Curtis Spires v. John Paul , 581 F. App'x 786 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-16364
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cv-00045-BAE-JEG
CURTIS SPIRES,
a.k.a. Jimmie Canupp, Jr.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN PAUL,
Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment,
Georgia State Prison,
OFFICER MYER,
Individually and in his official capacity,
KIM THOMAS,
LARRY BREWTON,
Unit Manager, Georgia State Prison,
OFFICER TAMMIE THOMAS,
Emergency Response Team,
Georgia State Prison, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(September 16, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Curtis Spires, an inmate at Georgia State Prison (“GSP”), appeals the district
judge’s order granting two GSP officials’ motions to dismiss and the order
granting summary judgment to two other officials in an 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action
alleging Eighth Amendment violations. We affirm summary judgment in favor of
two officials, reverse the dismissal of the claims against the other two, and remand
for further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves two distinct sets of claims. First is Spires’s claim that
Unit Manager Larry Brewton and Security Chief Doug Williams violated the
Eighth Amendment by allowing an attack by his former cellmate, Deondrea Lee.
Second, Spires claims Officer Tammie Thomas and Deputy Warden of Care and
Treatment John Paul violated the Eighth Amendment by placing him in a cell
without potable water, which forced him to drink from a toilet. The district judge
granted summary judgment to Williams and Brewton and dismissed the claims
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against Thomas and Paul. We first address the relevant facts underlying the attack
and then move to deprivation of potable water.
A. Attack by Deondrea Lee
On August 9, 2010, Deondrea Lee was assigned to Spires’s cell. Their
pairing was not peaceful. Lee started by threatening to commit violence against
Spires if he ate pork.1 Spires complained to an unknown corrections officer,
“Hall” about Lee. In the presence of Officer Hall, Lee threatened to rape and kill
Spires. He submitted several “witness statement” forms to GSP officials, 2
complaining of the danger to him from Lee. On August 12, Lee punched Spires in
the face and, later that night, digitally raped Spires. Spires never reported the
attacks. An unknown number of days after the August 12 incident, Spires
complained to Brewton that “[he] was having problems with [Lee] and . . . wanted
to be moved.” ROA at 662. On August 17, Spires submitted a new witness
statement form, this time to Brewton. In the form, Spires stated: “I am in fear for
my life from Deondre[a] Lee my roommate . . . . I have been threatened w[ith]
bodily harm . . . but no one is helping me.” ROA at 713. Brewton forwarded the
witness statement to GSP’s classification committee, which handles placement of
prisoners. One day later, Spires was removed from the cell.
1
Lee, a Muslim, objected to Spires’s consumption of pork during Ramadan.
2
A “witness statement” is a form used by inmates seeking protection.
3
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On October 18, two months later, Spires was assigned by the classification
committee to be housed in Building E-4. Lee previously had been assigned to the
same building. The same day that Spires arrived in Building E-4, Lee assaulted
him. He suffered trauma to his head and a broken finger. Afterwards, Williams
and Brewton spoke with Spires about the attack.
B. Spires’s Confinement Without Potable Water 3
After Spires was removed from the cell with Lee, but before the October 18
assault, Spires was caught with marijuana. As punishment, he was to spend 21
days in an isolation cell. On September 28, while en route to the isolation cell,
Officer Thomas asked Spires who had given him the marijuana. Spires refused to
answer, and Thomas said: “Enjoy your stay in isolation with no water to drink.”
ROA at 109. Over the next two days, Spires informed several officers that the sink
in his cell was not working; consequently, there was no potable water in his cell.
Because of Spires’s extreme thirst, he had to drink water from the toilet. On
October 1, after begging several GSP officers for water, one gave him four cups of
water. The next day, he again had to drink water from the toilet because of
extreme thirst.
On October 3, Spires wrote letters to Deputy Warden Paul and two other
officials and informed them of his “ordeal of no water in cell from which to drink
3
We assume these facts, which are alleged in the complaint, are true for the purpose of
reviewing a dismissal. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012).
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and . . . drinking from [a] toilet was a[]lot to ask of someone.” ROA at 111.
Spires asked Paul to look into the matter. Later that day, Spires experienced
cramps, vomiting, diarrhea, and blood in his stool. He continued to ask various
GSP officers for drinking water over the next two days.
On October 6, Spires received a response from Paul stating:
You have no water in your cell in which to drink from.
Should have thought of the consequences before you got
caught with dope! You made yet another bad decision
that cost you the privile[]ge of walking around. If your
sink fountain does not work inform cell block officer so
that they can do a work order.
ROA at 113. Spires continued to be sick, exhibited blood in his stool, and was
unable to eat for the several days. Potable water was provided to Spires’s cell
seven days later.
C. Proceedings in District Court
Spires filed suit and asserted the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights as follows: (1) Officer Thomas, by placing Spires in a cell without potable
water; (2) Deputy Warden Paul, by failing to remedy the lack of potable water in
his isolation cell; (3) Unit Manager Brewton, by ignoring Spires’s complaints
about Lee, which resulted in Lee’s attack on Spires; and (4) Brewton and Security
Chief Williams, by allowing Spires to be moved into the same building as Lee,
which likewise resulted in Lee’s attack on Spires.
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The defendants moved to dismiss all claims. The district judge dismissed
Spires’s claims against Thomas and Paul for failure to state a claim, but denied the
motion to dismiss as to Spires’s claims against Brewton and Williams. After
discovery, Brewton and Williams moved for summary judgment. In addition to
documents and a deposition describing the events discussed in Part I.A, Spires
provided additional documents regarding Lee’s past acts. Spires submitted Lee’s
disciplinary history from 2003 to 2010, which attributed 48 separate incidents to
him, though none were violent.
Spires also provided an affidavit from another inmate, Calvin Hodge.
Hodge attested a group of inmates that included Lee had beaten him on August 18,
2010, during a dispute about stolen items. Hodge further attested he identified his
attackers, including Lee, to the “Dep[uty] Warden of Security.” ROA at 1132.
Finally, Spires provided an undated witness statement submitted by Lee. In
the statement, Lee reported he was getting “frustrated” with his cellmate, and,
absent an intervention, a physical conflict was likely to occur. ROA at 1221. The
district judge granted summary judgment to Brewton and Williams and concluded
that neither had sufficient notice of serious risk to Spires from Lee. This appeal
followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
We address first the summary judgment ruling, then move to the dismissal of
the claims against Thomas and Paul.
A. Summary Judgment in Favor of Williams and Brewton
On appeal, Spires challenges the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Unit Manager Brewton and Security Chief Williams as to Lee’s October 18, 2010,
attack on Spires. Spires argues the evidence was sufficient to show both
defendants knew of the serious risk Lee posed to Spires on that date and did
nothing to protect him.
We review a district judge’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Mann v.
Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). We consider the facts and
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We may affirm the judgment of the district court on
any grounds supported by the record. Koziara v. City of Casselberry, 392 F.3d
1302, 1306 n.2 (11th Cir. 2004).
1. Williams
To survive summary judgment on a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim, a
plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm,
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(2) defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk, and (3) causation. Carter v.
Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003). To establish a substantial risk of
serious harm, the condition complained of must pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to a prisoner’s future health or safety. Chandler v. Crosby, 379
F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004). To establish deliberate indifference, one must
show: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk;
(3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence. Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d
1288, 1312 (11th Cir. 2010). An official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk he
should have perceived, but did not, does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); see also
Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349 (explaining that deliberate indifference requires “much
more than mere awareness” of the “generally problematic nature” of an issue).
Regarding Spires’s claim against Williams, there is insufficient evidence to
conclude Williams had actual knowledge of any substantial risk to Spires posed by
Lee. Spires claims, and we accept, that he submitted four witness statement forms
to prison officials describing threats by Lee. There is no evidence, however, that
Williams was one of the officials that received these statements. Lee’s disciplinary
history, while extensive, had no violent incidents before the attack. The affidavit
from the other inmate, Hodge, does describe an attack by Lee in August 2010, but
Hodges attested he only told the Deputy Warden of Security, not Williams, who
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was Security Chief.4 And the undated witness statement submitted by Lee
threatening violence against his cellmate, presumably Spires, does not show
Williams had personal knowledge of the threat posed by Lee.
Nor did Spires establish that Williams was responsible for placing him into
Building E-4 with Lee. 5 The only connection Williams had to the October 18
attack was that he interviewed Spires afterwards. Although Williams served as
Security Chief for GSP, his position alone, without more, is insufficient to imply
actual knowledge and establish deliberate indifference. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at
838, 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1979, 1981; Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312; Chandler, 379 F.3d
at 1289-90.
2. Brewton
Regarding Brewton, there is evidence he had knowledge of the risk posed by
Lee. Spires notified Brewton that he was having problems with Lee. He also
submitted to Brewton the August 17 witness statement, which stated Spires feared
for his life because of Lee’s threats. Brewton was responsible for security in
Building E-4, where Spires was attacked by Lee.
4
It appears Williams has since been promoted to Deputy Warden of Security, but that
was not his position at the time of the attack.
5
Spires did submit a document containing Williams’s job description. One of the duties
of his position is serving, when appropriate, on the classification committee, which is responsible
for placement of inmates. Williams, however, explained he was not on the classification
committee at the time Spires was placed in Building E-4, and Spires did not refute it.
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But Brewton, like Williams, had nothing to do with Spires’s placement into
Building E-4. There is no evidence he knew Spires was being assigned to Building
E-4 on the day of the attack. Additionally, Spires was not assaulted until two
months after the threat.
Although the district judge did not rule on qualified immunity, Brewton
raised it in the district court and also raised it on appeal. Qualified immunity
protects government officials performing discretionary functions from suits in their
individual capacities. Whittier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir.
2009). It is not enough to establish that a defendant may have violated a
constitutional right; the plaintiff also must show the right was clearly established
such that a reasonable person would have known the conduct was unlawful. Id. at
1308.
Spires notified Brewton that he believed Lee was a threat to him. The belief
later turned out to be accurate, but there is simply nothing in the record that could
have corroborated Lee’s beliefs for Brewton. We have never held that a prison
official, faced with a bare allegation of a threat from an inmate, is subsequently
liable for any attack occurring after the threat. To the contrary, in Carter we held
that “there must be much more than mere awareness of [an inmate’s] generally
problematic nature.” Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. Our precedent simply does not
suggest, much less “clearly establish,” a prison official’s knowledge of a bare
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threat, without more, creates individual liability for a prison attack. This is
especially true where the attack occurred months after the threat. Accordingly, we
conclude Brewton is entitled to qualified immunity.
B. Dismissal of Claims against Officer Thomas and Deputy Warden Paul
Spires argues he sufficiently alleged constitutional violations against Officer
Thomas and Deputy Warden Paul, for the lack of potable water in his cell.
Thomas and Paul respond that Spires’s allegations required speculation to state a
cause of action. Thomas and Paul alternatively argue they were entitled to
qualified immunity.
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2012).
We accept the allegations in the complaint as true and and construe them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, if accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Pro se filings are
to be construed liberally, and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must
be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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To state an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983, a prisoner must allege
an extreme condition that poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the
prisoner’s future health or safety, and that the defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to that risk. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir.
2010); see also Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1298 (highlighting that “extreme
deprivations” are required to make out an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-
confinement claim (internal quotation marks omitted)). A prison official’s act or
omission that results in the denial of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities” is sufficiently serious to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Farmer,
511 U.S. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at 1977 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that an
Eighth Amendment violation may be found where a prison official disregards “an
inmate’s basic needs”).
In a conditions-of-confinement claim, deliberate indifference does not
require acts or omissions to have been committed for the purpose of causing harm
or with knowledge that harm will result. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835-36, 114 S. Ct. at
1978. It is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his or her
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981.
Prison officials, who actually knew of a substantial risk to an inmate’s health or
safety, may escape liability if they responded reasonably to the risk, even if the
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harm ultimately was not averted. Id. at 844, 114 S. Ct. at 1982-83; cf. id. at 847,
114 S. Ct. at 1984 (explaining that an official may be liable under the Eighth
Amendment if he or she fails to “take reasonable measures to abate” a substantial
risk of serious harm). The plaintiff must also show the “official’s acts or omissions
were the cause—not merely a contributing factor—of the constitutionally infirm
condition.” LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1538; see also id. at 1539 (explaining that
causation may be found where an official was in a position to have taken steps that
could have averted an unconstitutional condition, but failed to do so).
Read liberally, Spires’s pro se pleadings alleged sufficient facts to state an
unlawful condition of confinement under the Eighth Amendment. The deprivation
of potable water for several days is a denial of a “basic need[]” and “the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities.” See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at
1977; LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1535; see also Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057,
1065-66 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the right not to be confined in conditions
lacking basic sanitation is well established). Spires sufficiently alleged an
unreasonable risk of serious harm by asserting he was housed in a cell without
potable water for two weeks. See Richardson, 598 F.3d at 737.
Spires also alleged that, while escorting him to the isolation cell, Thomas
stated: “Enjoy your stay in isolation with no water to drink.” ROA at 109. This
allegation was sufficient to show Thomas knew the cell to which she was taking
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Spires lacked potable water. Read liberally, the combined effect of several
allegations in Spires’s pleadings reasonably supports an inference that Thomas
knew Spires would be spending an unreasonable amount of time without potable
water. First, Spires had received 21 days in an isolation cell after marijuana was
found in his locker. A factfinder reasonably could infer that drug-possession
infractions typically resulted in at least several days in an isolation cell. Second,
Spires alleged that, while being escorted to the isolation cell, Thomas asked him to
divulge the source of his marijuana. Because Thomas knew the reason behind
Spires’s punishment, a factfinder also reasonably could infer she knew Spires was
to spend 21 days in the cell, or, at the very least, she “strongly suspected,” there
was a risk Spires would spend multiple days in the cell without drinking water.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 n.8, 114 S. Ct. at 1981 n.8.
Finally, Spires alleged he spent several days in the isolation cell without
water to drink, during which he suffered extreme thirst and resorted to drinking
water out of the toilet. This caused him to suffer cramps, vomiting, diarrhea, and
blood in his stool. These allegations support a reasonable inference that Thomas
did not tell anyone Spires was housed in an isolation cell without potable water.
See id. at 847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984 (explaining that liability may lie where an official
fails to “take reasonable measures to abate” a substantial risk of serious harm).
Thus, Spires’s allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim that Thomas
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acted with deliberate indifference to an unreasonable risk of serious harm to
Spires’s health, which caused Spires to suffer serious health issues. See Thomas,
614 F.3d at 1312; Swint v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995);
LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539 (explaining that causation may be found where an
official was in a position to have taken steps that could have averted an
unconstitutional condition, but failed to do so).
With respect to Deputy Warden Paul, Spires alleged he informed Paul on
October 3, five days after he was placed in his isolation cell, of his “ordeal” of
being kept in a cell with no potable water, which caused him to drink water from
the toilet. ROA at 111. This allegation could have been better drafted, but a
reasonable inference may be drawn that the “ordeal” to which Spires referred
included his unsuccessful attempts to get GSP officers to provide potable water in
his cell. Spires’s allegation he informed Paul that he had resorted to drinking toilet
water further supports an inference he had been unsuccessful in obtaining potable
water. The same allegation reasonably supports an inference Paul knew Spires had
been unsuccessful for several days in his attempts to obtain relief from officers
with whom he had contact, or, at the very least, that Paul strongly suspected this
was the case. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43 & n.8, 114 S. Ct. at 1981 & n.8.
Thus, Spires sufficiently alleged Paul knew of, or strongly suspected the existence
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of, an unreasonable risk of serious harm to Spires’s health. See id.; Richardson,
598 F.3d at 737.
In view of that knowledge, Paul’s response—that Spires should again bring
the problem to cell block officers—sufficiently states a claim that Paul acted with
deliberate indifference to an unreasonable risk of serious harm to Spires’s health,
which resulted in Spires suffering extreme thirst and several serious health issues.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312; Swint,
51 F.3d at 999; LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1539.
Moreover, Paul’s response referred to the lack of potable water as one of the
“consequences” of getting caught with marijuana. ROA at 113. When viewed in
context with Spires’s additional allegations, this supports a plausible inference that
Paul treated the lack of water as punishment for possessing marijuana and,
consequently, failed to take measures to abate it in a reasonably timely manner.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S. Ct. at 1984. It further supports a showing that
the prolonged deprivation of water was the result of more than gross negligence.
See Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1312. Finally, the defendants’ passing suggestion on
appeal, that Paul had no reason to believe Spires did not have other sources of
hydration, ignores Spires’s allegation that he informed Paul he had to drink toilet
water to quench his thirst.
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For all of the above reasons, Officer Thomas and Deputy Warden Paul are
not entitled to qualified immunity on the face of Spires’s complaint. Assuming the
truth of Spires’s allegations, it would be abundantly clear to a reasonable officer
that housing an inmate in a cell without potable water for at least several days
would violate the inmate’s constitutional rights. See Whittier, 581 F.3d at 1307-08;
see also Baird, 926 F.2d at 1065-66 (explaining that the right of a prisoner not to
be confined in conditions lacking basic sanitation is well established). Therefore,
we reverse the dismissal of Spires’s claims against Thomas and Paul.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the dismissal of Spires’s claims against Officer Thomas and
Deputy Warden Paul, affirm the grant of summary judgment to Unit Manager
Brewton and Security Chief Williams, and remand for further proceedings.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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