Hua Hui Chen v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                     Case: 11-13260            Date Filed: 11/16/2012   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-13260
    ________________________
    Agency No. A073-767-298
    HUA HUI CHEN,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                               Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                                Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (November 16, 2012)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Hua Hui Chen, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the Board of
    Case: 11-13260    Date Filed: 11/16/2012   Page: 2 of 8
    Immigration Appeals’ denial of her second motion to reopen her removal
    proceedings. Chen contends that the BIA abused its discretion in finding that she
    failed to show changed country conditions in China that would warrant reopening
    her removal proceedings.
    I.
    Chen, a native of Langqi Town in the Fujian Province, illegally entered the
    United States in 1994 and has since given birth to three children. An immigration
    judge ordered her removed in 2003, and the BIA affirmed that decision in 2004.
    In 2007 Chen filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings based on changed
    conditions in China. The BIA denied that motion, finding that Chen failed to
    show a material change in the enforcement of the family planning policy in the
    Fujian Province.
    On December 3, 2010, Chen filed a second motion to reopen her removal
    proceedings, contending that country conditions in China had changed since the
    BIA denied her 2007 motion to reopen. She argued that officials in the Fujian
    Province were more strictly enforcing China’s one-child family planning policy
    and that she feared sterilization upon return to China because she has three
    children. She also argued that she was eligible for asylum and withholding of
    removal. In support of her second motion, Chen submitted 67 exhibits, many of
    2
    Case: 11-13260     Date Filed: 11/16/2012    Page: 3 of 8
    which pre-date her first motion to reopen in 2007.
    The BIA denied Chen’s second motion to reopen her removal proceedings,
    finding that she failed to show that the one-child policy is currently enforced more
    strictly in the Fujian Province than it was at the time of the original removal
    proceeding. Chen filed this petition for review.
    II.
    “We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings for
    abuse of discretion.” Zhang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    572 F.3d 1316
    , 1319 (11th Cir.
    2009) (alteration omitted). “[R]eview is limited to determining whether the BIA
    exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner.” 
    Id.
    An alien generally may file only one motion to reopen removal proceedings,
    and it must be filed no later than 90 days after the final administrative decision. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.23
    (b)(1). These limitations, however, do not apply when: (1) the
    motion to reopen seeks asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the
    Convention Against Torture; (2) the motion is predicated on changed country
    conditions; and (3) the evidence of changed conditions is material and could not
    have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. 
    Id.
     §
    1003.23(b)(4)(i). Because motions to reopen removal proceedings are disfavored,
    the movant bears a heavy burden to present material evidence, which is evidence
    3
    Case: 11-13260     Date Filed: 11/16/2012     Page: 4 of 8
    that would likely change the result of the case if the proceedings were reopened.
    Jiang v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    568 F.3d 1252
    , 1256–57 (11th Cir. 2009).
    The BIA may deny a motion to reopen based on: (1) a failure to establish a
    prima facie case of eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal; (2) a failure
    to introduce evidence that is material and was previously unavailable; or (3) a
    determination that despite the alien’s statutory eligibility for relief, he or she is not
    entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion. Li v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    488 F.3d 1371
    , 1375 (11th Cir. 2007). In the present case the BIA based its decision on the
    second ground.
    III.
    Chen argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her second
    motion to reopen because her evidence showed a material change in country
    conditions. She argues that the BIA should not have relied on the 2007
    Department of State Country Report that she submitted with her second motion to
    reopen. The BIA, however, is entitled to rely heavily on State Department Reports
    to determine country conditions. Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    369 F.3d 1239
    , 1243 (11th Cir. 2004). The 2007 Country Report states that although
    Consulate General officials in the Fujian Province found that public coercion has
    been used to enforce the family planning policy, they did not find any cases where
    4
    Case: 11-13260     Date Filed: 11/16/2012    Page: 5 of 8
    physical force was used in connection with abortion or sterilization. The report
    further notes that United States officials in China were not aware of any national
    or local policy that would require either the husband or the wife to be sterilized
    when a Chinese couple returns to China with foreign born children. Based on the
    contents of the Country Report, we cannot say that the BIA abused its discretion in
    relying on that report in finding that Chen had failed to show that the conditions
    had changed in the Fujian Province.
    Chen also argues that the BIA abused its discretion in discounting as
    unpersuasive a 2009 report authored by Dr. Flora Sapio, which criticized the 2007
    Country Report. The BIA, however, was not required to accept Dr. Sapio’s
    opinion over the Department of State’s Country Report. 
    Id.
     In any event, Dr.
    Sapio’s opinion does not support Chen’s claim that there has been an increase in
    forced sterilization in the Fujian Province. Her opinion was that there is no
    consensus about whether forced sterilization and abortions are now used to
    implement China’s family planning policy. The BIA did not abuse its discretion
    by discounting the persuasive value of Dr. Sapio’s report.
    Chen next contends that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to properly
    consider the record in three ways. First, she argues that it ignored official
    5
    Case: 11-13260        Date Filed: 11/16/2012       Page: 6 of 8
    documents from China that were not authenticated.1 That was not an abuse of
    discretion, however, because official documents are required to be authenticated in
    BIA proceedings, 
    8 C.F.R. § 1287.6
    (c)(1), and we have held that
    “[u]nauthenticated documents lack veracity and are entitled to no deference,”
    Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    672 F.3d 961
    , 964 (11th Cir. 2011). In any event, the
    BIA did not ignore the unauthenticated official documents that Chen submitted. It
    mentioned all of them later in its decision, indicating that it considered them as
    evidence but chose to give that evidence little or no weight.2
    1
    Of her 67 exhibits, the unauthenticated official documents were Exhibits A, B, E, F, G,
    H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z, AA, BB, CC, DD, and FF.
    2
    The BIA listed the following official documents in its decision: the Nationality Law of
    the People’s Republic of China; the 1958 Household Registration Regulations of the People’s
    Republic of China; Answers to People’s Visits and Letters Regarding Birth Policy Issues for
    Chinese Staying Abroad; the Ying Qian Town Q&A Handbook; the Q&A Handbook from the
    Family Planning Office of Langqi Town; inquiries and responses from the Fuzhou Call Center
    for the Convenience of the People, the Beautiful Family website, and the Fujian Province
    Population and Family Planning Committee; regulations from the Population and Family
    Planning Bureau of Cangshan District, the Fuqing Municipal People’s Government, the
    Population and Family Planning Bureau of Xiuyu District, the People’s Government of Xiang
    An, Luanfeng Township, the People’s Government of Nanyang Town, Sha County, the National
    Territory Resources Bureau of Zhangpu County, Guantou Township, Ying Qian Town, and
    Quanzhou City Rural Area; documents that purport to be from the Chang Le City Population and
    Family Planning Leadership Group, the Chinese Community Party Chang Le City Shou Zhan
    Township Committee, and the Shou Zhan Township Population and Family Planning Leadership
    Group; and correspondence from the Fujian Province Population and Family Planning
    Commission. After discussing the relevant law, the BIA found that “[t]he evidence indicates that
    social compensation fees, job loss or demotion, loss of promotion opportunity, expulsion from
    the party, destruction of property, and other administrative punishments are used to enforce the
    family planning policy. . . . It reflects that China regards a child of Chinese nationals who have
    not permanently settled in another country as a Chinese national, but is not sufficient to
    demonstrate that the respondent will face forcible sterilization.”
    6
    Case: 11-13260        Date Filed: 11/16/2012       Page: 7 of 8
    Second, Chen argues that the BIA failed to consider other evidence in the
    record by ignoring unofficial evidence that was not authenticated, including a
    letter from one Chinese citizen and an affidavit from another who both claimed
    that they were sterilized after returning to China with two foreign-born children,
    and a statement by a third Chinese citizen who was granted asylum in 2008 based
    on a fear of sterilization if forced to return to China. Because there is no
    authentication requirement for unofficial documents, the BIA may not refuse to
    consider these documents at all solely because they are unauthenticated. Cf. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1287.6
    (c)(1) (requiring official documents to be authenticated). That is
    not, however, what the BIA did in this case. Instead, it stated: “The respondent’s
    evidence from persons in China unrelated to her has not been authenticated, and
    she has not shown that the circumstances in their cases are the same as the
    circumstances in her case. See Supplemental Exhibits C, D, GG, BBB, GGG,
    HHH, III, KKK.” 3 The BIA, therefore, did not refuse to consider the
    3
    The 8 exhibits listed by the BIA are the only exhibits in the record pertaining to people
    in China who are not related to Chen, and both of the BIA’s reasons for discounting the evidence
    apply to all of those exhibits: they are all unauthenticated, and they all involve people who are
    not from the same town in the Fujian Province as Chen. Choosing not to give much evidentiary
    weight to exhibits because they are unauthenticated and because they do not involve Chen’s
    hometown is not the same as ignoring the exhibits. The BIA, under its own precedents, may give
    limited weight to evidence from different towns in the same province. See In re S-Y-G, 
    24 I. & N. Dec. 247
    , 258 (BIA 2007) (finding that because of the “localized nature of family planning
    enforcement,” documents on family planning enforcement in different localities or provinces are
    not as helpful as documents relating to the petitioner’s hometown because they shed no light on
    7
    Case: 11-13260        Date Filed: 11/16/2012       Page: 8 of 8
    unauthenticated unofficial exhibits evidence altogether, but instead chose to give
    that evidence little or no weight because it was unauthenticated and involved
    people who were not similarly situated to Chen.
    Third, Chen contends that the BIA improperly considered the evidence by
    ignoring some of her exhibits because they were “incomplete.” The BIA did note
    that some of Chen’s exhibits were incomplete, but there is no indication that it
    refused to consider any of them for that reason alone. We will not assume that the
    BIA failed to consider certain reports and transcripts just because it did not discuss
    each one in its decision. The BIA is not required to specifically address every
    piece of evidence presented to it “[w]here [it] has given reasoned consideration to
    the petition, and made adequate findings.” Seck v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    663 F.3d 1356
    , 1364 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is especially
    true in a case like this, where Chen submitted to the BIA 67 exhibits, many with
    subparts.
    PETITION DENIED.4
    its policy).
    4
    Because we hold that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to
    show changed country conditions in China that would warrant reopening her removal
    proceedings, we do not reach the merits of her claim that she is prima facie eligible for asylum
    and withholding of removal relief. See Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    565 F.3d 805
    , 810 (11th Cir.
    2009) (holding that an alien cannot file a successive asylum application except as part of a
    properly filed motion to reopen).
    8