Case: 17-13513 Date Filed: 04/04/2018 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-13513
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:17-cv-00225-LJA
SELECHA ALLEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, BALDWIN STATE PRISON,
DEPUTY WARDEN, BALDWIN STATE PRISON,
WARDEN, DODGE STATE PRISON,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(April 4, 2018)
Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Selecha Allen, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of her
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint for failure to state a claim. She argues the district
court erred when it construed her complaint as only asserting a violation of her
federal right to intimate association and did not consider her state law claims. She
also argues her claim had merit because she was not a prisoner and thus stated a
different claim for relief due to a deprivation to her rights, not her fiancé’s. After
review, 1 we affirm the district court.
The district court did not err when it dismissed Allen’s federal constitutional
claim. See Brooks v. Warden,
800 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (explaining a
complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face”). Allen does not have the constitutional right to unrestricted visitation
with her fiancé, who is a prisoner. While Allen correctly asserts that her right to
intimately associate with her fiancé, and not his right, is at issue here, it necessarily
follows that the prison’s discretion to restrict his visitation would restrict her
ability to visit him. See Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126, 131-32 (2003)
(providing prisoners do not “altogether” lose their right to intimate association
while in prison, but “[m]any of the liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens
must be surrendered by the prisoner . . . [and] freedom of association is among the
1
We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint filed in forma pauperis
for failure to state a claim de novo. Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr.,
254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir.
2001).
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rights least compatible with incarceration”); Evans v. Johnson,
808 F.2d 1427,
1428 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A convicted prisoner has no absolute constitutional right to
visitation, such privilege being subject to the discretion of prison authorities,
provided the visitation policies of the prison meet legitimate penological
objectives.”). The fact that Rufus was in segregation demonstrates the prison had a
penological objective to restrict his visitation rights. See
Overton, 539 U.S. at
131-34 (recognizing that prohibiting the visitation of former inmates, restricting
the visitation privileges of inmates with two substance-abuse violations, and
requiring children to be accompanied by a parent or legal guardian when visiting
all served legitimate penological objectives); Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted,
35
F.3d 521, 525 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding, in the context of qualified immunity, that
restricting visitations between a prisoner and his wife because she had provided
him with contraband did not violate clearly established law because inmates did
not have “an absolute right to visitation”); Jackson v. Humphrey,
776 F.3d 1232,
1240-42 (11th Cir. 2015) (granting summary judgment on qualified immunity to
prison officials who restricted a plaintiff’s visitation rights with her husband
because she was instigating a hunger strike, as the officials did not violate any
clearly established law). The restriction on Allen visiting Rufus was an
unavoidable consequence of the prison’s ability to restrict his right to visit her. See
Overton, 539 U.S. at 131-34.
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To the extent Allen intended to allege a freestanding First Amendment
claim, prison officials also have the discretion to impose time, place, and manner
restrictions on outside visitors and thus did not violate her rights by restricting
visitation. See Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 826-27 (1974) (determining
prisons may impose reasonable time, place, and manner regulations on speech for
security concerns, such as “the imposition of some restrictions on the entry of
outsiders into the prison for face-to-face contact with inmates” so long as
reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no
discrimination in terms of content is involved). Accordingly, the district court did
not err when it determined Allen failed to state a plausible federal claim for relief
and dismissed her complaint.
The district court also did not err when it failed to consider Allen’s state law
claims because it no longer had original jurisdiction over her complaint after
dismissing her federal claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367(c).
AFFIRMED.
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