United States v. Lee Conder James , 536 F. App'x 913 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15953
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-00006-SPM-GRJ-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEE CONDER JAMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(September 16, 2013)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Lee Conder James appeals his conviction and mandatory minimum 20-year
sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute greater than 1,000
kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and
846. On appeal, James argues that (1) the evidence supporting his conviction was
insufficient, and (2) the court procedurally erred by imposing the mandatory
minimum sentence by relying on the jury’s special verdict for drug quantity
without conducting further fact finding. After thorough review, we affirm.
We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction,
drawing all reasonable factual inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict.
United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 840 (11th Cir. 2009). We review
sentencing arguments raised for the first time on appeal for plain error. United
States v. Bacon, 598 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2010). To establish plain error, the
defendant bears the burden to show that there was (1) error, (2) that was plain, and
(3) that affects substantial rights, and we may then exercise discretion to notice a
forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceeding. Id. An error is “plain” if it is obvious and
clear under current law. Id.First, we are unconvinced by James’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction. Evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of
fact could find that it established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Beckles, 565
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F.3d at 840. A determination concerning a witness’s credibility is the exclusive
province of the jury. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir.
1997). On appeal, a witness will be considered incredible as a matter of law only
if the testimony is unbelievable on its face, including testimony to events that
could not have been observed or could not have occurred under the laws of nature.
Id. We have said that a witness’s criminal history or incentive to give particular
testimony does not make the testimony incredible as a matter of law. Id.To convict a defendant of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was (1) an agreement between the
defendant and at least one other person, (2) the object of which was to violate the
narcotics laws. See United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).
The government may prove these elements by circumstantial evidence, and need
not demonstrate the existence of a formal agreement. Id. In order to have an
“agreement” to support a conspiracy conviction, the government must prove the
existence of “an agreement with the same joint criminal objective.” United States
v. Dekle, 165 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1999). The government need not show that
a defendant knew of every aspect or detail of a conspiracy, but rather needs to
prove that the defendant knew of the “essential nature” of the conspiracy. United
States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1269-70 (11th Cir. 2005).
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To sustain a conviction for a substantive violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
the government would have had to prove three elements: (1) knowledge; (2)
possession; and (3) intent to distribute. United States v. Garcia-Bercovich, 582
F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Thompson, 473 F.3d
1137, 1142 (11th Cir. 2006) (providing that “the government must have proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] knowingly possessed the drugs
with intent to distribute them”).
Here, James does not argue that a conspiracy did not exist and does not
argue that his actions did not aid that conspiracy. However, he argues that there
was insufficient evidence that he was aware that the conspiracy involved the
distribution of an illegal substance -- namely, marijuana. Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government, there are two pieces of evidence that
particularly show that James had actual knowledge of the marijuana: (1) his
codefendant’s testimony, as a cooperating witness, that, at some point during the
course of the conspiracy, he told James that the packages he was helping him
unload contained marijuana, and (2) an agent’s testimony that, when he searched
the warehouse where James had unloaded and broken up the crate where the
marijuana was stored, the warehouse smelled of marijuana. James’s argument that
his codefendant’s testimony should be considered incredible as a matter of law
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because of his criminal history and incentive to testify is foreclosed by our
precedent. See Calderon, 127 F.3d at 1325.
Thus, giving every reasonable inference in favor of the verdict, it appears
that at some point during the conspiracy, James learned that the incoming
shipments that he helped unload contained marijuana and agreed to continue his
role. This evidence -- that James knowingly continued to facilitate large shipments
after learning that they contained marijuana -- supports the jury’s verdict that
James conspired to distribute marijuana. His insufficiency argument fails.
Next, we find no plain error in the sentencing court’s reliance on the jury’s
drug quantity finding. To begin with, a defendant abandons an issue on appeal if
he does not “plainly and prominently” address it in his appellate brief. United
States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). Recently, we
explained that, under Jernigan, any claim that is not clearly and unambiguously
addressed in a discrete section may be considered abandoned. Brown v. United
States, __ F.3d __, 2013 WL 3455676, *12 (11th Cir. July 10, 2013). Along a
similar vein, a defendant may not challenge as error a ruling that he invited.
United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006); see also F.T.C. v.
AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 65-66 (11th Cir. 2013) (concluding that a party
that had argued for a certain standard in the district court invited error insofar as it
sought a different standard on appeal). In Love, we held that a defendant could not
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challenge his eligibility for supervised release where, at sentencing, he requested a
sentence that included a term of supervised release. 449 F.3d at 1157.
A defendant, convicted of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance,
faces a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment if the defendant
was responsible for 1,000 kilograms or more of a mixture containing marijuana
and has a prior felony drug offense. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(vii) and
846. In determining an applicable statutory minimum sentence, a defendant is
responsible for drugs associated with conspiracy activities in which he is involved
and for the drugs involved in subsequent acts that are in furtherance of the
conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. United States v. Chitty,
15 F.3d 159, 162 (11th Cir. 1994). We later said, under Chitty, that a sentencing
court was required to make an individualized finding of the quantity of a substance
that could be attributed to a defendant based on reasonable foreseeability. United
States v. O’Neal, 362 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated sub nom. Sapp v.
United States, 543 U.S. 1106 (2005), reinstated sub nom. United States v. Sapp,
154 F. App’x 161 (11th Cir. 2005). We again later clarified that a jury’s special
verdict as to the quantity of drugs attributable to an entire conspiracy should not be
automatically applied to each individual defendant without an individualized
finding, supportable by a preponderance of the evidence, as to the drug quantity
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foreseeable by that defendant. Bacon, 598 F.3d at 778. In Bacon, we held that the
court’s failure to make individualized findings was error and was plain. Id.As an initial matter, James may have invited any error arising out of the
imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum sentence. At sentencing, James
told the court that he was subject to a 20-year mandatory sentence and asked the
court to impose a 20-year sentence. Now, on appeal, he argues that the imposition
of that statutory minimum was in error, suggesting that any error arising out of that
sentence was invited. But in any event, the error that he alleges was not, under our
precedent, error that was plain, despite the government’s concession to the
contrary. Bacon required the sentencing court to make individualized findings
where the jury made a finding as to the drug quantity only for the overall
conspiracy. Id. Here, the district court did not rely on a generalized finding of
drug amount attributable to the conspiracy as a whole, but rather it relied on a jury
finding as to the amount of drugs attributable specifically to James. Therefore,
under Bacon, it was not error for the court to have relied on the jury’s special
verdict where, as here, the jury made an individualized conclusion. See id. at 777. 1
1
It is unclear to what extent Bacon and O’Neal remain applicable law after the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013). There,
the Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, any fact that
increases the applicable minimum sentence is an element of the offense and therefore must be
submitted to the jury. Id. at 2162-63. Thus, the scenario contemplated in Bacon and O’Neal --
where a judge was required to determine each defendant’s liability after the jury reached a
generalized special verdict of the overall conspiracy’s quantity -- can no longer arise under
Alleyne, because the jury would be required to make any finding that enhances the minimum
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AFFIRMED.
sentence. However, here, James does not raise a constitutional argument, so we do not consider
this claim. Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1283 n.8. And in any event, as we’ve discussed above, the jury
in this case made a finding about the amount of drugs attributable only to James.
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