Albright v. Columbia County Board of Education ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 16, 2005
No. 05-10056
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00106-CV-1
PAMELA ALBRIGHT,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
versus
COLUMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 16, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pamela Albright, a former school bus driver, appeals the summary judgment
entered in favor of her former employer, Columbia County Board of Education, on
her claim of disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. sections 12101 et seq. Albright argues that the district
court erred when it found that (1) she did not establish that she was terminated
because of her disability and (2) she could perform her job without a reasonable
accommodation. Because Albright failed to establish that she is disabled under
the ADA, we affirm.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Evanston Ins. Co. v.
Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 852, 858 (11th Cir. 1997). Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
. . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). “Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment, . . . upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient” to establish an element
essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). “In making this
determination, the court must view all evidence and make all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Haves v. City of
Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995).
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II. DISCUSSION
Albright contends that the Board discriminated against her because of her
disability when it terminated her and when it failed to accommodate her disability.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, an employee
must show that she (1) has a disability; (2) is qualified, with or without reasonable
accommodations; and (3) was unlawfully discriminated against because of her
disability. See Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir.
2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)).
As to her termination claim, the district court found that Albright did not
establish a prima facie case. The court concluded that Albright was disabled under
the ADA, and was qualified for the position, but also concluded that she did not
establish that she was discriminated because of her disability. As to the failure to
accommodate claim, the district court found that Albright could perform her job
without a reasonable accommodation. Although we agree that Albright’s claims
fail as a matter of law, we affirm for a different reason. See Cochran v. U.S.
Health Care Fin. Admin., 291 F.3d 775, 778 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002).
Albright did not establish a prima facie case because she did not establish
that she is disabled under the ADA. The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
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life activities of an individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or, (C) being
regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). The term
“substantially limits” means “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the
average person in the general population can perform” or “[s]ignificantly restricted
as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a
particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration
under which the average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity.” 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii). Major life activities include
“functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i ). With
respect to the major life activity of working, “substantially limits” means
“significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad
range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities,” and “[t]he inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity
of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
The district court correctly found that Albright did not meet the first
definition of disability because her condition did not substantially limit a major
life activity. The court, however, erroneously found that Albright had a record of
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impairment because “the School Board was well aware that Plaintiff suffered from
panic attacks because she had been placed on short-term disability throughout the
prior school year for this reason.” The law is clear that “the record-of-impairment
standard is satisfied only if she actually suffered a[n] . . . impairment that
substantially limited one or more of her major life activities.” Hilburn v. Murata
Elecs. N. Am., Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Colwell v.
Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 645 (2d Cir. 1998); Davidson v.
Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 n.7 (7th Cir. 1998); Sherrod v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 1112, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court found
that Albright did not suffer an impairment that substantially limited a major life
activity. A determination that she had a record of impairment was foreclosed by
the earlier conclusion.
Because Albright is not disabled, her claim of discrimination in her
termination fails. In addition, Albright failed to present any evidence that she was
fired because of her disability. The district court correctly entered summary
judgment against Albrights’s termination claim.
Because we conclude that Albright is not disabled within the meaning of the
ADA, the Board also was not required to accommodate her. Moreover, the record
clearly shows that Albright did not require an accommodation to perform her job.
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It is undisputed that Albright performed her bus driving duties without an
accommodation, and Albright conceded that she drove her regular bus route
without any incident related to her alleged disability.
III. CONCLUSION
Albright did not establish that she was disabled under the ADA. We affirm
the summary judgment for the Board.
AFFIRMED.
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