Christopher Jordan v. Secretary, Department of Corrections ( 2012 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-15209
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-14261-KMM
CHRISTOPHER JORDAN,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant,
SARGEANT MURPHY,
Officer for the Martin Correctional Inst.,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll lDefendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(December 20, 2012)
Before CARNES, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Christopher Jordan, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant, Sergeant Deneen
Murphy, in his civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an Eighth
Amendment violation. On appeal, Jordan argues that Sgt. Murphy acted with
deliberate indifference to a serious risk of injury when she failed to protect him
from being physically attacked by another prisoner. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Sgt. Murphy.
I.
In April 2010, Jordan filed a pro se amended complaint under § 1983
against Sgt. Murphy, an officer at Martin Correctional Institution (“MCI”),
alleging that, on April 6, 2007, while he was incarcerated at MCI, he was
physically threatened by Floyd Robinson, another inmate, in Sgt. Murphy’s
presence. In response, Sgt. Murphy “employed the least and most minimal
measures” to resolve the conflict by separating Floyd and Robinson. Further, Sgt.
Murphy did not “follow[] up with preventative and correctional measures designed
to ensure the safety of both inmates.” Shortly after the incident, Robinson
physically attacked Jordan in Jordan’s cell, which Sgt. Murphy had left open and
unsupervised, in violation of the Florida Department of Correction (“DOC”) rules.
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The attack resulted in the loss of Jordan’s right eye, which was replaced with a
prosthetic eye, and progressively weakening eyesight in his left eye. Jordan also
suffered damage to his head, psychological distress, migraine headaches, periodic
dizziness, and emotional trauma. Jordan claimed that Sgt. Murphy’s actions
violated the Eighth Amendment because her “acts or omissions” created a
substantial risk of serious harm to Jordan, and she was deliberately indifferent to
his safety and security.
After discovery, Sgt. Murphy moved for summary judgment, arguing that
Jordan failed to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. Contrary to his
allegations, Sgt. Murphy was not aware that he was in danger of an attack.
Specifically, she had no knowledge of any prior issues between Jordan and
Robinson, and Robinson’s prison records reflected he had received minimal
disciplinary action. Further, Sgt. Murphy confirmed with Jordan and Robinson
that “everything was okay” between them, and she remained on their dormitory
wing for a period of time after the initial argument ended. Additionally,
Sgt. Murphy asserted that she responded to the incident, which appeared to be
merely a “commonplace argument” between inmates, in an objectively reasonable
manner. Regardless, Sgt. Murphy was entitled to qualified immunity because her
actions did not constitute a clearly established constitutional violation.
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In support of her summary judgment motion, Sgt. Murphy submitted several
exhibits, including her own affidavit and affidavits from MCI Security Chief
James Upchurch, two MCI inmates, DOC inspector Nelson Rios, and DOC
Program Administrator Bradford Locke. Sgt. Murphy also submitted excerpts
from Jordan’s deposition.
The magistrate issued a report and recommendation that the district court
grant Sgt. Murphy’s motion for summary judgment. The magistrate found that the
undisputed material facts showed that, when Jordan was in his cell, with the cell
door “locked” open, such that others could enter, Robinson entered Jordan’s cell
and “brutally attacked Jordan.” The attack resulted in severe physical injuries to
Jordan, including the loss of an eye. While the undisputed facts involved a “tragic
and brutal” attack on Jordan, the attack and resulting injuries were not caused by
any unconstitutional action or inaction by Sgt. Murphy. The evidence showed that
Sgt. Murphy had no knowledge before or during the verbal argument between
Jordan and Robinson that Jordan was in danger of an imminent attack. Moreover,
Sgt. Murphy had no knowledge of any prior issues between Jordan and Robinson,
and Robinson’s prison records showed that he had received minimal disciplinary
action during his confinement. After the verbal altercation concluded and while
she was still conducting her rounds, Sgt. Murphy confirmed with Jordan and
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Robinson that “everything was okay.” Additionally, Jordan never expressed
concern to Sgt. Murphy regarding his safety.
The magistrate further found that, even if Sgt. Murphy was aware of a risk
of harm, she responded in an objectively reasonably manner by ending the dispute
and ordering Jordan and Robinson to separate to different locations. Further,
during the 10 to 15 minutes that Sgt. Murphy remained on the wing after the
“name-calling incident,” she made efforts to determine that no further problem
existed between Jordan and Robinson, and they confirmed that the problem had
been resolved. Sgt. Murphy did not observe that Jordan needed protection, and no
other inmate alerted her to any possible danger to Jordan. Based on her
experience, Sgt. Murphy concluded that the initial altercation was only a
“commonplace argument” between inmates that would not result in violence. For
these reasons, Jordan could not satisfy the subjective or objective requirements to
show that Sgt. Murphy was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to Jordan.
Additionally, the magistrate found that Jordan’s claim that Sgt. Murphy was
responsible for his injuries because she left his door opened and the wing
unsupervised was contradicted by the undisputed facts. No DOC policy required
Sgt. Murphy to lock Jordan’s cell door during the relevant time period, and there
appeared to be no reason for Sgt. Murphy to lock the door closed for Jordan’s
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protection. Further, after the argument concluded, Jordan and Robinson were sent
to different locations, and Sgt. Murphy never left the wing unsupervised. Instead,
Robinson’s attack was a “sudden, isolated incident arising out of his anger with
[Jordan] over use of a mop.” In sum, Jordan failed to show an issue of material
fact regarding whether Sgt. Murphy violated his Eighth Amendment rights by
failing to protect him from Robinson’s attack. Further, because Jordan failed to
demonstrate a constitutional violation, the magistrate was not required to
determine whether Sgt. Murphy was entitled to qualified immunity. Regardless,
Sgt. Murphy was entitled to qualified immunity because, under the circumstances,
a reasonable corrections officer would not have been aware that her actions or
inactions violated the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, the magistrate
recommended that the district court grant Sgt. Murphy’s motion for summary
judgment as to Jordan’s constitutional claim, and dismiss without prejudice
Jordan’s state law negligence claim.
The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation and
granted Sgt. Murphy’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
considering the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most
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favorable to the non-moving party. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
1303 (11th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Once the party moving for
summary judgment discharges its “initial responsibility of informing the district
court of the basis for its motion,” the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
come forward with relevant evidence beyond the pleadings showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d
1292, 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2011). If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient
showing to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is
appropriate. Id. at 1315. Mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations
are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d
1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment prohibits prison officials from exhibiting deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 828, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Carter v. Galloway, 352
F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). To survive summary judgment on an Eighth
Amendment claim concerning prison conditions, a plaintiff must “produce
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sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant[’]s
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty.,
50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995). To establish deliberate indifference on the
part of a prison official, a plaintiff must show: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk
of serious harm, (2) disregard of that risk, (3) by conduct that is more than gross
negligence.” Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010). The prison
official “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [s]he must also draw that inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. Thus, prison officials may avoid
liability under the Eighth Amendment if (1) “they did not know of the underlying
facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger,” (2) “they knew the underlying
facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was
insubstantial or nonexistent,” or (3) “they responded reasonably to the risk, even if
the harm ultimately was not averted.” Rodriguez v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 508
F.3d 611, 617-18 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844, 114 S.Ct. at
1982-83).
Finally, government officials are immune from suit when performing
discretionary functions in their individual capacities unless they violate “clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
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have known.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotations
omitted). However, we have declined to address whether a defendant was entitled
to qualified immunity where we first held that the district court properly granted
summary judgment to the defendants as to the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350 n.10 (stating that
defendants had no need for a qualified immunity defense when plaintiff’s
deliberate indifference claim failed).
Here, the district court correctly concluded that Jordan failed to present
sufficient evidence that Sgt. Murphy knowingly disregarded a substantial risk of
serious harm to his safety or that she acted unreasonably in response to a known
risk. See Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312; Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617-18. The
undisputed evidence revealed that, on April 6, 2007, Sgt. Murphy observed Jordan
and Robinson using profanity while verbally arguing over a mop. Although Jordan
alleged in his complaint that Sgt. Murphy had observed a physical confrontation,
he presented no evidence to support that claim, and on appeal, he describes the
encounter as a “verbal altercation.” While Jordan now asserts that he
“convey[ed]” to Sgt. Murphy that he felt threatened, in the district court he
presented no evidence to substantiate this claim. Sgt. Murphy’s unrebutted
affidavit established that Jordan never indicated that he was afraid of Robinson or
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that he needed protection. Moreover, Rios, the DOC inspector, confirmed that “no
tangible evidence or witnesses” supported Jordan’s claim that his injuries resulted
from Sgt. Murphy’s failure to acknowledge that Jordan had expressed fear for his
safety or a need for protection. Additionally, Sgt. Murphy, who had been a
corrections officer for 12 years, stated that, based on her experience, arguing and
name calling is common among inmates and does not often lead to violence.
Thus, Sgt. Murphy’s observation of the argument between Jordan and Robinson
was insufficient to alert her that Robinson posed a substantial risk of physical
injury to Jordan. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979.
Regardless, Sgt. Murphy’s response to the verbal argument was objectively
reasonable. See Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617-18. When Sgt. Murphy observed
Jordan and Robinson arguing, she ordered them to stop and to separate from each
other. Further, Jordan testified that he and Robinson complied with Sgt. Murphy’s
order to stop arguing. After the argument, Sgt. Murphy remained in the area for
10 to 15 minutes, and she heard no further arguing after Jordan and Robinson
separated. Two inmate witnesses corroborated that Sgt. Murphy did not leave the
area until the situation appeared “calm” or had “cool[ed] down.” Further, Jordan
presented no evidence that he had any prior conflict with Robinson or that Sgt.
Murphy was aware that Robinson was a violent inmate, and prior to the attack,
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Robinson had received only two prior disciplinary reports, one for fighting in May
2003 and one for disobeying an order in February 2006.
Jordan argues that Sgt. Murphy acted unreasonably by failing to handcuff
Jordan and Robinson or to lock them in their cells. However, before she left the
area, Sgt. Murphy ensured that Jordan and Robinson had separated, and their
conflict had been resolved. Thus, Sgt. Murphy had no apparent reason to restrain
Jordan or Robinson and no reason to believe that Robinson would return to
physically attack Jordan after the verbal argument had concluded. Jordan also
argues that Sgt. Murphy left him unsupervised, but evidence showed that the
prison dormitory was supervised at all times from an officer in a centrally located
Officer’s Station. In sum, Jordan failed to present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that Sgt. Murphy acted unreasonably in response to his verbal
argument with Robinson or that she showed a disregard for his safety. See
Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617-18.
Finally, because the district court properly granted summary judgment to
Sgt. Murphy as to the Jordan’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim,
we decline to address whether Sgt. Murphy was entitled to qualified immunity.
See Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350 n.10. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to Sgt. Murphy.
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AFFIRMED.
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