Maynard v. Williams ( 1996 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-2629.
Collene MAYNARD, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert WILLIAMS, John Awad, Dr., Defendants-Appellants.
Jan. 12, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida. (No. 92-40279MMP), Maurice Mitchell Paul,
Chief Judge.
Before COX, Circuit Judge, and CLARK and WOOD*, Jr., Senior Circuit
Judges.
HARLINGTON WOOD, Jr., Senior Circuit Judge:
James Towey, the Secretary1 of the Florida Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, and John Awad, the District
Administrator of District II of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, (together, "HRS") appeal the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Tanja Mathis. Mathis
and two others brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after HRS
imposed a freeze on the provision of child care services to
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") who
were, or who wished to be, engaged in an approved education or
training program as detailed in Title IV-F of the Social Security
*
Honorable Harlington Wood, Jr., Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
James Towey replaced Robert Williams as the Secretary of
the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
during the pendency of this case. Pursuant to Rule 43(c)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr. Towey automatically
replaced Mr. Williams as a party. Since this appeal was filed
under the name of Mr. Williams, however, the original caption of
the case has been retained in order to avoid confusion.
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 681, et seq. Mathis alleged that HRS was required
to provide child care services to all such AFDC recipients pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 602(g), as amended by the Family Support Act of
1988. HRS argues that summary judgment was improperly granted
because (1) no private right of action exists under § 1983 to
enforce § 602(g)'s child care provisions; (2) the plaintiffs
lacked standing because they had not been officially approved to
participate in an education or training program; and (3) § 602(g)
does not, on the merits, require states to provide child care to
all AFDC recipients who are, or who seek to be, enrolled in an
approved education or training program. We conclude that no
private right of action exists here under § 1983, and we reverse
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Mathis.
I. BACKGROUND
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children program,
authorized by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, is a
cooperative federal-state program which provides a variety of
financial assistance to needy families with minor children. 42
U.S.C. § 601 et seq. Participation in the program is voluntary,
but participating states, such as Florida, must comply with the
requirements imposed by the Social Security Act and with the
regulations issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
("Secretary"). Turner v. Ledbetter, 906 F.2d 606, 609 (11th
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928, 111 S. Ct. 2041, 114 L. Ed. 2d
125 (1991).
One such requirement mandates the creation and operation of a
"job opportunities and basic skills training program" ("JOBS
program"). 42 U.S.C. § 681, et seq. ("Title IV-F"). The JOBS
program is designed to provide a bootstrap to families receiving
AFDC assistance; through education and training, the JOBS program
seeks to help recipients avoid long-term welfare dependence. 42
U.S.C. § 681. Florida's JOBS program is entitled "Project
Independence."
Recognizing that the high cost of child care services
prohibits many parents or guardians of minor children from
participating in the JOBS program, Congress amended Title IV of the
Social Security Act in an effort to make the JOBS program more
available to those individuals who, arguably, need it most.
Therefore, pursuant to the Family Support Act of 1988, persons
participating in a JOBS program are now eligible to receive child
care services. 42 U.S.C. § 602(g). Section 602(g) provides:
Each State agency must guarantee child care in accordance
with subparagraph (B)—
....
(II) for each individual participating in an education
and training activity (including participation in a program
that meets the requirements of subsection (a)(19) of this
section and part F of this subchapter) if the State agency
approves the activity and determines that the individual is
satisfactorily participating in the activity.
42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(1)(A)(i).2
2
Section 602(g) further provides:
The State agency may guarantee child care by—
(i) providing such care directly;
(ii) arranging the care through providers by use
of purchase of service contracts, or vouchers;
(iii) providing cash or vouchers in advance to the
caretaker relative in the family;
This lawsuit stems from the decision of the Florida Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the state agency responsible
for administering Florida's JOBS program, Fla.Stat.Ann. §
409.029(4)(a), to freeze the provision of child care services
effective July 10, 1992. The freeze does not apply to individuals
who were receiving child care services prior to the cut-off date.
A projected budget deficit was cited as the reason for this action.
Thereafter, this suit was filed with Collene Maynard, Darlene
Michal, and Tanja Mathis named as plaintiffs. They claim that the
child care freeze forced them to forgo their education plans.3 The
plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief. The
plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction as well
as a motion for class certification. The plaintiffs hinged their
suit upon § 602(g)'s "guarantee" of child care. They alleged that
42 U.S.C. § 602(g) imposes a statutory obligation, regardless of a
state's fiscal situation, to supply child care services to all AFDC
recipients who are, or who wish to be, enrolled in an approved
education or training program. In response, HRS primarily argues
(iv) reimbursing the caretaker relative in the
family; or
(v) adopting such other arrangements as the agency
deems appropriate.
When the State agency arranges for child care, the
agency shall take into account the individual needs of
the child.
42 U.S.C. § 602(g)(1)(B).
3
Mathis enrolled in Project Independence with the avowed
goal of earning an Associate of Arts degree at Tallahassee
Community College. Maynard and Michal are seeking to earn their
General Equivalency Diplomas ("GED").
that 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19), when read in pari materia with §
602(g), specifically allows a state to take its financial health
into consideration when it decides on the extent to which it will
make child care services available.
In brief, § 602(a) requires a state that wishes to participate
in the AFDC program to submit a plan to the Secretary that details
the state's proposed administration of the AFDC program. See
Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 189, 105 S. Ct. 1138, 1141, 84
L. Ed. 2d 138 (1985). Section 602(a)(19) details one required
provision of a state's plan:
A State plan for aid and services to needy families with
children must—
....
(19) provide—
(A) that the State has in effect and operation a
[JOBS] program which meets the requirements of part F of
this subchapter;
(B) that—
(i) the State will (except as otherwise provided in
this paragraph or part F of this subchapter), to
the extent that the program is available in the
political subdivision involved and State resources
otherwise permit—
(I) require all recipients of [AFDC] in such
subdivision with respect to whom the State
guarantees child care in accordance with section
602(g) of this title to participate in the program;
and (II) allow applicants for and recipients of
[AFDC] ... who are not required under subclause (I)
to participate in the program to do so on a
voluntary basis....
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)-(B)(i) (emphasis added). The named
plaintiffs were all participating in Project Independence on a
voluntary basis.
The litigants subsequently filed competing motions for summary
judgment and HRS also filed a motion to dismiss the action. On
April 15, 1994, the district court denied HRS's motions and granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The district court's
opinion, however, was specifically limited to Mathis; Maynard and
Michal had failed to respond to an earlier order of the district
4
court which directed them to update the court on their status.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's opinion is not a final decision within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, as it did not adjudicate the
claims of all of the parties to this action, and as it did not
direct entry of a final judgment in favor of Mathis "upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay."
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b). The district court's opinion is justiciable,
however, as it enjoined HRS from denying child care to Mathis. 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment by
considering all factual issues in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party (herein HRS) and determining de novo whether there
exists any genuine issue of material fact requiring submission of
the case to the finder of fact or whether judgment as a matter of
law was appropriate. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Wilson v. Northcutt, 987
F.2d 719, 721 (11th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).
4
The district court did, however, indicate that it would
consider the status of Maynard and Michal at a later date, when
it addressed the class certification issue. These issues are not
before us and we express no direct opinion on them.
III. DISCUSSION
Private Right of Action Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The appellants argue that summary judgment was wrongly granted
below as no private right of action exists under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to enable Mathis to enforce § 602(g)'s child care provisions.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws" of the United States. The Supreme Court has held that this
language is not limited to constitutional violations; § 1983
potentially encompasses violations of all federal statutes. Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2504, 65 L. Ed. 2d 555
(1980).
The Court has, however, defined two exceptions to the
applicability of § 1983 to claims based on statutory violations:
(1) For an action to be cognizable under § 1983, it is not enough
that the conduct in question merely violates federal law—that
violation must trammel a "right" secured by federal law, Golden
State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110
S. Ct. 444, 448-49, 107 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1989); Wehunt v. Ledbetter,
875 F.2d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027,
110 S. Ct. 1472, 108 L. Ed. 2d 609 (1990); (2) Even if the statute in
question creates such a right, a private right of action under §
1983 may still be unavailable if "Congress has foreclosed private
enforcement in the enactment of the statute" through the inclusion
of sufficiently comprehensive remedial devices. Wehunt, 875 F.2d
at 1563 (citing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20-21, 101 S. Ct. 2615, 2626-27, 69
L. Ed. 2d 435 (1981)).
A. Existence of a Federal Right
To ascertain whether 42 U.S.C. § 602(g) creates a "federal
right" that is enforceable under § 1983, we must determine
whether "the provision in question was intend[ed] to benefit
the putative plaintiff." [Golden State, 493 U.S. at 106, 110
S.Ct. at 448 (citations and internal quotations omitted).] If
so, the provision creates an enforceable right unless it
reflects merely a "congressional preference" for a certain
kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the
governmental unit, Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 19 [101 S. Ct. 1531, 1540-41, 67 L. Ed. 2d
694] (1981), or unless the interest the plaintiff asserts is
" "too vague and amorphous' " such that it is " "beyond the
competence of the judiciary to enforce.' " Golden State, [493
U.S.] at 106 [110 S.Ct. at 448] [ (quoting Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431-32, 107 S. Ct.
766, 774-75, 93 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1987)).]
Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509, 110 S. Ct. 2510,
2517, 110 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1990). Furthermore, "each statute must be
interpreted by its own terms." Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,
358 n. 8, 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1367 n. 8, 118 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1992).
1. Intent to Benefit
The first step of our federal right analysis, therefore, is to
determine whether Congress intended the child care provisions of §
602(g) to benefit AFDC recipients who are, or who wish to be,
voluntarily enrolled in approved education or training activities.
As was the case in Wilder,5 it appears that the provisions in
5
The Wilder Court concluded that there was "little doubt"
that health care providers were the intended beneficiaries of the
Boren Amendment:
The provision establishes a system for
reimbursement of providers and is phrased in terms
benefiting health care providers: It requires a state
plan to provide for "payment ... of the hospital
services, nursing facilities services, and services in
an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded
question were indeed intended to benefit Mathis: The purpose
behind Title IV-A, which contains the child care provisions here at
issue, is "to help [the parents or relatives with whom needy
dependent children are living] to attain or retain capability for
the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with
the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection." 42
U.S.C. § 601. Section 602(g)(1)(A)(i)(II) furthers this end by
"guarantee[ing] child care ... for each individual participating in
an education and training activity ... if the State agency approves
the activity and determines that the individual is satisfactorily
participating in the activity." These statutory pronouncements
convince us that § 602(g) was intended to benefit AFDC recipients
who require child care services in order to participate in an
education or training program under the JOBS program.
A comparison of § 602(g)'s child care provisions with the
child support provisions of Title IV-D, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.,
which we addressed in Wehunt v. Ledbetter, is illustrative: In
Wehunt, we held that the child support provisions of Title IV-D
were not intended to benefit AFDC recipients. Beyond the first
fifty dollars of child support collected each month, 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(8)(A)(vi), the funds recovered through the workings of that
title accrue directly to the state government. 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(26)(A). Thus, Title IV-D's provisions were viewed as
primarily designed to benefit all taxpayers: "[T]he goal of Title
provided under the plan."
496 U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2517-18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(13)(A) (emphasis added) (other citation omitted).
IV-D was to immediately lower the cost to the taxpayer as well as
to lessen the number of families enrolling in welfare in the
future—benefits to society as a whole rather than specific
individuals." 875 F.2d at 1565.
It is true that the child support provisions of § 602(g),
which reduce long-term welfare dependence by facilitating the
education and training of AFDC recipients, also benefit taxpayers
as a whole. The effects of this program, however, are ultimately
personal; the benefits of education and training accrue first and
foremost to the individual who is being so educated or trained.
In marked contrast to the voluntary nature of Mathis's
participation in Project Independence, "AFDC recipients do not
apply for nor request support enforcement services [under Title IV-
D]. They assign their child support rights to the state and are
required to cooperate (unless good cause for refusing to do so is
determined to exist) in whatever legal action the state
undertakes." Id. at 1566 (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, our holding in Wehunt impliedly acknowledged that
Title IV-A was intended to benefit AFDC recipients:
Title IV-D does not create any enforceable right: it was
not enacted for the "especial benefit" of AFDC families. A
Title IV-D program operates under a separate legislative and
regulatory framework than that of a Title IV-A program. Title
IV-A provides funds from the public treasure to support
children in need. Title IV-D seeks to recover those funds and
restore the Treasury balance by enforcement of support
obligations owed by the absent parents of these children.
Id. at 1565.
2. Binding Obligation
Having found that the child care provisions of § 602(g) were
intended to benefit individuals such as Mathis, the second step of
our inquiry addresses whether that section imposes a "binding
obligation" upon HRS to provide child care or whether it merely
expresses a "congressional preference" for the provision of child
care. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517.
(a) Section 602(g)'s Reference to § 602(a)(19)
We note initially that § 602(g) does purport to "guarantee"
child care to individuals participating in approved education or
training activities. Section 602(g), however, goes on to condition
its guarantee by expressly referring to § 602(a)(19), which
contains the "and State resources otherwise permit" language upon
which the appellants rely.
Moreover, Title IV-F, which details the required elements of
a state's JOBS program, also refers to § 602(a)(19). Section
682(a) of that title states: "As a condition of its participation
in the program of [AFDC] under part A of this subchapter, each
State shall establish and operate a [JOBS] program ... under a plan
approved by the Secretary as meeting all of the requirements of
this part and section 602(a)(19) of this title...." 42 U.S.C. §
682(a)(1)(A).6
As discussed above, § 602(a)(19) provides, in part, that AFDC
recipients must be "allow[ed]" to voluntarily participate in the
JOBS program to the extent that "State resources otherwise permit."
The express reference to this provision by both § 602(g), which
"guarantee[s]" child care, and by § 682(A)(1)(A), which addresses
6
See also, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(44)(A) (stating that a state
plan must "provide that the State agency shall—(A) be responsible
for assuring that the benefits and services under the programs
under this part ... and part F of this subchapter are furnished
in an integrated manner").
the states' establishment of their JOBS programs, demonstrates that
Congress intended for a state to consider the extent of its
available resources when it determined the overall scope of its
JOBS program—including the provision of child care services.
(b) Section 602(a)(19)'s Reference to § 602(g)
Furthermore, § 602(a)(19) references § 602(g). Section
602(a)(19)(B)(i)(I) asserts that a state "will ... require all
recipients of [AFDC] in such subdivision with respect to whom the
State guarantees child care in accordance with section 602(g) of
this title to participate in the [JOBS] program." In other words,
the state must guarantee the provision of child care services to
those individuals who are required to participate in the JOBS
program. However, subclause (II), which discusses voluntary
participation, does not refer to § 602(g)'s child care guarantee.
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(B)(i)(II). Thus, § 602(g)'s limited child
care guarantee does not apply to Mathis, as she chose to
participate in Project Independence on a voluntary basis. 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(B)(i)(II).
(c) Conclusion
There are, we admit, several obstacles to a smooth in pari
materia reading of §§ 602(g) and 602(a)(19). First, both sections
are rather long and involved. However, neither section attempts to
constrict its reference to the other, and we must presume that
Congress knew how to be more specific if it wished to be.
Therefore, we presume that § 602(g) was intended to reference the
relevant portions of § 602(a)(19), and that § 602(a)(19) was
intended to reference the relevant portions of § 602(g).
Second, whereas these two provisions are now subsections of
the same section, they were originally enacted under different
titles of the Family Support Act of 1988.7 We conclude, however,
that while this fact should inform our analysis, it need not
dictate our result. As discussed above, each section expressly
refers to the other—we find this fact to be sufficient to overcome
any interpretative difficulty which their legislative
disjointedness otherwise presents.
Third, unfortunate results seem to flow from this decision.
It is safe to say that disadvantaged people with children are
likely to be more needy than disadvantaged people without children.
Under our reading of the Family Support Act of 1988, Florida may
effectively cut off the former group's participation in its JOBS
program by freezing the provision of child care while continuing to
allow individuals from the latter group to voluntarily enroll.
Allowing the state to deny child care to these "more" needy
individuals seems unfair. We recognize, however, that state
resources are not unlimited and hard choices have, sometimes, to be
made. Regrettably, Henry David Thoreau was not universally correct
when he wrote that "[i]t costs us nothing to be just." Henry D.
Thoreau, John Brown's Body, in The Works of Thoreau 825, 827 (Henry
S. Canby ed., 1937).
All in all, as our discussion demonstrates, this case presents
a most difficult question, but we are constrained to find that the
7
Section 602(g) was enacted under Title III of the Family
Support Act: "Supportive Services for Families." Section
602(a)(19) was enacted under Title II: "Job Opportunities and
Basic Skills Training Program."
mutual cross-references of §§ 602(g) and 602(a)(19) modify the
otherwise obligatory language of § 602(g)'s child care guarantee.
The district court's opinion, which is well-reasoned in every other
respect, only fails, as we see it, to grant these mutual
cross-references their proper weight. We must, therefore, disagree
with that court's conclusion.
We assume that Congress would prefer that all individuals
voluntarily enrolled in approved education and training activities
would receive child care, but we conclude that Congress did not
intend for 42 U.S.C. § 602(g) to impose a binding obligation upon
the states to provide child care to these volunteers on an
unlimited basis. Accordingly, we must find that no private right
of action exists under § 1983 to allow a voluntary participant in
a JOBS program to enforce the child care provision of § 602(g).8
8
This conclusion is in keeping with the Supreme Court's
interpretative guidance in this area: "[T]he starting point of
the [AFDC] analysis must be a recognition that the federal law
gives each State great latitude in dispensing its available
funds." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478, 90 S. Ct. 1153,
1158, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970). See also Anderson v. Edwards, ---
U.S. ----, ----, 115 S. Ct. 1291, 1296, 131 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1995)
(identifying the Dandridge Court's language, quoted supra, as the
"cardinal principle" of statutory interpretation in the AFDC
context). Our finding is also consistent with Congress's
recognition of the limited nature of state resources. In the
preamble to the AFDC program, Congress stated:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of
dependent children in their own homes or in the homes
of relatives by enabling each State to furnish
financial assistance and rehabilitation and other
services, as far as practicable under the conditions in
such State, to needy dependent children and the parents
or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain
and strengthen family life and to help such parents or
relatives to attain or retain capability for the
maximum self-support and personal independence
consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental
care and protection, there is hereby authorized to be
B. Remaining Issues
In light of our finding that no private right of action exists
under § 1983 to allow Mathis to enforce § 602(g)'s child care
provisions, we need not address the issue of whether these
provisions are too vague and amorphous to be effectively
interpreted and enforced by the judiciary. In addition, we need
not address whether the Social Security Act, as amended by the
Family Support Act, contains a remedial scheme which is
sufficiently comprehensive to foreclose private enforcement under
§ 1983. Furthermore, we need not reach the question of standing
nor need we reach the merits of this matter.
We note in closing that we do not feel that our decision
nullifies in any way the child care provisions of the Family
Support Act: Florida's continued receipt of funding at its current
level is conditioned upon its compliance with all of the Social
Security Act's requirements.9 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 604. As the issue
is not before us, however, we express no opinion on what sort of
showing would be required—were the Secretary to later challenge
Florida's action—to demonstrate that state resources did not
appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to
carry out the purposes of this part....
42 U.S.C. § 601.
9
It is true that the Wilder Court found the conditional
provision of federal funds influential in its conclusion that the
Boren Amendment does impose an obligation on states participating
in the Medicaid program which may be privately enforced under §
1983. 496 U.S. at 512, 110 S.Ct. at 2518-19. As discussed
above, however, the child care provisions of the Family Support
Act are lacking—in light of § 602(g)'s reference to §
602(a)(19)—that mandatory cast which the Wilder Court also found
so influential. Id.
"otherwise permit" the provision of child care services to
individuals such as Mathis.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the grant of
summary judgment by the district court and REMAND for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.