Evelyn B. Vandenbrink v. Jeremy Joseph Voneschen , 542 F. App'x 728 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-10829
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:12-cv-00897-JSM-TBM
EVELYN B. VANDENBRINK,
Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
RICHARD BERG,
Individually and on behalf of all
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
versus
JEREMY JOSEPH VONESCHEN,
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a foreign corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 27, 2013)
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Before PRYOR, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Evelyn B. Vandenbrink appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her third
amended complaint for failure to state a claim against her insurer, State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, and Jeremy Joseph Voneschen. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Vandenbrink sought a declaratory judgment and a permanent
injunction against State Farm that would protect the proceeds of a settlement that
resolved Vandenbrink’s personal injury claim against Voneschen. See Fla. Stat.
§ 86.011. Vandenbrink received medical payment benefits from State Farm that
were subject to repayment after Vandenbrink was “made whole.” State Farm
notified Vandenbrink that it intended to seek reimbursement if she were made
whole, but State Farm did not take any action to collect its payments and later
disclaimed any present intent to obtain any of the proceeds of Vandenbrink’s
settlement. Because Vandenbrink’s complaint presents a controversy not ripe for
judicial review, we vacate the order that dismissed her complaint for failure to state
a claim and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
Vandenbrink was injured in an automobile accident caused by Voneschen.
Vandenbrink paid some of her medical expenses using medical payment benefits
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disbursed by State Farm. Voneschen’s insurance company refused to settle, and
Vandenbrink sued Voneschen.
State Farm notified Vandenbrink’s attorney that it intended to seek
reimbursement if Voneschen fully compensated Vandenbrink for her losses. On
August 3, 2011, State Farm sent Vandenbrink a letter stating that it “intend[ed] to
pursue a subrogation claim for . . . Medical Payments Coverage in the amount of
$6,584.50.” On March 7, 2012, State Farm sent Vandenbrink a second letter
stating that it “intend[ed] to seek recovery for the [$8,509.54] paid under the
Medical Payments Coverage (MPC) portion of the policy as allowed under Florida
Sources Statute 768.76.” The March letter stated that State Farm “underst[ood]
that [its] right to recovery [was] contingent upon [Vandenbrink] being made whole
by the settlement . . . negotiate[d] with the tortfeasor or [his] insurance carrier.”
Vandenbrink settled her dispute with Voneschen, paid her attorney’s fees
and outstanding medical bills, and deposited the remainder in a trust account.
Vandenbrink amended her complaint against Voneschen to add a putative class
action against State Farm, and State Farm removed the amended complaint to the
district court. Later, Vandenbrink filed a second amended complaint that added
new claims against State Farm and named Richard Berg as a co-plaintiff. The
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district court dismissed the second amended complaint and allowed Vandenbrink
to replead.
Vandenbrink filed a third amended complaint that requested, on behalf of
herself and other similarly situated residents of Florida, a declaration under the
Florida Declaratory Judgment Act that State Farm was “not entitled to seek
reimbursement or subrogation for medical benefits [it had] paid.” See Fla. Stat.
§ 86.011. Vandenbrink alleged that she “[had] not [been] made whole because she
did not recover the full value of her case, which, at a minimum, was at least
$40,000” and that State Farm knew it “had no right to [seek reimbursement or
subrogation for medical benefits it had paid] if [Vandenbrink] had not been made
whole.” Vandenbrink also alleged that State Farm had “pressed its standard and
commonly followed practice and course of conduct seeking reimbursement or
subrogation,” as revealed in its letters dated August 3, 2011, and March 7, 2012.
State Farm moved to dismiss Vandenbrink’s third amended complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1), (b)(6), and to strike her request for class certification, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(d)(1)(D). State Farm argued that Vandenbrink’s allegations were inadequate to
“support a claim for declaratory relief.” State Farm argued that “no controversy or
doubts [existed] as to the rights of the parties because the Policy complies with [the
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requirement under] Florida law . . . [that there was no right of reimbursement until
an insured was made whole] and because State Farm [had] not taken any action
contrary to the Policy.”
The district court ruled that Vandenbrink had standing to seek a declaratory
judgment because she risked injury “if State Farm pursue[d] its subrogation claim
before Vandenbrink [was] made whole,” but that she had failed to state a claim that
she faced an imminent injury as required under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The district court ruled that the complaint failed to allege a “present controversy
about” the right of State Farm to reimbursement when the parties agreed that “any
subrogation right [was] subject to [Vandenbrink] being ‘made whole by the
settlement negotiated’” with Voneschen. The district court also ruled that
Vandenbrink failed to “sufficiently allege that an actual need for [a] declaration is
imminent because she did not allege that she [had] paid any money to State Farm,
that State Farm actually [had] received a portion of [Vandenbrink’s] settlement
from [Voneschen], or that State Farm [had] initiated any action against
[Vandenbrink] seeking to recover payments.” The district court dismissed
Vandenbrink’s third amended complaint and dismissed as moot the motion to
strike her request for class certification.
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We review de novo issues involving subject matter jurisdiction. See Digital
Props., Inc. v. City of Plantation, 121 F.3d 586, 589 (11th Cir. 1997). The
jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to actual cases and controversies.
“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal
courts to cases and controversies of sufficient concreteness to evidence a ripeness
for review.” Id. For a controversy to be ripe for review, “the complained-of injury
must be immediate or imminently threatened.” Wilderness Soc’y v. Alcock, 83
F.3d 386, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). In other words, it must be “the correct time for the
complainant to bring the action.” Id.The district court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Vandenbrink’s third
amended complaint because she did not face an “injury imminent enough for
purposes of judicial decisionmaking.” See id. at 390. State Farm asserted a right
to reimbursement, but it also acknowledged that it could not recover its medical
payments until Vandenbrink was “made whole” for her injuries. See Schonau v.
GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., 903 So. 2d 285, 287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). State Farm
has not exercised its right to reimbursement since Vandenbrink collected her
settlement proceeds, and State Farm avows that it “does not seek recovery of [the]
funds” that Vandenbrink placed in a trust account. Because Vanderbrink does not
face even the threat of an injury, her complaint is nonjusticiable.
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We VACATE the order that dismissed Vandenbrink’s third amended
complaint for failure to state a claim and REMAND with instructions for the
district court to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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