United States v. Earl Dawson Hunter , 536 F. App'x 955 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-15961
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:10-cr-00336-JSM-TGW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EARL DAWSON HUNTER,
a.k.a. Fifty,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 27, 2013)
Before HULL, JORDAN, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Earl Dawson Hunter appeals his 290-month sentence of imprisonment,
which the district court imposed upon his conviction for distributing five or more
grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court
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initially sentenced Hunter to 360 months of imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)
in May 2011, but we vacated Hunter’s sentence and remanded for resentencing
under the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”). Upon resentencing, the district
court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months of
imprisonment. It then sentenced Hunter, who was now subject to sentencing under
§ 841(b)(1)(C), to 290 months of imprisonment. In explaining Hunter’s sentence,
the district court stated that it considered the Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, and found that Hunter’s sentence was sufficient, but not greater
than necessary to comply with the statutory purposes of sentencing.
On appeal, Hunter argues the district court’s explanation of his sentence
failed to comply with § 3553(c)(1) inasmuch as his Guidelines range exceeded 24
months, and the district court failed to articulate its reasons for choosing a
particular sentence within that range. He also argues his sentence is substantively
unreasonable given his age at the time of his release, the non-violent nature of his
offense, and the small amount of cocaine base involved in his offense. Finally,
Hunter argues the district court’s amended judgment erroneously cites
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) as the statute of conviction, and we should remand to the
district court in order to correct the amended judgment to reflect his conviction
under § 841(b)(1)(C).
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I. § 3553(c)(1)
We review the district court’s compliance with § 3553(c)(1) de novo
regardless of whether the defendant objected before the district court. United
States v. Bonilla, 463 F.3d 1176, 1181 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2006). If the district court
imposes a sentence within a defendant’s Guidelines range that exceeds 24 months,
it must state its reasons for imposing a sentence at a particular point within the
Guidelines range. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1). The sentencing court should, when
stating its reasons for imposing a particular sentence pursuant to § 3553(c), tailor
its comments to demonstrate that the sentence imposed is appropriate in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors. Bonilla, 463 F.3d at 1181-82. Thus, we have concluded that the
district court’s explanation of its sentence was insufficient where there was no
consideration or mention of the § 3553(a) factors. See id.; see also United States v.
Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (vacating and remanding a
sentence for compliance with § 3553(c)(1) where the district court failed to provide
any reason for the life sentence that it imposed); United States v. Veteto, 920 F.2d
823, 824, 826-27 (11th Cir. 1991) (remanding for compliance with § 3553(c)(1)
because the trial court explained its sentence with the “truism” that the chosen
punishment “seemed right”).
Nonetheless, a sentencing court does not have to incant the specific language
used in the Guidelines that applies to each reason given, nor must it state that a
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particular factor is inapplicable in a given case. Bonilla, 463 F.3d at 1182.
Nothing requires the district court to articulate its consideration of each individual
§ 3553(a) factor when explaining a sentence under § 3553(c)(1), especially when it
is obvious that the district court considered many of the § 3553(a) factors. Id.
Thus, we have held that the district court’s explanation of a sentence complied
with § 3553(c)(1) where the district court stated it was satisfied that the
defendant’s sentence was consistent with the Guidelines, was in accord with the
§ 3553(a) factors, adequately reflected the seriousness of the defendant’s offense,
and was neither greater nor lesser than necessary to achieve the statutory purposes
of sentencing. Id. at 1181-82. Reviewing the record as a whole, we noted that, in
addition to its explanation, the district court gave the parties the opportunity to
make arguments on the § 3553(a) factors and heard the defendant’s statement of
remorse, thereby making it obvious that the district court considered many of the
§ 3553(a) factors. See id.
The court discussed Hunter’s criminal record, including multiple drug
offenses, dating back to a very young age. Counsel and the court discussed
Hunter’s drug addiction, his daily use of drugs and alcohol, his failure to complete
a drug treatment program while on supervised release and his need for treatment.
During resentencing, the district judge stated: “After considering the advisory
sentencing guidelines and all of the factors identified in Title 18 of the United
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States Code, Sections 3553(a)(1) through (7), the Court finds that the sentence
imposed is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the statutory
purposes of sentencing.” (R.9 at 16).
The district court heard arguments from the parties addressing the § 3553(a)
factors, and then explained that Hunter’s sentence was premised upon its
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Viewing the record as a whole, the district
court’s explanation satisfied its responsibilities under § 3553(c)(1).
II. Substantive Reasonableness
We review the reasonableness of a defendant’s sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct.
586, 591, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007), and the party challenging the sentence bears
the burden of demonstrating that it is unreasonable, United States v. Talley, 431
F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). The district court must impose a sentence that is
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of
sentencing listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the needs to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, protect the
public, and provide needed educational or vocational training, or medical care. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The district court must also consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, the kinds
of sentences available, the applicable Guidelines range, pertinent policy statements
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from the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities, and the need for restitution. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
A district court abuses its discretion when it balances the § 3553(a) factors in
such a way that is not reasonable, or places unreasonable weight upon a single
factor. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189, 1192-94 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc). We will only reverse a sentence as substantively unreasonable if, after
considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, we are left with the definite
and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
weighing the § 3553(a) factors so that the sentence falls outside the range of
reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case. Id. at 1189-90. So long as
the district court does not commit a clear error of judgment, we will not substitute
our own judgment regarding the weight assigned to relevant sentencing factors for
that of the district court. See United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2012). Sentences that fall within the applicable Guidelines range are
ordinarily expected to be reasonable, and the fact that a sentence falls appreciably
below the statutory-maximum penalty further tends to indicate substantive
reasonableness. See United States v. Valnor, 451 F.3d 744, 751-52 (11th Cir.
2006); Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
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Hunter has not demonstrated that the district court committed a clear error in
judgment when imposing his 290-month sentence of imprisonment, and his
sentence is, accordingly, substantively reasonable.
III. The District Court’s Amended Judgment
We may remand with instructions to correct a clerical error in the judgment.
United States v. James, 642 F.3d 1333, 1343 (11th Cir. 2011). Moreover, it is
fundamental error for a court to enter a judgment of conviction against a defendant
who has not been charged, tried, or found guilty of the offense cited in the
judgment. Id.The district court’s amended judgment incorrectly reflects a conviction
under § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Accordingly, a remand is appropriate for the limited
purpose of correcting the amended judgment to reflect a conviction under
§ 841(b)(1)(C).
IV. Conclusion
We affirm Hunter’s sentence, but remand for the limited purpose of
correcting the judgment.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REMANDED IN PART.
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