United States v. Raymond Williams ( 2013 )


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  •               Case: 12-15608    Date Filed: 06/04/2013   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-15608
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:04-cr-00105-JA-DAB-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RAYMOND WILLIAMS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (June 4, 2013)
    Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Raymond Williams, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of
    his motion for a reduction of sentence, filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In
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    response, the United States has moved for summary affirmance of the district
    court’s decision based on its belief that our controlling precedent clearly
    establishes that Mr. Williams is ineligible for a sentence reduction. After review,
    we agree with the government and, therefore, affirm.
    On July 29, 2004, Mr. Williams pled guilty to three counts of possessing
    cocaine base with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Both
    parties agree that Mr. Williams qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §
    4B1.1, which subjected him to an enhanced sentencing guideline range of 188 to
    235 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Mr. Williams as a career
    offender to three concurrent terms of 188 months’ imprisonment.
    On May 6, 2008, the district court sua sponte ordered both parties to address
    whether Mr. Williams was eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)
    based on the retroactivity of Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The
    district court determined that Mr. Williams was ineligible for a sentence reduction
    because he was sentenced as a career offender, and, consequently, his applicable
    guideline range was not affected by Amendment 706. We affirmed the district
    court’s order. See D.E. 79.
    On August 27, 2012, Mr. Williams filed a new § 3582(c)(2) motion arguing
    that, even though he was a career offender, he was entitled to a sentence reduction
    based on Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The United States filed a
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    response in opposition, asserting that Mr. Williams is ineligible for a sentence
    reduction because he was sentenced as a career offender and, therefore,
    Amendment 750 does not impact his sentencing range. The district court denied
    Mr. Williams’ motion, and this appeal followed.
    “In a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, ‘we review de novo the district court's legal
    conclusions regarding the scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines.’”
    United States v. Moore, 
    541 F.3d 1323
    , 1326 (11th Cir. 2008). Under § 3528(c)(2),
    a district court may reduce the terms of a defendant’s imprisonment if the sentence
    was based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the
    Sentencing Commission. If, however, “a retroactively applicable guideline
    amendment reduces a defendant's base offense level, but does not alter the
    sentencing range upon which his or her sentence was based, § 3582(c)(2) does not
    authorize a reduction in sentence.” 
    Moore, 541 F.3d at 1330
    .
    In this case, Mr. Williams is not eligible for a reduced sentence under
    Amendment 750 because he was sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1. His
    sentencing guidelines remain unchanged because § 4B1.1 was not affected by
    Amendment 750. See 
    id. at 1327 (holding
    that defendants sentenced as career
    offenders under § 4B1.1 are not entitled to sentence reductions based on
    Amendment 706, which amended the base offense levels for crack cocaine
    offenses in § 2D1.1); United States v. Lawson, 
    686 F.3d 1317
    , 1319 (11th Cir.
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    2012) (holding that Moore remains binding precedent and applies to Amendment
    750).
    Mr. Williams’ claim for relief under the Fair Sentencing Act is similarly
    foreclosed by our binding precedent. In United States v. Berry, 
    701 F.3d 374
    , 377
    (11th Cir. 2012), we held that the Fair Sentencing Act is not a guidelines
    amendment by the Sentencing Commission and, therefore, cannot be the basis for a
    sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). In addition, Mr. Williams was sentenced
    before the effective date of the FSA, and it is not retroactively applicable to him.
    See 
    id. (“We agree with
    every other circuit to address the issue that there is ‘no
    evidence that Congress intended [the FSA] to apply to defendants who had been
    sentenced prior to the August 3, 2010 date of the Act's enactment.’”) (citation
    omitted). See also United States v. Hippolyte, No. 11-15933, ___ F.3d ___, ___,
    
    2013 WL 978695
    , at *5 (11th Cir. Mar. 14, 2013) (same).
    Finally, Mr. Williams’ Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge is
    the type of “extraneous resentencing issue” that is not cognizable in a § 3582(c)(2)
    motion. See United States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 781-82 (11th Cir. 2000)
    (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to address defendant’s
    constitutional claim in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding). See also Dillon v. United States,
    560 U.S. ___, ____, 
    130 S. Ct. 2683
    , 2691-92 (2010) (noting that § 3582(c)(2) has
    a limited scope and purpose). Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to
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    address this constitutional issue, it could not have plainly erred by failing to
    consider sua sponte Mr. Williams’ equal protection challenge. If Mr. Williams
    desires to make a constitutional challenge to his sentence, § 3582(c)(2) is not the
    proper vehicle.
    For these reasons, we find that all of the arguments raised by Mr. Williams
    are squarely foreclosed by our prior precedent, and “there can be no substantial
    question as to the outcome of this case.” See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 
    406 F.2d 1158
    , 1162 (5th Cir. 1969) (summary disposition is appropriate in cases
    where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that
    there can be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case”). Accordingly,
    the United States’ motion for summary affirmance is granted, the judgment of the
    district court is affirmed, and the United States’ alternative motion for extension of
    time to file a brief is denied as moot.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-15608

Judges: Tjoflat, Pryor, Jordan

Filed Date: 6/4/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024