Bladimir Rios v. Secretary, Department of Corrections , 460 F. App'x 831 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-13655 FEB 22, 2012
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 5:08-cv-00239-WTH-TBS
BLADIMIR RIOS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(February 22, 2012)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bladimir Rios, a Florida prisoner, appeals pro se the denial of his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the Florida courts, Rios
collaterally attacked, Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850, his conviction for second degree
murder on the ground that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to move
for a judgment of acquittal. Because the Florida courts reasonably applied clearly
established federal law when they concluded that Rios had failed to establish that
his counsel had performed deficiently, we affirm.
We review de novo the denial of a writ of habeas corpus. Borden v. Allen,
646 F.3d 785, 808 (11th Cir. 2011). To obtain a writ of habeas corpus, a
defendant must prove that the decision of the state court was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established
federal law when the state court “‘identifies the correct governing legal principle
from [the] decisions [of the Supreme Court], but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520,
123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534–35 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413,
120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000)). To constitute an “unreasonable application” of
federal law, the decision of the state court must be “so lacking in justification that
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there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___,
131 S. Ct. 770, 786–87 (2011). A habeas petitioner must “[s]urmount . . . [a] high
bar” to overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded counsel under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), and he must
overcome the “doubly deferential” standard applied to the decisions of counsel
under section 2254(d)(1). Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788. In other words, the
petitioner must establish that no “reasonable argument [can be made] that counsel
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.The district court correctly denied Rios habeas relief. The Florida courts
reasonably concluded that Rios’s attorney had not been “deficient for failing to
raise a meritless” motion to acquit Rios of first degree murder. Freeman v. Att’y
Gen., 536 F.3d 1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2008). The Florida courts reasonably
determined that the state had presented sufficient evidence to prove that Rios had
murdered Elvin Rodriguez with “premeditated design.” Fla. Stat. §
782.04(1)(a)(1). One of Rios’s cohorts, Edgardo Mercado, testified that Rios
stabbed Rodriguez repeatedly because he was a snitch, and Mercado’s account of
the murder was consistent with the conditions at the murder scene and the findings
of the medical examiner that Rodriguez had been stabbed at least 87 times with
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two knives and had been struck in his left lung, aorta, and jugular vein. See Boyd
v. State, 910 So. 2d 167, 182 (Fla. 2005) (“[T]he deliberate use of a knife to stab a
victim multiple times in vital organs is evidence that can support a finding of
premeditation.”). Rios argues that the decision of the Florida courts was
unreasonable because a motion for a judgment of acquittal would have highlighted
the discrepancies between Mercado’s testimony and other evidence, but “[t]he fact
that the evidence is contradictory does not warrant a judgment of acquittal,”
Fitzpatrickv. State, 900 So. 2d 495, 508 (Fla. 2005). The Florida courts
reasonably concluded that Rios had failed to establish that his counsel was
ineffective.
We AFFIRM the denial of Rios’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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