Allstate Insurance v. Clohessy , 199 F.3d 1293 ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                                 [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                      FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________             ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    01/07/2000
    No. 99-2034                    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________                   CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 97-01806-CV-T-17A
    ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MARY A. CLOHESSY, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (January 7, 2000)
    Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, and FAY, Senior Circuit Judge.
    ANDERSON, Chief Judge:
    On March 22, 1993, Mary Clohessy and her sons Brendan and Liam Clohessy were walking
    together near their home in New Haven, Connecticut. As they were attempting to cross a
    street–Liam on his mother’s right and Brendan on his mother’s left–an automobile driven by an
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    uninsured motorist struck and killed Brendan. Mary and Liam witnessed ELEVENTH but were not
    the accident, CIRCUIT
    01/07/2000
    struck by the automobile.                                                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    The Clohessy family had an automobile insurance contract (“Policy”) with Allstate Insurance
    Company (“Allstate”), which included uninsured motorist coverage. The insurance contract was
    formed in Florida. The Policy contained certain limits of liability; in particular, it stated:
    Uninsured Motorist Insurance – Coverage . . .
    We [Allstate] will pay damages for bodily injury, sickness, disease or death which
    a person insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
    uninsured auto. Injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership,
    maintenance or use of an uninsured auto. We will not pay any punitive or exemplary
    damages.
    ....
    Limits of Liability
    ....
    (a) The coverage limit stated on the declaration page for:
    (1) “each person” is the maximum that we will pay for damages arising out
    of bodily injury to one person in any one motor vehicle accident, including
    damages sustained by anyone else as a result of that bodily injury, sickness,
    disease or death.
    When the limits of two or more insured autos are stacked, our maximum limit
    of liability for all damages to one person in any one accident is the sum of the
    “each person” limit for each insured auto shown on the declarations page.
    (2) “each accident” is the maximum that we will pay for damages arising out
    of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one motor vehicle accident.
    When the limits of two or more insured autos are stacked, subject to the limit
    for “each person”, our maximum limit of liability for all damages to two or
    more persons in any one accident is the sum of the “each accident” limit for
    each insured auto shown on the declarations page.
    After the appropriate stacking, the Policy’s “each person” coverage limit was $200,000 and “each
    accident” coverage limit was $600,000.
    Under the Policy’s uninsured motorist coverage, the Estate of Brendan Clohessy made a
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    claim and received $200,000, the “each person” limit. Under the Policy, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Mary and Liam Clohessy
    01/07/2000
    (“the Clohessys”) also made a claim based on the emotional distress resulting from witnessing the
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    collision and Brendan’s death.
    Allstate brought suit against the Clohessys for declaratory judgment asking the district court
    to declare that the Policy’s limits of liability have been exhausted and that the Clohessys are not
    entitled to recover anything further under the Policy. Allstate argued that the Clohessys’ insurance
    claims, which are based on their claims against the uninsured motorist for negligent infliction of
    emotional distress, are subject to the $200,000 “each person” limit which was applied to and
    exhausted by the claim of Brendan Clohessy’s estate. Applying Florida law,1 the district court
    concluded that:
    [A] Florida court considering this case would interpret the automobile insurance
    policy at issue according to this rule that reason dictates is correct, that is, that the
    per-person limit of liability apply [sic] to bystander emotional distress claims.
    Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clohessy, 
    32 F. Supp. 2d 1333
    , 1337 (1998). Accordingly, the district court
    declared that the insurance policy limits have been exhausted and the Clohessys are not entitle to
    recover anything further under the policy. See 
    id. 1 In
    particular, the district court followed the command of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 
    304 U.S. 643
    (1938), and applied the conflicts of law rule of the state in which it is located, in this
    case Florida. Applying that Florida law, the district court concluded that under Sturiano v.
    Brooks, 
    523 So. 2d 1126
    (Fla. 1988), the terms of an automobile insurance policy are governed
    by the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract was formed, again in this case Florida. See
    Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clohessy, 
    32 F. Supp. 2d 1333
    , 1335 (M.D.Fla. 1998). We agree. Florida law
    “determines the rights and risks of the parties to automobile insurance policies on the issue of
    coverage.” Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. August, 
    530 So. 2d 293
    , 295 (Fla. 1988).
    The Clohessys appeal to this Court arguing that the district court incorrectly resolved the
    issue of whether their claims are subject to the “each person” limit which was exhausted by the pay
    out to the Estate of Brendan Clohessy or instead subject to their own “each person” limit. The
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    parties have not cited nor have we uncovered any controlling Florida case on this issue.CIRCUIT
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    when faced with the same issue, courts in other states have split on its proper resolution. KAHN
    THOMAS K. Compare,
    CLERK
    e.g., Triechel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    930 P.2d 661
    (Mont. 1997) (holding that a wife’s
    claim for emotional distress resulting from witnessing her husband being hit and killed by a car was
    not limited by the per person limit applied to her husband); Crabtree v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
    632 So. 2d 736
    , 738 (La. 1994) (“[W]e conclude the wife’s mental anguish claim is not subject to the
    single person policy limit regardless of whether her mental anguish ‘results from’ or ‘derives from’
    her husband’s bodily injuries.”); and Pekin Ins. Co. v. Hugh, 
    501 N.W.2d 508
    (Iowa 1993) (holding
    that insured’s claim for bystander emotional distress was based on independent bodily injury and,
    therefore, subject to the per occurrence limit rather than the per person limit of the policy) with
    McNeill v. Metro. Property and Liability Ins. Co., 
    650 N.E.2d 793
    , 795 (Mass. 1995) (“[T]he
    plaintiff’s emotional distress claim is a by-product of and entirely dependent upon the bodily injury
    to his daughter. The claims thus are subject to the ‘per person’ limit.”)(internal quotations omitted)
    and Gocha v. Shimon, 
    573 N.W.2d 218
    , 219 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (“The unambiguous language of
    the ‘each person’ limitation in State Farm’s policy consolidates the bodily injuries to one person
    with all injuries and damages to others which result from the one person’s bodily injuries. Because
    the emotional stress of the Gochas would not have occurred but for the injury to Kyle, the ‘each
    person’ limitation is applicable.”). Consequently, we seek the assistance of the Supreme Court of
    Florida in resolving this issue.
    Having concluded that this case involves an unanswered question of state law that is
    determinative of this appeal and having found no clear, controlling precedent in the decisions of the
    Supreme Court of Florida, we certify the following question of law to the Supreme Court of Florida
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    for instructions:                                                         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    01/07/2000
    ARE THE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES SUSTAINED BY MARYK. KAHN        THOMAS AND LIAM
    CLERK
    CLOHESSY DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE BODILY INJURY TO BRENDAN
    CLOHESSY, I.E., DAMAGES SUSTAINED AS A RESULT OF THAT BODILY INJURY,
    AND THEREFORE SUBJECT TO THE SINGLE, ALREADY-REACHED, EACH
    PERSON LIMIT APPLIED TO BRENDAN CLOHESSY?
    In certifying this question, we do not intend the particular phrasing of it to limit the court in
    its consideration of the problem posed by the case. In order to assist the court's consideration of the
    case, the entire record, along with the briefs of the parties, shall be transmitted to the court.
    QUESTION CERTIFIED.