Tom Yarcheski v.Keiser School, Inc. , 508 F. App'x 916 ( 2013 )


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  •              Case: 12-12377     Date Filed: 02/05/2013   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-12377
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 0:11-cv-61188-KMW
    TOM YARCHESKI,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    KEISER SCHOOL, INC.,
    d.b.a. Keiser University,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 5, 2013)
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 12-12377    Date Filed: 02/05/2013    Page: 2 of 5
    This is an appeal from an order of the district court dismissing
    plaintiff/appellant, Dr. Tom Yarcheski’s (“Yarcheski”) amended complaint. The
    district court dismissed Count 1 of the amended complaint, which contained a
    claim for breach of contract, because Yarcheski’s employment contract expressly
    provides that it is an at-will agreement and does not imply continued employment
    for a set period of time.
    Because this is an appeal from a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
    dismissal, we review de novo the district court’s order, drawing all the facts from
    the amended complaint, accepting those facts as true, and construing them in the
    light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 
    679 F.3d 1267
    ,
    1271 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012); Ironworkers Local Union 68 v. AstraZeneca Pharm.,
    LP, 
    634 F.3d 1352
    , 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations
    must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
    assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
    fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555, 
    127 S. Ct. 1955
    , 1965
    (2007) (internal citations omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff
    must plead “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
    Id. at 570
    , 
    127 S. Ct. at 1974
    .
    2
    Case: 12-12377     Date Filed: 02/05/2013    Page: 3 of 5
    Because subject matter jurisdiction in this case is predicated on the diversity
    of citizenship of the parties under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    (a)(1), Florida substantive law
    applies to the legal issues presented in this appeal. See Sierminski v. Transouth
    Fin. Corp., 
    216 F.3d 945
    , 950 (11th Cir. 2000).
    Yarcheski acknowledges in his initial brief that he can only state a cause of
    action for breach of an employment contract if the agreement established
    employment for a definite term. Under Florida law, no cause of action arises for
    breach of an at-will employment contract. Smith v. Piezo Technology &
    Professional Adm’rs, 
    427 So. 2d 182
    , 184 (Fla. 1983).
    The issue of whether a contract is for employment at-will is a question of
    law that is resolved by a review of the contract. Olsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    759 F. Supp. 782
    , 786 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
    After reviewing the agreement at issue here, we conclude that the agreement
    does not provide for a definite duration of employment. There is no mention in the
    agreement that Yarcheski was being employed for a definite period of time.
    Additionally, the agreement expressly states that it is terminable “at-will” and
    “does not imply continued employment for a set period of time.” Thus, we agree
    with the district court that under Florida law, the agreement is one for at-will
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    Case: 12-12377       Date Filed: 02/05/2013   Page: 4 of 5
    employment which cannot support a breach of contract action. Accordingly, we
    affirm the dismissal of Count 1.
    We also conclude that the district court properly dismissed Yarcheski’s
    claim under Florida’s Private Whistleblower Act (Florida Statute § 448.101 et seq.)
    (hereinafter “FWA”). To state a claim under the FWA, a plaintiff must set forth
    facts to show: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered a
    materially adverse action of a type that would dissuade a reasonable employee
    from engaging in statutorily-protected activity; and (3) there was some causal
    connection between these events. See Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 
    261 F.3d 1262
    , 1266 (11th Cir. 2001) (setting forth elements for retaliation claim under Title
    VII). See also Rivera v. Torfino Enter., Inc., 
    914 So.2d 1087
    , 1089 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
    App. 2005) (noting that the Florida Civil Rights Act’s anti-retaliation provision
    overlaps with the protections offered by the Florida Whistleblowers Act); Selim v.
    Pan Am. Airways Corp, 
    889 So.2d 149
    , 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that
    Florida Civil Rights Act is patterned after Title VII).
    We conclude from a review of Yarcheski’s amended complaint that it fails
    to contain any factual allegations showing that Yarcheski engaged in a statutorily-
    protected activity, and therefore, we conclude that the district court properly
    dismissed the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Moreover, because
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    Case: 12-12377      Date Filed: 02/05/2013      Page: 5 of 5
    Yarcheski cannot demonstrate that he complained about Keiser University
    allegedly violating an applicable law, rule or regulation as required by the FWA,
    the district court also properly dismissed this claim with prejudice.
    Because we conclude from the record and briefs that there is no merit to any
    of Yarcheski’s appellate arguments, we affirm the district court’s judgment of
    dismissal.
    AFFIRMED. 1
    1
    Keiser University’s motion for damages and costs filed on August 21, 2012, is
    DENIED.
    5