United States v. Clarence Leonard Chatman , 342 F. App'x 555 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-10825 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 20, 2009
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00265-CR-2-KOB-PWG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLARENCE LEONARD CHATMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 20, 2009)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clarence Leonard Chatman appeals his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), arguing that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress a firearm found during a
traffic stop. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
On January 28, 2008, Birmingham Police Officers Phillip Harris and Steven
Beshears were riding in their marked patrol car when they saw Chatman driving
his automobile without a seatbelt on. Officer Harris turned on his lights and sirens
and conducted a traffic stop solely because Chatman was not wearing a seatbelt.
Officer Harris approached the vehicle and asked Chatman for his license and proof
of insurance. As Chatman was complying with this request, Officer Harris asked,
“Is there anything illegal or anything I should know about this vehicle?” Chatman
answered that there was a gun in the glove box. When asked if he had a permit for
the gun, Chatman responded, “No, sir.” At this point, Officer Harris asked
Chatman to step out of the car. He walked Chatman to the patrol car and placed
him in the back seat. Officer Beshears retrieved the gun from the glove box and
then contacted a dispatcher to determine if Chatman’s license was valid and
whether Chatman had any outstanding warrants. Approximately three to five
minutes later, the officers received information that Chatman had an outstanding
warrant with the City of Birmingham. The officers then arrested Chatman on the
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outstanding warrant and for his possession of a firearm without a permit. The
entire incident – from the time the officers stopped Chatman to the time they left
the scene with him – lasted between ten and fifteen minutes.
In June of 2008, a single-count indictment was entered in the Northern
District of Alabama, charging Chatman with being a felon in possession of a
firearm. Chatman filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the gun discovered on
January 28, 2008, arguing that the officer’s asking him “is there anything illegal”
violated Alabama Code Section 32-5B-8(c), which provides that a “law
enforcement officer may not search or inspect a motor vehicle, its contents, the
driver, or a passenger solely because of a violation” of the Alabama Safety Belt
Act. (Emphasis added). Chatman also argued that the traffic stop and subsequent
search of the glove box were unconstitutional. Following a hearing on the motion,
a magistrate judge issued findings and a recommendation that the motion to
suppress be denied. Over Chatman’s objections, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denied the motion to suppress.
Chatman then pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the adverse ruling on his
motion to suppress. The district court sentenced Chatman to ten months of
imprisonment.
Chatman now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, asserting that the
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gun evidence was unconstitutionally obtained because the traffic stop was not
supported by probable cause and because the officers exceeded the scope and
duration of a permissible traffic stop by asking Chatman questions unrelated to the
seatbelt violation.
“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress. We
view all evidence in the light most favorable to the party that prevailed in the
district court.” United States v. Carter, 566 F.3d 970, 973 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quotation and citation omitted).
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV. A traffic stop is considered “only a limited form of seizure”1 which is
permissible without a warrant where a police officer has “probable cause to believe
that a driver have violated any one of a multitude of applicable traffic and
equipment regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles.” United States
v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Also,
although warrantless searches are generally per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has recognized an the automobile exception
1
United States v. Purcell, 236 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
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which “permits warrantless vehicle searches if the vehicle is operational and agents
have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.” United
States v. Tamari, 454 F.3d 1259, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006).
As an initial matter, we conclude that Chatman’s argument challenging the
validity of the initial stop is without merit because the officers had probable cause
to believe that he was violating Alabama Code § 32-5B-4 by not wearing a seat
belt.2 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). Although Officer Harris
testified at the hearing that he was unfamiliar with the requirements of the Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Act and could not name the section of the Birmingham
Municipal Code which required seatbelt use, Chatman has not shown that the
officers did not act in accordance with the governing law or that the traffic stop
was premised upon a mistake of law. See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342
F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that traffic stop for improper equipment
was unsupported by probable cause where officer incorrectly believed that state
law required an inside-rear view mirror). Accordingly, because the officers saw
that Chatman’s seatbelt was unfastened and correctly identified that this conduct
violated a traffic regulation, the initial traffic stop did not violate the Fourth
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Because we conclude that the stop was supported by probable cause, we decline to
address Chatman’s argument, raised for the first time on appeal, that the stop was invalid under
the “special needs” doctrine.
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Amendment.
We also conclude that the warrantless search of the glove compartment in
this case was justified under the automobile exception because Chatman informed
the officers that there was a firearm located there and that he lacked the required
permit. We reject Chatman’s contention that the officers exceeded the scope of the
traffic stop by asking him questions unrelated to the seat-belt violation, as these
questions did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. See United States
v. Hernandez, 418 F.3d 1206, 1209 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “[w]hen
an officer is, for instance, looking at a driver’s license . . . , he can lawfully at about
the same time also ask questions – even questions not strictly related to the traffic
stop” as long as such questioning does not unreasonably extend the duration of the
stop); Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1279 (“Fourteen minutes is not an unreasonable amount
of time for a traffic stop. We have approved traffic stops of much longer
duration.”). We also reject the argument that these questions constitute an
impermissible “inspection,” in violation of Ala. Code § 32-5B-8(c). Accordingly,
we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress the gun evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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