United States v. Francisco Duarte-Cuautle , 415 F. App'x 127 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-12316                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar            FEBRUARY 16, 2011
    ________________________               JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00558-WSD-RGV-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    FRANCISCO DUARTE-CUAUTLE,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (February 16, 2011)
    Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Francisco Duarte-Cuautle appeals his 37-month sentence imposed for
    illegally re-entering the United States after having been deported, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
    On appeal, Duarte-Cuautle argues that his sentence substantively is
    unreasonable based on a 16-level enhancement in his guidelines range for a 10-
    year-old robbery conviction.* Because of the age and non-violent nature of the
    offense, Duarte-Cuautle says that his case justified a sentence below the guidelines
    range. We evaluate the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a
    deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 
    128 S.Ct. 586
    , 597
    (2007).
    The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the
    sentence is unreasonable in the light of both the record and the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors. United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Briefly stated, under section 3553(a), a district court should consider the nature
    and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant,
    *
    See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) (providing for a 16-level enhancement for a defendant
    previously deported after a conviction for a crime of violence).
    2
    the need for the sentence to provide adequate deterrence, respect for the law, and
    protection of the public, provision for the medical and educational needs of the
    defendant, the guidelines range, policy statements of the Sentencing Commission,
    and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1)-(7).
    We conclude that Duarte-Cuautle’s 37-month sentence -- at the bottom of
    the applicable guidelines range -- substantively is reasonable. See Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 788
     (noting that “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the
    Guidelines range to be reasonable”). The sentence is well below the 20-year
    statutory maximum. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2); United States v. Valnor, 
    451 F.3d 744
    , 751-52 (11th Cir. 2006) (concluding that a 28-month sentence was reasonable
    because, among other things, the sentence was “appreciably below the length of
    the [180-month] statutory maximum”).
    In addition, the district court explained that a guidelines sentence was
    warranted in Duarte-Cuautle’s case because he repeatedly had broken United
    States immigration law and needed to be deterred from future violations. The
    district court also noted that Duarte-Cuautle’s criminal and immigration histories
    showed a lack of respect for the law. And the record reflects that Duarte-Cuautle
    earlier had been deported after a 1999 robbery conviction and again deported in
    3
    2007. Thus, the district court’s reasons for the sentence are supported by the
    record and the section 3553(a) factors; and we see no abuse of discretion in
    imposing a guidelines sentence.
    Duarte-Cuautle argues that his 10-year-old robbery conviction unreasonably
    lengthened his sentence. But the guidelines provide specifically for a 16-level
    enhancement to the base offense level for a defendant who previously was
    deported after a conviction for a “crime of violence,” which includes robbery.
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); section 2L1.2 comment. (n.1(B)(iii)). And this
    enhancement applies no matter the age of the conviction. United States v.
    Camacho-Ibarquen, 
    410 F.3d 1307
    , 1314-15 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Duarte-Cuautle contends that the robbery conviction formed the bases of the
    court’s sentence; but the district court chiefly relied on his recidivist violation of
    United States immigration law, and not the robbery conviction, in fashioning the
    sentence. We cannot say then, as Duarte-Cuautle contends, that the court placed
    too much weight on the guidelines range. United States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    ,
    1191 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that, unjustified reliance on any one section
    3553(a) factor may indicate an unreasonable sentence, but that the decision on
    how to weigh the factors is within the district court’s discretion).
    The district court abused no discretion in imposing a guidelines sentence;
    4
    and Duarte-Cuautle has not carried his burden of showing that his sentence is
    unreasonable. See Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 788
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-12316

Citation Numbers: 415 F. App'x 127

Judges: Tjoflat, Edmondson, Carnes

Filed Date: 2/16/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024