United States v. Tommy Chris Barnett ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ------------------------------------------- ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    JANUARY 19, 2007
    No. 06-10149
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar
    CLERK
    --------------------------------------------
    D.C. Docket Nos. 05-00092-CV-WDO-3 & 92-00018 CR-001
    TOMMY CHRIS BARNETT,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
    (January 19, 2007)
    Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Tommy Chris Barnett (“Barnett”), a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
    appeals the district court’s denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion requesting
    relief from his previous convictions and sentence. No reversible error has been
    shown; we affirm.
    Barnett was convicted in November 1993 of drug trafficking charges. In
    December 1993, while still represented by counsel, Barnett filed a pro se Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 33 motion for new trial. Without addressing this motion, the district
    court sentenced Barnett. We affirmed Barnett’s convictions and sentences on
    appeal.
    In May 2001, Barnett filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment for
    lack of jurisdiction. The district court denied this motion. While Barnett’s appeal
    was pending, he filed in this Court a “Motion Before the Appeal Court for the
    Lower Court [to] Entertain his Rule 33 Motion.” We denied Barnett a certificate
    of appealability (“COA”) and denied his motion as moot.
    In January 2004, Barnett filed a Rule 60(b) motion. He argued, among other
    things, that we lacked jurisdiction to consider his direct appeal when his motion
    for new trial still was pending in district court. Upon the recommendation of the
    magistrate judge, the district court denied the 60(b) motion. We affirmed, holding
    that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Barnett’s motion because Rule
    60(b) did not allow Barnett to attack collaterally matters from his criminal case.
    2
    Barnett v. United States, No. 04-11983, 
    2005 WL 2082900
    , at *1 (11th Cir. Aug.
    30, 2005).
    In October 2005, Barnett filed a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4),
    arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him because it failed
    to address his motion for a new trial. He asserted that Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S.
    Ct. 2641 (2005), permits use of a Rule 60(b) motion to obtain relief from a
    criminal judgment. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied
    (1) because Barnett’s pro se motion was untimely, and (2) because Barnett was
    represented by his retained counsel when he filed the motion and had no legal
    right to act on his own behalf. The district court adopted the magistrate’s
    recommendation and denied the motion. Barnett filed the instant appeal. We
    initially denied Barnett’s motion for a COA but, on reconsideration, determined
    that a COA was not required. We now affirm.
    We review issues of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. United States v.
    Moore, 
    443 F.3d 790
    , 793 (11th Cir. 2006). Here, as in Barnett’s previous appeal,
    the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Barnett’s Rule 60(b) motion, as
    that motion sought to attack collaterally his criminal judgment. Barnett, No. 04-
    11983, 
    2005 WL 2082900
    , at *1; United States v. Mosavi, 
    138 F.3d 1365
    , 1366
    (11th Cir. 1998). Barnett’s reliance on Gonzalez is misplaced, as that case merely
    3
    allows a district court to rule on a Rule 60(b) motion when that motion alleges “a
    defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings” brought under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2254. 
    Gonzalez, 125 S. Ct. at 2648
    . Gonzalez does not allow a defendant to
    attack collaterally his underlying conviction and sentence through use of a Rule
    60(b) motion, as Barnett seeks to do here. See 
    id. at 2647.
    Accordingly, the
    district court’s denial of Barnett’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion is
    AFFIRMED.1
    1
    As we noted in our decision regarding Barnett’s previous appeal, “That the district court denied
    Barnett’s Rule 60(b) motion on different grounds is of no concern: we are obligated to inquire into
    the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction at all times, and we may affirm the district court’s
    judgment for any reason supported by the record.” Barnett, 
    2005 WL 2082900
    , at * 1 (internal
    citations omitted).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-10149

Judges: Edmondson, Wilson, Pryor

Filed Date: 1/19/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024