United States v. Ronald J. Trucchio , 196 F. App'x 825 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-13242                 September 14, 2006
    Non-Argument Calendar           THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 04-00348-CR-T-24-TGW
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RONALD J. TRUCCHIO,
    a.k.a. Ronnie One Arm,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    (September 14, 2006)
    Before DUBINA, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronald J. Trucchio (“Trucchio”) appeals the district court’s order denying
    his motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A grand jury indicted Trucchio for one count of conspiracy to violate the
    Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) laws, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (d). Specifically, the grand jury charged that Trucchio was a “capo”
    or “captain” in the Gambino crime family who supervised and controlled Mafia
    “crews” operating in New York, New Jersey, the Southern District of Florida, the
    Middle District of Florida, and elsewhere, in return for “tribute,” or a share of the
    crews’s proceeds. According to the indictment, members of the crew included
    John Alite, Steven Catalano, Michael Malone, Kevin McMahon, Terry Scaglione,
    Pasquale Andriano, and others (collectively, “the Alite crew”). The grand jury
    further charged that the statutory enterprise, an association in fact, was the Alite
    crew, operating under the authority of the Gambino crime family, and that,
    between 1984 and 2005, Trucchio and the Alite crew conspired with each other to
    violate § 1962(c). The pattern of racketeering activity was premised upon 11
    violations of federal and state laws, including murder, extortion, and drug
    trafficking.
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    Prior to the instant case, a Southern District of Florida grand jury convicted
    Trucchio for RICO conspiracy. There, the grand jury charged that Trucchio was a
    capo in the Gambino crime family who supervised and controlled Mafia crews
    operating in New York, Florida, and elsewhere. According to the indictment, the
    crew in question referred to themselves as the “Liberty Posse” and the “Young
    Guns,” and included Peter Zuccaro, Kevin Antinuche, Gennaro Bruno, Edward
    Callegari, Robert Bucholz, Darrin Sirrota, Frank Roccaforte, David Prevete, and
    Jamie Carr, and others (collectively, the “Liberty Posse crew”). The grand jury
    further charged that the statutory enterprise, an association in fact, was the
    Gambino crime family and that, between 1986 and 2004, Trucchio and the Liberty
    Posse conspired to violate § 1962(c). That pattern of racketeering activity was
    premised upon 17 violations of federal and state laws, including murder, extortion,
    and drug trafficking.
    II. DISCUSSION
    On appeal, Trucchio argues that because he may be convicted of the instant
    charges based upon the same facts for which he was tried and convicted in the
    Southern District case, the district court should have granted his motion to
    dismiss. He asserts that the conspiracy charged in the instant case is identical to
    the conspiracy charged in the Southern District case because (1) the time periods
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    overlap, (2) there is overlap in the persons charged with the conspiracy, and (3) all
    of the criminal offenses charged in the instant case, except violations of New
    Jersey law, were charged in the earlier case. Next, Trucchio asserts that neither of
    the indictments identify an enterprise other than the Gambino crime family and
    that, essentially, the government created artificial divisions within that enterprise
    for the purposes of the prosecutions. Finally, he argues that the government’s
    Rule 404(b) letter in the Southern District case stated that all the evidence
    presented at trial was relevant and material to that case, and, thus, because the
    government failed to give him notice of the uncharged crimes of the Alite crew, all
    of the evidence was direct evidence of the charged conspiracy.
    This court reviews de novo a district court’s ruling on double jeopardy.
    United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 
    17 F.3d 1354
    , 1360 (11th Cir. 1994). We
    have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders regarding application of the
    Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Duarte-Acero, 
    208 F.3d 1282
    , 1284
    (11th Cir. 2000).
    The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no person shall “be subject for
    the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. Const. amend.
    V. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects defendants in three situations: (1) A
    second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) A second prosecution
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    for the same offense after conviction; and (3) Multiple punishments for the same
    offense. Jones v. Thomas, 
    491 U.S. 376
    , 380-81, 
    109 S. Ct. 2522
    , 2525 (1989).
    Generally, when presented with a double jeopardy claim to charges involving
    distinct statutory provisions, the courts must determine “whether each provision
    requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v.
    United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304, 
    52 S. Ct. 180
    , 182 (1932). We have noted,
    however, that the Blockburger test is insufficient to analyze a double jeopardy
    challenge to successive conspiracy charges, because the government “could divide
    a single conspiracy into two separate charges by alleging different overt acts for
    the two conspiracies when in fact only one conspiracy existed.” United States v.
    Loyd, 
    743 F.2d 1555
    , 1562 (11th Cir. 1984). We also have observed that “the
    peculiar nature of the RICO statute” further complicates the analysis. United
    States v. Ruggiero, 
    754 F.2d 927
    , 931 (11th Cir. 1985).
    Section 1962(c) of the RICO statute provides:
    It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
    any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
    or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
    in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
    racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (c). In Ruggiero, we held that “pattern of racketeering activity”
    is a separate element of the RICO offense, and, thus, a defendant may be
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    prosecuted for more than one violation of § 1962(c) in connection with the same
    enterprise, without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause, so long as each
    violation involved a different pattern of racketeering activity. Ruggiero, 
    754 F.2d at 931
    . We enumerated five factors to be considered in determining whether a
    defendant has been charged with different patterns of racketeering activity: (1)
    whether the activities occurred during the same time periods; (2) whether the
    activities occurred in the same places; (3) whether the activities involved the same
    persons; (4) whether the two indictments alleged violations of the same criminal
    statutes; and (5) whether the overall nature and scope of the activities set out in the
    two indictments were the same. 
    Id. at 932
    . The fifth factor is the most important
    factor. 
    Id. at 933
    . We also noted that the presence of one particular “racketeering
    act” in both indictments was “not significant,” as one racketeering act may be part
    of two different patterns of racketeering activity. 
    Id. at 934
    .
    Because the two indictments charged different patterns of racketeering
    activity, specifically the activities of two different Mafia “crews” under Trucchio’s
    control, each of which engaged in similar but distinct activities, we conclude that
    the district court did not err in denying Trucchio’s motion. Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court’s order denying Trucchio’s motion to dismiss.
    AFFIRMED.
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