Aaron H. Holley v. Secretary, Department of Corrections ( 2013 )

Case: 12-12113 Date Filed: 05/15/2013 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-12113
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cv-01111-TJC-MCR
AARON H. HOLLEY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(May 15, 2013)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges:
PER CURIAM:
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Aaron H. Holley, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Holley argues that the Florida court’s adjudication of his claim—
that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel—was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law. Upon careful review of the record and
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
Holley was indicted for possessing and selling cocaine in four separate
cases, three of which were the subject of hearings on April 21, 2003. The Florida
trial judge conducted a detailed Faretta 1 inquiry upon a request by Holley to
represent himself in one of those cases, but did not repeat the inquiry for the case
which is the subject of the present petition. Although pretrial matters for the cases
were handled together, and Holley was otherwise made aware of the benefits of
counsel and the disadvantages of proceeding pro se, he contends on this appeal that
his waiver of his right to counsel in the related case is not transferrable to this one.
He asserts that he never affirmatively waived his right to counsel in this case, and
any alleged waiver was unknowing because the court failed to conduct another
Faretta inquiry before allowing him to proceed pro se.
1
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541, (1975).
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The district court denied Holley’s petition, and found it clear that the judge
and the parties were operating under the assumption that the Faretta inquiry in one
case was applicable to the others, and that Holley’s waiver of counsel in the
present case was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
We review de novo the district court’s determination that the standard for
granting a § 2254 petition has not been met. Van Poyck v. Florida Dep’t of Corr.,
290 F.3d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
(AEDPA), federal courts cannot grant federal habeas relief unless the state court’s
decision was (1) contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
federal law as defined by Supreme Court precedent or (2) based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the assistance of
counsel during all critical stages of the criminal justice process. Iowa v. Tovar,
541 U.S. 77, 80–81, 124 S. Ct. 1379, 1383 (2004). The Constitution guarantees a
defendant the right to conduct his own defense. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S. Ct.
at 2541. But, in order to do so, he must “knowingly and intelligently” waive his
right to counsel. Id. at 835, 95 S .Ct. at 2541.
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The Supreme Court has described a waiver of counsel as knowing and
voluntary when the defendant “knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open.” Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88, 124 S. Ct. at 1387 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Supreme Court has not, however, “prescribed any formula or script
to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.” Id.Thus, “the failure to provide on-the-record warnings does not always lead to
reversal,” because “the ultimate test of whether a defendant’s choice is knowing is
not the adequacy of the trial court’s warning but the defendant’s understanding.”
Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The information a defendant must possess to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver “will depend on a range of case-specific factors.”
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88, 124 S. Ct. at 1387. However, the “core inquiry is whether
the defendant understood the choices before him” and the risks of self-
representation. Jones, 540 F.3d at 1293. Moreover, “it is irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether his understanding comes from a colloquy with the
trial court, a conversation with his counsel, or his own research or experience.” Id.Holley has not shown that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his
right to assistance of counsel, and therefore, the Florida court’s adjudication of his
claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court. We agree with the district court that while it
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would have been preferable for the Florida court to have conducted a separate
Faretta inquiry before permitting Holley to represent himself, the failure to do so
does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional violation. Holley made it
abundantly clear that he desired to represent himself, and he rejected the offer of
appointed counsel on numerous occasions. Holley was made aware of the nature
of the charges and the possible penalties, the benefits of proceeding with counsel,
and the disadvantages of proceeding pro se through his discussions with the court
and his counsel, his prior experience in criminal proceedings, and the Faretta
hearing that was conducted in the related case in which Holley represented himself.
Therefore, Holley made the choice to represent himself “with eyes open.” See
Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88, 124 S. Ct. at 1387 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
also note that Holley had the benefit of two public defenders as stand-by counsel at
his trial. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying him habeas relief,
and we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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