James Russell, Shannon Russell v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. , 464 F. App'x 842 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 27, 2012
No. 11-14458
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 5:09-cv-00255-WTH-TBS
JAMES RUSSELL, etc.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff,
SHANNON RUSSELL,
as daughter and personal representative
of the estate of her mother, Rose Ann Eaton,
deceased,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
PHILLIP MORRIS USA, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 27, 2012)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Shannon Russell, as representative of Rose Anne Eaton’s estate, seeks to
apply the findings in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006)
(per curiam),1 to prove that Marlboro cigarettes were defectively designed. Phillip
Morris USA, Inc., the manufacturer of Marlboro cigarettes, argues that Russell
cannot rely on Engle because Eaton is not a member of the Engle class and that
under Florida law collateral estoppel cannot be applied in this case. After
reviewing the briefs and the case law, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Phillip Morris.
Russell filed a wrongful death action on behalf of her mother alleging that
her mother died of lung cancer caused by a lifetime of smoking Marlboro
1
In Engle the Florida Supreme Court decertified the class, but permitted members of the
Engle class to rely on the jury’s “Phase I common core findings.” Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.,
945 So. 2d 1246, 1269 (Fla. 2006). The Court also closed the class of plaintiffs eligible to rely
on the Engle findings in order to ensure that the class was not open ended. Id. at 1255.
2
cigarettes. Eaton’s lung cancer was not diagnosed until 2006. Russell admitted to
the district court that she could not prove her claims without relying on Engle.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
party. Owen v. I.C. Sys., Inc., 629 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We give preclusive effect to state court judgments when two conditions are
met: “(1) the courts of the state from which the judgment emerged would do so
themselves; and (2) the litigants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate their
claims and the prior state proceedings otherwise satisfied the applicable
requirements of due process.” Quinn v. Monroe Cnty, 330 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th
Cir. 2003). Florida law requires mutuality of parities in order to apply collateral
estoppel. E.C. v. Katz, 731 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1999) (per curiam). “[U]nless
both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it in a subsequent
action.” Id. (quoting Stogniew v. McQueen, 656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995)).
Eaton is not a member of the Engle class and cannot now seek to join it
because the Florida Supreme Court held that the cut-off date for inclusion was
November 21, 1996. Engle, 945 So. 2d at 1255. Thus, Eaton was not a party to
3
the Engle case and cannot now rely on the findings in that case under Florida law.
See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Brown, 70 So. 3d 707, 715 (Fla. App. 2011)
(finding that plaintiffs must prove that they are a member of the Engle class).
Because Russell conceded that she could not prove her claim without Engle and
she is barred from relying on Engle, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Phillip Morris.
AFFIRMED.
4