Martha Gladys Baquero v. U.S. Atty. Gen. , 199 F. App'x 864 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    _________________________   ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCT 5, 2006
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    No. 05-17097
    CLERK
    Non-Argument Calendar
    _________________________
    Agency Nos. A95-218-099
    A95-216-498
    MARTHA GLADYS BAQUERO,
    GABRIEL ANDRES SANTOS BAQUERO,
    MARIA CAROLINA SANTOS BAQUERO,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (October 5, 2006)
    Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Martha Gladys Baquero, her children Gabriel Andres Santos Baquero and
    Maria Carolina Santos Baquero, natives and citizens of Colombia,1 petition for
    review of the adoption and affirmance by the Board of Immigration Appeals
    (“BIA”) of the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The decision denied
    asylum and withholding of removal. No reversible error has been shown; we deny
    the petition.
    We review the decisions of the IJ and the BIA in this case. See Al Najjar v.
    Ashcroft, 
    257 F.3d 1262
    , 1284 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that we review the BIA’s
    decision; but “[i]nsofar as the [BIA] adopts the IJ’s reasoning, we will review the
    IJ’s decision as well”). An IJ’s factual determination that an alien is not entitled to
    asylum “must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Mazariegos v.
    U.S. Attorney Gen., 
    241 F.3d 1320
    , 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). “Under this highly
    deferential test, we affirm the IJ’s decision if it is supported by reasonable,
    substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Forgue
    v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 
    401 F.3d 1282
    , 1286 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
    and alteration omitted). “To reverse the IJ’s fact findings, we must find that the
    1
    Baquero included her children as derivatives in her asylum application. We refer only to
    Baquero in this opinion; but our decision about Baquero also applies to her children.
    2
    record not only supports reversal, but compels it.” Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney
    Gen., 
    327 F.3d 1283
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
    An alien may obtain asylum if she is a “refugee”: a person unable or
    unwilling to return to her country of nationality “because of persecution or a
    well-founded fear of persecution on account of” a protected ground, including
    political opinion. 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
    (a)(42)(A); 1158(a)(1), (b)(1). An imputed
    political opinion can be a protected ground. See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289 (“An
    asylum applicant may prevail on a theory of imputed political opinion if he shows
    that the persecutor falsely attributed an opinion to him, and then persecuted him
    because of that mistaken belief about his views.”) (internal quotation and
    alteration omitted).
    The asylum applicant bears the burden of proving statutory “refugee” status.
    Id. at 1284. To establish a well-founded fear of future persecution, the alien must
    “present specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he or she will
    be singled out for persecution on account of” the protected ground. D-Muhumed
    v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 
    388 F.3d 814
    , 818 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
    omitted); see also Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration, 
    894 F.2d 1292
    , 1297 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Even a clear probability that an alien’s life is
    3
    threatened without any indication that the basis of the threat is related to a
    statutorily enumerated ground is insufficient to establish eligibility for relief.”).
    Baquero testified that her husband, who owned cattle farms in Colombia,
    did not provide the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (“FARC”), a
    guerilla organization, with access to his land or with fuel or food, as the FARC
    had demanded. Baquero’s husband instead contacted neighboring farmers and
    urged them to form a watch group. Baquero then began to receive threatening
    telephone calls from persons who claimed to be members of the FARC and who
    accused Baquero’s husband of being a “snitch” and threatened to kill Baquero’s
    husband and his family. Later, when Baquero, her husband, and their children
    were traveling in their car, another car stopped them; and the persons in the other
    car displayed guns and shouted that they were kidnaping the Baqueros. But
    Baquero and her family escaped from the attempted kidnaping. A few months
    later, Baquero and her children left Colombia for the United States.
    Baquero asserts that the IJ erred in determining that she had not
    demonstrated past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution based on
    her imputed political opinion as a result of her husband’s conflict with the FARC.
    Substantial evidence supports the determination that Baquero failed to meet her
    4
    burden that she had been persecuted, or that she faced a well-founded fear of
    future persecution, on a protected ground.
    Although we have explained that an alien may establish past persecution or
    a well-founded fear of future persecution based on her imputed political opinion,
    in this case, the alleged persecution of Baquero and her family resulted from her
    husband’s refusal to cooperate with the FARC’s demands and was not because of
    Baquero’s political opinion, imputed or otherwise. Nothing in the records shows
    Baquero’s political views. An alien’s refusal to cooperate with the FARC is not
    sufficient to qualify her for relief from removal. See Sanchez v. U.S. Attorney
    Gen., 
    392 F.3d 434
    , 438 (11th Cir. 2004).
    Substantial evidence also supports the conclusion that Baquero failed to
    show a well-founded fear of future persecution based on a protected ground. The
    record shows that future harm that Baquero or her family may experience would
    not result from Baquero’s political opinion, but instead would be on account of her
    husband’s decision not to comply with the FARC’s demands. Therefore, the
    evidence does not compel the conclusion that Baquero is eligible for asylum.2
    2
    To the extent that Baquero challenges the BIA’s conclusion that she could relocate to an area of
    Colombia where the FARC would not threaten her, we need not consider this argument because, for
    the reasons discussed, Baquero otherwise has failed to meet her burden that she is eligible for
    asylum.
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    Because she has failed to demonstrate that she is eligible for asylum, Baquero also
    has failed to meet the higher burden of proof required for withholding of removal.
    See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1292-93.
    Based on the foregoing, we deny the petition for asylum and withholding of
    removal.
    PETITION DENIED.
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