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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-12294
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 0:16-cr-60352-WJZ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSHUA MAXWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(April 4, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, WILLIAM PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Joshua Maxwell appeals his sentence for carjacking, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2119(1), which included special conditions of supervised release. On
appeal, Maxwell argues that the District Court abused its discretion in imposing
special conditions of supervised release requiring him to participate in a sex-
offender treatment program and preventing him from having unsupervised contact
with minors, contact with minors in employment, and involvement in youth
organizations, because the conditions are not reasonably related to the instant
offense and involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to
deter criminal activity, protect the public, and promote rehabilitation.
We review the imposition of special conditions of supervised release for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Moran,
573 F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009).
We will reverse only if we have a definite and firm conviction that the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in its conclusion.
Id.
A court may impose a special condition of supervised release to the extent
that the condition: (1) is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the
offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate
deterrence, the need to protect the public, and the need to provide the defendant
with needed training, medical care, or correctional treatment in an effective
manner; (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary
to accomplish the goals of deterrence, protecting the public, and rehabilitation; and
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(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D). It is not necessary
for a special condition to be supported by each factor enumerated in § 3553(a).
Moran, 573 F.3d at 1139. Rather, each is an independent consideration to be
weighed.
Id.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
these special conditions on Maxwell’s release. During sentencing the Court heard
testimony that Maxwell had received less than two years of psychological
treatment prior to his carjacking offense, and that he failed to report his sex-related
convictions to the psychologist during his treatment. Thus, although Maxwell’s
sex-related convictions were a decade old at the time of his sentencing for
carjacking, he never received psychological treatment related to his sexual
misconduct with a minor. Hence, the District Court had a reasonable basis upon
which to conclude that psychological examination and treatment related to that
offense was appropriate, and that the related restrictions on interacting with minors
were justified. 1 We therefore conclude that the District Court’s decision was
reasonably related to Maxwell’s history and characteristics, the need to protect the
1
We acknowledge, as did the Government at sentencing, that neither the parties nor the
Court had enough information to know whether Maxwell’s mental state at the time of sentencing
warranted imposition of the restrictions imposed by the Court. Perhaps the wiser course of
action would have been to first order a mental examination and then to impose special conditions
afterwards if necessary. But in light of our case law and our deference to the District Court’s
discretion, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the Court committed a clear
error of judgment in imposing those conditions. See
Moran, 573 F.3d at 1137.
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public, and the need to provide Maxwell with needed medical care and correctional
treatment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D).
These restrictions were not greater than was reasonably necessary to
effectuate those goals. Maxwell’s prior convictions stemmed from sodomizing a
child under the age of twelve on more than one occasion. Limiting Maxwell’s
contact with minors and simultaneously requiring him to undergo sex-offender
treatment are not disproportionate measures in light of the heinous nature of
Maxwell’s prior conduct. Nor are the restrictions necessarily absolute: Maxwell
can still interact with minors under supervision and he may seek permission from
the U.S. Probation Office if he wishes to make unsupervised contact with minors.
Finally, Maxwell’s treatment requirement is not necessarily indefinite, as he will
be required to undergo follow-up treatment only if his care provider determines
that additional treatment is necessary.
Our conclusion is buttressed by this Court’s previous decision in Moran. In
Moran, we upheld special supervised-release conditions related to potential sexual
misconduct, rejecting the argument that the conditions were inappropriate because
there was no reasonable relationship between the conditions and the defendant’s
instant conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Moran, 573 F.3d at
1134–35. Ten years before his felon-in-possession conviction, Moran had been
convicted for a lewd and lascivious act on a child under 16 and sexual assault and
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had been arrested three times for sexual crimes against his wife and child.
Id. at
1135–36. Moran was also living with his girlfriend and her minor daughter after
failing to register as a sex offender under state law.
Id. at 1135. Accordingly, the
District Court imposed special conditions of supervised release, requiring that
Moran, among other things, participate in a sex-offender mental-health program
and refrain from contact with minors without probation-office approval.
Id. at
1136.
We held that the District Court had properly imposed these special
conditions.
Id. at 1139–41. We concluded that the Court did not abuse its
discretion in ordering the defendant to participate in a sex-offender mental-health
program because the defendant was a convicted sex offender, had a documented
history of sex-related offenses, and treatment could assist him in avoiding similar
future misconduct, which would protect the public.
Id. at 1139. We rejected the
argument that ten-year-old sex-crime convictions were too remote in time to be
relevant and noted that the defendant was discovered in a household containing a
minor female after failing to register as sex offender under state law.
Id. Applying
plain-error review, we further concluded that the defendant’s previous incidents
involving minor victims justified a special condition prohibiting direct contact with
minors, since it promoted rehabilitation and protected the public.
Id. at 1140.
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Although Moran is distinguishable from the instant case because Moran’s
sexual misconduct was more extensive than Maxwell’s and Moran failed to
register as a sex offender (which Maxwell was not required to do), this Court’s
decision did not turn solely on the number of offenses or facts suggesting
continuing problems. Instead, our decision rested largely on whether the District
Court’s imposition of sex-offender-based restrictions was reasonably related to
rehabilitating Moran and protecting the public. See
id. at 1139 (“Treatment could
assist Moran in avoiding similar future misconduct, which would protect the
public.”). We think the latter is the proper inquiry in this case as well, and, based
upon Maxwell’s prior sexual-misconduct convictions and the uncertainty
surrounding his mental state at the time of his sentencing for carjacking, the
District Court’s imposition of sex-offender restrictions on his release was
reasonably related to his rehabilitation and the public’s protection.
AFFIRMED.
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