Larkin Lloyd Derks, III v. Centurian Medical, LLC ( 2021 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 21-10785    Date Filed: 12/17/2021   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-10785
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    LARKIN LLOYD DERKS, III,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CENTURION MEDICAL, LLC,
    A. OAKS,
    Medical Administrator,
    DR. GUZMAN-RODRIGUEZ,
    DR. JASON BRENES-CATINCHI,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    USCA11 Case: 21-10785         Date Filed: 12/17/2021    Page: 2 of 4
    2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-10785
    V. BAKER,
    Medical Administrator, et al.,
    Defendants.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 6:18-cv-00451-PGB-EJK
    ____________________
    Before LUCK, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Larkin Derks, III, a pro se state prisoner, filed a 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     action against a private contractor that provided medical ser-
    vices to his prison—Centurion Medical, LLC (“Centurion”)—and
    three of its employees—Brenes-Catinchi, Oaks, and Guzman-Ro-
    driguez—alleging that they refused to provide medical care or fol-
    low specialists’ recommendations regarding his back and shoulder
    injuries. He appeals the denial of two Rule 59(e) motions. The first
    motion was filed after the district court dismissed his complaint as
    to Centurion, Brenes-Catinchi, and Oaks because Derks failed to
    exhaust his administrative remedies, and the second was filed after
    the district court dismissed his complaint as to Guzman-Rodriguez
    based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Derks argues that he
    USCA11 Case: 21-10785         Date Filed: 12/17/2021    Page: 3 of 4
    21-10785               Opinion of the Court                         3
    did not receive one of two identical motions to dismiss and, thus,
    did not have the opportunity to respond to the exhaustion argu-
    ments raised in that motion.
    I.
    We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of
    discretion. Lambert v. Fulton Cnty., Ga., 
    253 F.3d 588
    , 598 (11th
    Cir. 2001). The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are
    newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. Ar-
    thur v. King, 
    500 F.3d 1335
    , 1343 (11th Cir. 2007).
    Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all
    the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
    the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objec-
    tions. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 
    559 U.S. 260
    ,
    272, 
    130 S. Ct. 1367
    , 1378 (2010). It does not require actual notice.
    Jones v. Flowers, 
    547 U.S. 220
    , 225, 
    126 S. Ct. 1708
    , 1713 (2006).
    Pro se litigants must conform to procedural rules. Albra v.
    Advan, Inc., 
    490 F.3d 826
    , 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Con-
    sequently, arguments not raised on appeal, even by pro se litigants,
    are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874
    (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). An appellant also abandons a claim
    when: (1) he makes only passing reference to it, (2) he raises it in a
    perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and authority,
    (3) he refers to it only in the “statement of the case” or “summary
    of the argument,” or (4) the references to the issue are mere
    USCA11 Case: 21-10785       Date Filed: 12/17/2021    Page: 4 of 4
    4                     Opinion of the Court                21-10785
    background to the appellant’s main arguments. Sapuppo v. All-
    state Floridian Ins. Co., 
    739 F.3d 678
    , 681-82 (11th Cir. 2014).
    Here, the district court properly denied Derks’s Rule 59 mo-
    tion as to Centurion, Oaks, and Brenes-Catinchi because the sec-
    ond motion to dismiss contained identical exhaustion arguments,
    so Derks had actual notice of them and not receiving the first mo-
    tion did not deny him the opportunity to respond to them. Addi-
    tionally, Derks does not raise and, thus, abandons any argument as
    to newly-discovered evidence.
    II.
    Derks abandons his claim that the district court abused its
    discretion by denying Derks’s Rule 59 motion as to Guzman-Ro-
    driguez. In his brief, he merely states that Guzman-Rodriguez was
    an employee of a private company and not a government agency
    or local government, without providing any supporting arguments
    as to newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors or citing any
    authority. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.