court.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008)
(quotation marks omitted). A sentence imposed well below the statutory
maximum is another indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United States v.
Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
A. Procedural Reasonableness
The district court found that Stewart: (1) possessed the firearm with an “evil
motive”; and (2) committed perjury during his sentencing hearing. Stewart
contends these facts are clearly erroneous and argues his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court based its decision to vary upward on these
clearly erroneous facts. We find no clear error in either of the district court’s
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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factual findings.2
At the sentencing hearing, the district court credited the testimony of Officer
Jerry Boykins over Stewart’s testimony as to the events. According to Officer
Boykins, on August 7, 2009, a local prostitute, named Stephanie Jackson, flagged
him down while on patrol. Jackson reported that a black male had forced her
friend into a truck at gunpoint and driven away. Officer Boykins proceeded in the
direction Jackson indicated and spotted a truck matching the description given by
Jackson.
Officer Boykins initiated a traffic stop and approached the truck once
backup arrived. The driver, a black male, was Defendant Stewart. Sitting next to
him was a woman, Alice Barlow, who was naked from the waist up. As Officer
Boykins approached, Barlow whispered to him, “I need help. I need to get out of
here.” Officer Boykins asked Defendant Stewart if there were any weapons in the
truck, and Stewart said no. After Stewart complied with the request to exit the
truck, Officer Boykins took Barlow to his patrol car. Barlow told Officer Boykins
that she wanted to get away from Stewart and that he had a weapon somewhere in
2
We review a sentencing court’s fact findings for clear error and will reverse only if “after
making all credibility choices in favor of the fact-finder and reviewing the record as a whole, it is
clear that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Ladson, 643 F3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 11-6575, 2011 WL 4460103 (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011).
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the truck. Upon searching the truck, Officer Boykins found a black and silver
semiautomatic pistol under the driver’s side seat.3
Mike Myric, a homicide detective, also testified at Stewart’s sentencing
hearing. Detective Myric interviewed Defendant Stewart and Alice Barlow
because the firearm found in Stewart’s truck was used eight months earlier in a
shooting incident in a hotel room. During this December 2009 shooting incident,
a prostitute named Burnette Blue was critically injured and her boyfriend, Shawn
Rogers, was killed.
According to Detective Myric, Alice Barlow told him that she and
Stephanie Jackson encountered Defendant Stewart at a truck stop when he offered
to help them get marijuana. Stewart drove them to a hotel parking lot, where he
pulled a gun from his glove box and said he would shoot them if they did not have
sex with him. Defendant Stewart made Jackson lie face down on the ground and
ordered Barlow to remove her clothing. Stewart then changed his mind, ordered
Barlow back into his truck and drove away with her. Defendant Stewart told
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Stewart’s version of the traffic stop was wholly different. Rather than having Barlow
unclothed and afraid in his truck, Stewart testified that he was giving a ride to a male friend and a
woman (who was fully dressed) when a police officer, not Officer Boykins, pulled Stewart’s
truck over. Once the truck stopped, Stewart’s male friend and the woman jumped out of the
truck and ran away. Officer Boykins arrived on the scene only after Defendant Stewart had
exited his truck and was sitting next to a patrol car. Stewart claimed he saw the woman who had
been riding in his truck return to the scene and talk with Officer Boykins.
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Barlow to get dressed. While Barlow was putting on her clothes, a police officer
pulled Defendant Stewart’s truck over.
During Detective Myric’s interview, Defendant Stewart admitted that he
shot Blue and Rogers in December 2009. Stewart also said that, after he had sex
with Blue in the hotel room, Rogers entered with a gun, demanded Stewart’s
money and left. Believing he “had been set up,” Defendant Stewart demanded that
Blue give him his money back. When Blue resisted, Defendant Stewart retrieved
his firearm from his car and went back into the hotel room. Stewart told Detective
Myric that “pride made him go back in.” When Blue would not return his money,
Defendant Stewart cocked the firearm to scare her, but then “realized he had shot
her.” Stewart tried to leave the hotel room and encountered Rogers in the
doorway. Believing Rogers had a weapon, Defendant Stewart squatted down and
fired at Rogers, shooting him in the throat.
The government also submitted a transcript of Defendant Stewart’s
statement to Detective Myric. During the interview, Defendant Stewart said that
he demanded his money from Blue, but had no intention of shooting anyone.
Through a window, Stewart thought he saw Rogers returning and was “twisting
and turning back and forth trying to watch him and watch her.” Defendant Stewart
stated, “The situation pretty much got out of control to the point where I told her,
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‘Give me my money,’ and I pulled the trigger.”4
The district court found that Stewart “failed to show consideration of others,
and instead acted with an evil motive.” The district court explained that
Defendant Stewart’s own admission that in December 2008 he had shot Blue after
demanding that she give him his money showed “an evil mind at work.” The
district court pointed out that, on August 7, 2009, Defendant Stewart “had the
same gun he had when he shot Ms. Blue,” and concluded that Stewart had
“without question, beyond a reasonable doubt the evil motive as well.” The
district court elaborated that Defendant Stewart possessed the firearm in this
offense with the specific intent to hurt someone and that, if Stewart had
encountered someone who offended him, “he would have shot that person.” The
district court’s finding that Defendant Stewart possessed the gun with “an evil
motive,” that is, with the intent to use the gun to harm someone, is supported by
the government’s evidence presented at the sentencing hearing.
Defendant Stewart emphasizes that the district court found that the
government failed to prove he kidnapped Jackson and Barlow. The district court
did find that although the government’s hearsay evidence supported the
4
At the time of this sentencing, Defendant Stewart faced state charges of capital murder of
Rogers and attempted murder of Blue.
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kidnapping scenario, it was not convincing enough to meet the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard.5 The court pointed out neither Jackson nor Barlow testified
at the hearing. Nonetheless, contrary to Stewart’s contention, this kidnapping
finding is not inconsistent with the district court’s separate finding that Stewart
possessed the firearm with an “evil motive.” The district court credited Officer
Boykins’ testimony that when he pulled over Defendant Stewart’s truck, he found
Barlow inside, unclothed from the waist up, and clearly afraid of Stewart, whom
she knew had a weapon in his truck. Regardless of how Barlow got into Stewart’s
truck, the circumstances in which Officer Boykin found her fearful during the
traffic stop, coupled with the fact that Stewart admitted using the same firearm
eight months earlier to shoot another woman who had offended his pride, support
the court’s finding that Defendant Stewart possessed the firearm with the intent to
use it to harm someone.
We also find no clear error in the district court’s finding that Defendant
Stewart committed perjury during the sentencing hearing. The district court found
that Officer Boykins’ testimony was “more credible,” and that while Officer
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Because the district court found that the government had not proved Stewart kidnapped
Barlow and Jackson during the offense, the district court declined to calculate Stewart’s offense
using U.S.S.G. § 2A4.1(a), which would have resulted in an advisory guidelines range of 235 to
293 months. Instead, the district court calculated Stewart’s offense level using U.S.S.G.
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), which yielded the significantly lower advisory guidelines range of 27 to 33
months.
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Boykins told the truth, Defendant Stewart “perjured himself; that is, he
intentionally did not tell the truth.”
We give deference to a sentencing court’s credibility findings. United
States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998). Moreover, under this
deferential standard, “[w]here the factfinding resolves a swearing match of
witnesses, the resolution will almost never be clear error.” United States v.
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, giving due deference to
the district court’s credibility finding, Officer Boykins’ testimony about the events
of the traffic stop directly contradicted Defendant’s Stewart’s testimony.
Although Stewart tries to minimize the contradiction by characterizing it as minor
or immaterial, we disagree. At sentencing, the circumstances in which Stewart
was found in possession of the gun are material. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)
(listing “the nature and circumstances of the offense” as one of the factors the
district court must consider in choosing a sentence). The record supports the
district court’s finding of perjury.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
Stewart argues the district court’s 27-month upward variance was
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substantively unreasonable because it was based on an impermissible factor.6 See
United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009) (stating that a
sentence may be substantively unreasonable if, inter alia, the district court based it
on an impermissible factor). Stewart contends the district court should not have
considered the December 2008 shooting because it was not relevant conduct.
The problem for Stewart is that the district court was not limited to relevant
conduct in considering what sentence to impose. Indeed, § 3553(a) requires the
district court to consider not only the circumstances of the charged offense but
also the “history and characteristics of the defendant,” which would include the
defendant’s criminal history and propensity for violence, and the need for the
sentence to, among other things, protect the public and deter further criminal
conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),(2)(B),(C). The district court identified these
factors to be “critical,” and “of primary importance” in Stewart’s case. The district
court’s consideration of Stewart’s December 2008 shooting of Blue and Rogers
implicated all of these permissible factors.
Furthermore, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in
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Stewart also argues that the upward variance was based on speculation as to Stewart’s
evil motive for possessing the firearm. This is merely a reformulation of his argument that the
district court clearly erred in finding that Stewart possessed the firearm with the intent to harm
someone. For the reasons already stated, the district court’s finding was supported by the
evidentiary record and was not speculation.
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imposing the 27-month upward variance. Stewart’s prior felony conviction was
for arson. According to paragraph 30 of the Presentence Investigation Report (to
which Stewart did not object), Stewart started the fire in front of witnesses after
arguing with, and beating, a woman. Stewart admitted that his arson resulted in
burn injuries to another woman and her two small children who were in the home
at the time. Less than three years after Stewart was released from prison, Stewart
shot Blue and Rogers after arguing with them. Eight months after that, Stewart
still had the firearm when Officer Boykins pulled him over under suspicious
circumstances. At that time, the firearm was under Stewart’s seat, and Stewart’s
passenger, Barlow, was naked from the waist up and asking Officer Boykins for
help. When Barlow was safely out of the truck, she warned Officer Boykins that
Stewart had a gun.
Given Stewart’s history of violence, the circumstances of Stewart’s
possession of the firearm, and the need to protect the public from Stewart and to
deter Stewart from committing further crimes, the district court’s decision to
impose a 60-month sentence, well-below the ten-year statutory maximum, was
reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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