Gregory L. Johnson v. Secretary, US Department of Veterans Affairs , 517 F. App'x 933 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14287
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-21364-PCH
GREGORY L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, US DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(May 1, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gregory Johnson, a black male, appeals the summary judgment the District
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Court’s granted the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“the VA”) in his
employment discrimination case, filed pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16,
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Johnson claimed that the VA failed to promote him to a
supervisor position on account of his race. The District Court denied the claim
because Johnson failed to show that the VA’s reason for not promoting him—that
he was not the best candidate for the position—was a pretext for discrimination. 1
He argues that the court erred in making that determination because, among other
things, the panel formed to interview the candidates for the position was
improperly composed and failed to interview him (and others similarly situated) in
violation of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the VA and the
American Federation of Government Employees. We affirm.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the record and drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Kernel
Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 2012). We may affirm
the district court on any adequate ground, however, even if it is other than the one
on which the court relied. Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117
F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997).
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine
1
Johnson also argues that the District Court erred in requiring him to show pretext
because the VA’s race neutral reason for the challenged employment decision was merely post
hoc justification. Johnson did not present this this argument to the District Court; hence, we
decline to address it. See Ramirez v. Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1249-50
(11th Cir. 2012).
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issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the initial burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact, but “[o]nce the
movant adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial.” Kernel Records
Oy, 694 F.3d at 1300. “Evidence that is merely colorable, or is not significantly
probative of a disputed fact cannot satisfy a party’s burden, and a mere scintilla of
evidence is likewise insufficient.” Id. at 1301 (citations and quotations omitted).
“Title VII prohibits employers—including the federal government—from
discriminating against employees on the basis of race.” Ramirez v. Secretary, U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239, 1243 (11th Cir. 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a).
This provision, § 2000e-16(a), expanded coverage of Title VII to federal
employees to the same extent that it was already applicable to non-federal
employees. Llampallas v. Mini–Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th
Cir.1998) (citations omitted). Relatedly, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, an employee has
a right to be free of discrimination by an employer based on race in the
performance of a contract. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). These two statutes “have the
same requirements of proof and use the same analytical framework.” Shields v.
Fort James Corp., 305 F.3d 1280, 1282 (11th Cir. 2002).
In considering whether to grant summary judgment of an employment
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discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence, as was the case here, the
District Court assesses the claim using the burden-shifting framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668(1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of
presenting sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to determine that he has
satisfied the elements of his prima facie case. Id. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. Here,
there is no dispute that Johnson made out a prima facie case—that is, that he
belonged to a protected class based on his race; that he was qualified for and
applied for the open position; that he was not selected; and finally, that the position
was filled by an individual outside his protected class. See Vessels v. Atlanta
Independent School System, 408 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir. 2005) (articulating prima
facie elements for discriminatory failure to promote claim). The burden thus
shifted to the VA to produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S.Ct. at 1824.
Here, the selection of the candidate deemed to be the most qualified, even if based
on the subjective criteria of the decisionmaker, was legally sufficient to meet the
VA’s burden of production. See Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group,
Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348-1350 (11th Cir. 2007).
Since the VA satisfied this burden of production, Johnson had to come
forward with evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that
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the reasons the VA gave were pretextual. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). He
could do so by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies or contradictions in [the VA’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its
actions that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.”
Springer, 509 F.3d at 1348. Importantly, conclusory allegations of discrimination,
without more, are insufficient to show pretext. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co.,
101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). Moreover, “[a] reason is not pretext for
discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that
discrimination was the real reason.” Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson
County, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original and quotations
omitted).
When analyzing the issue of pretext, the “[f]ederal courts do not sit as a
super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions.”
Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(quotations omitted). Regarding the use of subjective evaluations of a job
candidate’s qualifications, we have stated that “subjective evaluations of a job
candidate are often critical to the decisionmaking process.” Id. at 1033. “Personal
qualities also factor heavily into employment decisions concerning supervisory or
professional positions.” Id. Although an interview may be critical in evaluating a
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candidate’s personal qualities, it may not be necessary where the decisionmaker
has first-hand knowledge of the candidate. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1350. In the
context of a promotion, “a plaintiff cannot prove pretext by simply arguing or even
by showing that he was better qualified than the [person] who received the position
he coveted. A plaintiff must show not merely that the defendant's employment
decisions were mistaken but that they were in fact motivated by race.” Brooks,
446 F.3d at 1163 (quotations omitted). To show pretext by a disparity in
qualifications, Johnson had to show that “the disparities between the successful
applicant’s and his own qualifications were of such weight and significance that no
reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial judgment, could have chosen the
candidate selected over [him].” Springer, 509 F.3d at 1349 (quotation omitted).
Even where an employer violates internal policies in a hiring decision, it does not
necessarily indicate racial discrimination. See id.Here, the District Court determined that Johnson failed to rebut the VA’s
nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision and thus failed to raise an inference of
pretext. We find no error in its determination. As the court recognized, even if the
interview panel’s composition and its failure to interview Johnson constituted
violations of the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between the VA and the
American Federation of Government Employees, a breach of internal policies
alone does not amount to a showing of pretext. See Springer, 509 F.3d at 1350.
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Moreover, notwithstanding any such violations, the VA presented a valid
nondiscriminatory reason for declining to interview the internal candidates, namely
management’s personal familiarity with each. See id. Indeed, Johnson even
admitted that he had been interviewed for the open position three times previously,
including once or twice by his second-line supervisor, who was also the
recommending official for the open position.
Moreover, while the panel included an individual from a different division
not intimately familiar with the responsibilities of the Supervisory USRO position
to which Johnson applied, that individual was a last minute substitution owing to
an emergency and there is no indication in the record that he harbored a racially
discriminatory intent. As for the qualifications matrix used to evaluate Johnson
and the other internal candidates, there does not appear to be any evidence that it
was first utilized in this instance, but even if so, there is nothing suspect in the
criteria employed—i.e., the quality of the candidates’ applications, their
supervisory experience, and an overall HR rating. While these factors certainly
allowed for a large measure of subjective evaluation, that is permitted under Title
VII. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1033.
Next, it does not follow, as Johnson contends, from the fact that his
personnel record does not recount any notable deficiencies in attention to detail
and communication skills—two qualifications important for the open position
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alluded to by management—that he was more qualified in these respects than was
the external candidate who was hired. But even assuming that Johnson was more
qualified, the disparity between the two was not so great that no reasonable person
could have passed over him. Finally, the recommending official’s alleged
statement, when read in context, appears benign. It may, to be sure, signal a lack
of confidence in Johnson and the other internal candidates, but it does not suggest
that the official’s assessment was premised on account of race.
For these reasons, the judgment of the District Court is
AFFIRMED.
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