Allen v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. , 155 F. App'x 480 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
__________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 21, 2005
No. 04-14430 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
__________________________
D.C. Docket No. 03-00089-CV-BBM-1
JOHN ALLEN,
RHONDA ALLEN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES, U.S.A., INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
______________________________
(November 21, 2005)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiffs-Appellants John and Rhonda Allen brought suit in the State Court
of Gwinnett County, Georgia, against Defendant-Appellee Toyota Motor Sales,
U.S.A., Inc. (“Toyota”), claiming damages for breach of written warranty, breach
of implied warranty, and revocation of acceptance, each under the Uniform
Commercial Code, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and Georgia statutory law.
Toyota removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. After trial, a jury
returned a verdict for Toyota. In this appeal, Plaintiffs, for the first time, challenge
the trial court’s jurisdiction. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
Plaintiffs’s complaint alleged that they purchased a 2002 Lexus for
$66,678.65, exclusive of collateral charges, such as bank and finance charges.
Plaintiffs asserted that the vehicle suffered various defects that violated the
vehicle’s written warranty and the implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiffs
claimed to have afforded the Lexus dealer a reasonable number of attempts to cure
the defects, but no cure was effected. The complaint sought an unspecified
amount of damages under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the Uniform
Commercial Code and Georgia law, for (without limitation) loss of use,
diminished value, lost wages, aggravation, and other incidental and consequential
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damages, together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Plaintiffs also
claimed they were entitled to either a refund of their purchase price or a free
replacement under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4), and to
a revocation of acceptance pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code and Georgia
statutory law, again together with reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
In its notice of removal, Toyota noted the parties complete diversity and that
the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. Toyota supported the amount in
controversy by reference to the Plaintiffs’s demand for damages in excess of the
$66,678.65 purchase price. Plaintiffs presented no challenge to the district court’s
diversity jurisdiction; indeed, the Joint Preliminary Report and Discovery Plan
(signed by counsel for both parties) states expressly that no question about the
district court’s jurisdiction exists, and the Joint Consolidated Proposed Pre-Trial
Order (signed by both parties and also signed by the district court judge) again
states expressly the absence of question about federal court jurisdiction.
After a jury verdict in favor of Toyota, Plaintiffs filed this appeal to raise a
single issue: whether the district court exercised properly subject matter
jurisdiction over this controversy. It is now Plaintiffs’s position that Defendant
failed to show a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeded
the requisite amount to support removal jurisdiction. Although Plaintiffs raise this
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issue only after the jury rendered a verdict against them, a jurisdictional defect
cannot be waived by the parties and may be raised at any point during litigation.
See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1998) (gathering
precedents acknowledging inability of parties to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on a federal court and recognizing court’s independent obligation to inquire into
jurisdiction whenever jurisdictional infirmity may exist).
Because this case was first filed in state court and removed to federal court
by Toyota, Toyota bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Williams
v. Best Buy Company, Inc., 269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001). When the
plaintiff fails to plead a specific amount of damages, the removing defendant, by a
preponderance of the evidence, must prove that the amount in controversy exceeds
the jurisdictional requirement. Id. With jurisdiction premised on diversity, Toyota
must show that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a).
When the complaint does not claim a specific amount of damages, “the
removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional requirement.” Best Buy, 269
F.3d at 1319. In Best Buy, the plaintiff sought damages for physical and mental
injuries she alleged she suffered when she tripped while entering a Best Buy store.
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The complaint sought general, special and punitive damages, each in unspecified
amounts. The notice of removal proffered no facts in support of the jurisdictional
amount; instead, the notice of removal stated only that the plaintiff refused to
stipulate that damages did not exceed $75,000 and that the jurisdictional amount
was exceeded. When the plaintiff appealed the district court grant of summary
judgment in favor of Best Buy, we asked the parties to brief whether the
jurisdictional amount was satisfied. Best Buy offered no evidence; it continued to
rely on the negative inference from Plaintiff’s refusal to stipulate and on its
unsupported conclusion that damages exceeded $75,000.
We said that “[a] conclusory allegation in the notice of removal that the
jurisdictional amount is satisfied, without setting forth the underlying facts
supporting such an assertion, is insufficient to meet the defendant’s burden.” Id.
at 1319-20. We rejected Best Buy’s assertion that the plaintiff’s refusal to
stipulate that her claims did not exceed $75,000.00, without more, satisfied Best
Buy’s burden on the jurisdictional issue. Id. at 1320. And because the record
contained no evidence relevant to the issue, we could not say “that the amount in
controversy more likely than not exceeds $75,000,” id. at 1320; we ordered a
limited remand for the district court to make factual findings on the amount in
controversy.
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Plaintiffs argue that Best Buy compels a remand; we disagree. The notice
of removal filed by Toyota -- unlike the notice of removal in Best Buy -- attaches a
specified amount ($66,678.65) to one component of the damage request.1 In
addition, the notice of removal set out other components of Plaintiffs’s claims for
damages. In the light of the quantified damages approaching the jurisdictional
amount by themselves, together with the specification of additional other damages
claimed, and combined with Plaintiffs’s representations before trial that no
question existed about the district court’s jurisdiction, on this record we can say --
unlike the Best Buy court -- “that the amount in controversy might well exceed the
jurisdictional amount.” Toyota shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied.2
AFFIRMED.
1
And the trial record makes clear that Plaintiffs-- by the time of removal -- deemed the defective
Lexus to be entirely without value because of alleged safety defects that the manufacturer was
unwilling or unable to remedy. See Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 949 (11th
Cir. 2000) (allowing consideration of post-removal evidence in assessing removal jurisdiction
provided the jurisdictional facts that support removal are judged as of the time of removal).
2
Although not cited in the district court, the parties’s briefs address an alternative basis for federal
jurisdiction: the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. That Act provides for
federal district court jurisdiction over certain warranty claims brought by a consumer, provided the
amount in controversy is at least $50,000 (exclusive of interest and costs). 15 U.S.C. §
2310(d)(3)(B). Because we conclude that the district court had diversity jurisdiction, we do not
consider whether this alternative source of federal jurisdiction was available.
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