[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 4, 2005
No. 05-12781 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-01282-CV-WBH-1
JANIS M. MOSS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(November 4, 2005)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Janis Moss appeals from a grant of summary judgment for Defendant
Bellsouth Telecommunications (BST). Moss filed her lawsuit in state court in
Georgia, alleging BST’s tort liability for assault, false imprisonment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (R.1-1 at Exh. A.) BST timely removed
the action to federal district court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), alleging federal
question jurisdiction under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a), and
28 U.S.C. § 1337. (R.1-1.) Moss did not object
to removal or move for remand to state court.
The district court granted BST summary judgment on the grounds that
Moss’s state tort claims were preempted by Section 301 of the LMRA. (R.1-19.)
The district court found that Moss’s allegations put at issue the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between BST and the Communications
Workers of America (Moss’s representative) and the terms of a settlement
agreement between BST and the union. (R.1-19 at 10-11.) We agree.
“‘When resolution of a state law claim is substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract,’
the state law claim has been preempted.” Bartholomew v. AGL Resources, Inc.
361
F.3d 133, 1338 (11 th Cir. 2004) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S.
202, 213,
105 S. Ct. 1904, 1912,
85 L.Ed. 2d 206 (1985)). On appeal, Moss
contends that her lawsuit does not place the terms of the CBA or the settlement
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agreement at issue. Examination of the complaint and the Joint Preliminary Report
and Discovery Plan (signed and filed jointly by the parties as required by Rule 16
and adopted by the district court as its pretrial order) compel a different
conclusion. The complaint incorporates into the counts for assault, false
imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress allegations that both
Moss’s right to a union representative and a previous settlement agreement were
violated during the tortious behavior. (R.1-1 at Exh.A, ¶¶ 7, 8, 14, 18, 22.)
Moreover, the Rule 16 report clearly puts the CBA and settlement agreement
between BST and the union at issue. (R.1-10 at 1, 2.) Therefore, the LMRA
preempts Moss’s state law claims. Summary judgment was appropriate.
AFFIRMED.
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