Joe Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama , 225 F.3d 1243 ( 2000 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 99-12813 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPTEMBER 07, 2000
__________________________
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 97-01421-CV-D-N
JOE MARSH, LEROY OWENS,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
BUTLER COUNTY, ALABAMA,
THE BUTLER COUNTY COMMISSION, et al.
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
__________________________
(September 7, 2000)
ON SUA SPONTE RECONSIDERATION
Before BIRCH, BARKETT and ALARCON*, Circuit Judges.
______________
*Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
Upon reconsideration, this court, sua sponte, VACATES its prior opinion in
this matter, published at 212 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2000), and substitutes the
following in its place:
Joe Marsh and Leroy Owens, former inmates at Butler County Jail in
Greenville, Alabama, appeal the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of their complaint against Butler County, the Butler
County Commission, and Sheriff Diane Harris in both her individual and official
capacities. Marsh and Owens sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their
rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the County,
the County Commission, and the Sheriff’s deliberate indifference to the substantial
risk of serious harm to inmates at Butler County Jail. Owens also claimed that his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by their deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. Marsh and Owens claim that the injuries
they suffered, although arising from distinct incidents, were caused by the same
unconstitutional jail conditions and jail practices. The district court dismissed the
complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the grounds that
Butler County and the Butler County Commission are protected from this suit by
legislative immunity, and that Sheriff Harris is protected by qualified immunity.
We reverse.
2
DISCUSSION
The dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo.
In re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 349 (11th Cir. 1996) In conducting such a review,
appellate courts must keep in mind that “a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1974). In interpreting Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8, which governs the filing of complaints, the Supreme Court has held
that a plaintiff need only set out “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). That requirement is no
different in cases brought under Section 1983. Indeed, the Court has explicitly
held that courts may not apply a “heightened pleading standard” over and above
the dictates of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to claims under Section 1983.1
1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) states:
(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a
short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction
depends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new
grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for
the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types
may be demanded.
3
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507
U.S. 163, 168 (1993).
This case involves a complaint filed against Butler County, the Butler
County Commission, and Sheriff Diane Harris. The claims against the County and
the County Commission on the one hand and Sheriff Harris on the other involve
different questions of liability and immunity as different types of governmental
entities are entitled to different types of immunity. In order to determine whether
Marsh and Owens have stated legal claims against Butler County, the Butler
County Commission, and Sheriff Harris, we must first ascertain the type of
governmental body or officer each represents, which will determine the type of
conduct each may be held liable for under Section 1983. In determining the
particular functions of a governmental body or official, we must refer to the state
law definitions of that entity’s functions. Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137
F.3d 1285, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). This Court has stated that “[o]ur
analysis of Alabama law persuades us that an Alabama sheriff acts exclusively for
the state rather than for the county in operating a county jail.” Id. at 1288. Thus,
we examine Marsh and Owens’ complaint to determine both whether it states a
claim against the County and County Commission as local governmental bodies,
and whether it states a claim against Sheriff Harris as a state official in either her
4
official or personal capacity. Accordingly, we discuss the claims against the
County and the Commission separately from those against Harris.
I. Claims against Butler County and the Butler County Commission2
A. Allegations in the Complaint
In order to state a claim under Section 1983 against a local governing body,
a plaintiff must allege that he suffered an injury under federal constitutional or
statutory law, and that his injury was caused by “a policy statement, ordinance,
regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.”
Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A local governing
body may also be held liable for “constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to
governmental ‘custom’ even though such a custom has not received formal
approval through the body’s official decisionmaking channels,” but may not be
held liable under a theory of vicarious liability. Id. at 690-91. The extent to which
the County may be held liable for violations of federal law at the Butler County
Jail is proscribed by the extent to which the County is responsible for the
conditions therein. In Alabama, the distinct responsibilities of counties and
sheriffs with respect to the operation and maintenance of county jails have been
2
We henceforth refer to Butler County and the Butler County Commission collectively as
“the County.” The County Commission is the governing body of the County, and the liability
and immunity analyses are identical for both entities.
5
recognized by this Court. We have held that the “duties of the counties with
respect to the jails ‘are limited to funding the operation of the jail and to providing
facilities to house the jail.’” Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285,
1289 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (quoting Stark v. Madison County, 678 So.2d 787,
787 (Ala. Civ. Ct. App. 1996)). “The county commission is charged with erecting
and maintaining jails, and each county is required to maintain a jail of sufficient
size and strength to secure the prisoners.” Id. at 1289-90 (quoting Ala. Code §§
11-14-10, 11-14-13 (1989)).
In their complaint, Marsh and Owens claim that the County’s “deliberate
indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm to inmates at Butler County
Jail” resulted in substantial injury to them, in violation of their Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In order to state such a claim successfully for the
purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Marsh and Owens must allege facts supporting
each element of a deliberate indifference claim. Thus, the complaint must allege
facts demonstrating: 1) that inmates at Butler County Jail were subjected to a
substantial risk of serious harm; 2) that the County was deliberately indifferent to
that risk; 3) that there was a causal link between the acts or omissions of the
County and the excessive risk of violence; and 4) that there was a causal link
between the excessive risk of violence and the injuries suffered by Marsh and
6
Owens. Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582-84 (11th Cir. 1995); see
also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 847 (1994). For the purposes of
reviewing the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, we must accept
all facts alleged in the complaint as true. Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1027
(11th Cir. 1993). Of course the facts as stated herein may differ from the facts
ultimately determined by a jury.
The complaint in this case makes the following allegations about conditions
in Butler County Jail. The Butler County Jail, a two-story building located in
downtown Greenville, Alabama, was constructed in 1929 and 1930. By 1996,
because the County failed to maintain the facility over the years, the building was
in an extremely dilapidated and poor physical condition. Sewage leaked from
overhead pipes. Showers were covered with rust, mildew and peeling paint. Sinks
and toilets were dilapidated and inoperable. Hallways were littered with trash.
Windows were cracked and could not be closed. Shards of broken glass lay in the
window sills. Rats, cockroaches and other rodents and vermin entered the jail
through broken windows and cracks in the walls. The locks on inmate cells on the
second floor of the Jail had been inoperable since at least 1995. As a result,
inmates housed on the second floor have been able at all times to open their cell
doors and walk into the hall, other cells, or the dayrooms whenever they wished,
7
and they did so.
The complaint further alleged that the Jail was grossly understaffed. Despite
the fact that jailers had numerous duties,3 the Jail was often staffed by only one
person. Jailers spent most of their time sitting at a desk at the entrance to the Jail
on the first floor, from which position they could not view any of the inmate cells,
dayrooms, or the kitchen. In fact, most inmate living areas at the Jail were
completely unsupervised. Jailers were “too afraid to conduct visual inspections of
inmate cells on the second floor” because the broken locks prevented them from
ever locking down the inmates. The Jail had no visual or audio surveillance
system on the second floor, and no jailer was assigned there.
Because of the poor condition of the Jail, inmates were able “to vandalize
[the facility], break windows, and rip metal pipes and other dangerous objects from
the structure.” Due in part to the low perimeter fence around the exercise yard,
inmates were also “able to obtain screwdrivers, sticks, and [make-shift knives
called] ‘shanks’ from outside the exercise yard.”
3
Jailers’ duties included controlling the inmate population, which could exceed fifty persons;
administering inmate intake and release; controlling the electronic gate in the fence surrounding
the Jail; supervising visitation and outdoor exercise; handling mail; coordinating food service;
dispensing medication; supervising trustees; and answering the Jail telephone. On weekends,
jailers were also responsible for answering telephone calls to the Butler County Sheriff’s
Department and for operating the dispatch radio. Because their duties were so overwhelming,
jailers often relied on unsupervised inmate trustees to assist them by, e.g., distributing medicine,
unloading supplies, and sometimes handling the Jail’s keys.
8
As a result of the County’s failure to maintain a jail of sufficient size and
strength to adequately secure and protect the prisoners, Marsh and Owens contend
that inmates at Butler County Jail faced a substantial risk of serious harm at the
hands of other inmates. Inmates were able to acquire weapons from in and around
the Jail facility, and were able to roam freely among the rooms on the second floor
without supervision. In the event that those unsupervised and armed inmates
attacked someone, inmates on the second floor were unable to contact jailers
directly. If they needed assistance, they either shouted out the windows or banged
on the walls. Even then, “[j]ailers often did not respond.”
The complaint further alleges that the County “knew and should have known
about [the] risk” to inmates, and “failed to take measures to abate [the] substantial
risk of serious harm.” Marsh and Owens alleged that the County was “repeatedly
informed that more staff was needed at the jail” and that “the jail was not
reasonably secure.” Critical reports from the Alabama Department of Corrections
and several other state agencies, numerous inmate complaints and requests for
assistance, and a federal civil rights action filed in May 1996 put the County on
notice of the poor conditions at the Jail. In spite of these warnings, by July 1996, it
had failed to take measures to ameliorate the situation. The County “did not
improve the physical condition of the jail or maintenance practices . . ., did not
9
repair the locks on the second floor,” and did not increase staffing at the Jail.
In their complaint, Marsh and Owens alleged that the substantial risk of
harm faced by the inmates at Butler County Jail was traceable to the acts and
omissions of the County. In particular, they alleged that they were subject to a
substantial risk of serious harm because inmates were able to fashion weapons by
vandalizing the decrepit Jail facility. Inmates were also able to secure weapons
from in and around the outdoor exercise area due in part to the inadequacy of the
perimeter fence. Moreover, Marsh and Owens alleged that inmates faced
substantial risk of harm as a result of the broken locks on the second floor of the
Jail. Because jailers were not able to lock down inmates on the second floor, the
jailers were afraid to enter the floor, and thus could not perform necessary health
and safety checks. Inmates were also permitted to roam freely among the cells and
other rooms on the second floor because of the broken locks. In addition, the Jail
did not utilize any visual or audio surveillance system. Finally, Marsh and Owens
alleged that the Jail was chronically under-staffed, resulting in inadequate
supervision and discipline of the inmates.
The complaint then delineates the injuries suffered by Marsh and Owens as a
result of the deplorable jail conditions and the County’s failure to address them.
As to Marsh, the complaint alleges the following. On July 2, 1996, Joe Marsh was
10
resting on a bunk bed in a cell on the second floor of the Jail when four inmates
entered the cell and one of them challenged Marsh to a fight in the dayroom.
“When Marsh refused, the inmate struck him across the head with a metal pipe.”
The three other inmates joined in the assault on Marsh, which lasted for several
minutes. “They punched, kicked, and hit Marsh with the pipe while he was balled
up in a corner. One inmate cut Marsh with a screwdriver while the other three held
him.” While the assault was in progress, other inmates on the second floor
“shouted and pounded on the walls” in an attempt to procure assistance from the
jailers on the first floor. After being struck with the pipe a final time in the head,
Marsh managed to walk toward the entrance to the back side to seek help. His face
and head were covered in blood. As a result of the assault, Marsh suffered
lacerations on his face, on the back of his head, and on this back. In addition, he
sustained a fracture to the bone above his left eye. Since leaving the Jail, Marsh
has suffered from frequent headaches and nightmares about the assault.
On the evening of July 3, Leroy Owens entered the dayroom on the second
floor of the Jail, followed by the four inmates who had assaulted Marsh. One of
those inmates “hit Owens over the head with a metal pipe,” and “[a]nother hit him
with a water cooler.” They proceeded to smash his head against a metal table, kick
him, stomp on him, stab him, and beat him. Owens screamed for help. A number
11
of other inmates pounded on the walls and called for help, one of them yelling,
“[t]hey’re killing him up here.” Only one jailer was on duty, and he did not come
to Owens’ assistance. Instead, he called the Greenville City Police, who refused to
approach the second floor when they arrived at the Jail. The jailer then called
Sheriff Harris and the jail administrator, both of whom refused to come to the Jail.
The jailer finally called the chief deputy of the Sheriff’s Department, who came to
the Jail.
The assault lasted between 30 minutes and an hour, during which time the
four inmates stopped beating Owens and returned to their cells several times
because they mistakenly thought they heard approaching jailers. Each time, they
returned to the dayroom and continued to beat Owens when they realized that
nobody was coming. When the assault was over, Owens lay on the floor of the
dayroom in a pool of his blood. Inmates continued to call for help. Approximately
20 minutes after the assault ended, the chief deputy removed Owens from the
second floor and had him transported to the emergency room.
B. District Court’s Ruling
The County moved for dismissal on the ground that it “does not have
authority to control or set policies or customs for the operation of the Butler
County Jail, nor does it have the authority to promulgate policies for treatment of
12
inmates housed in the Butler County Jail.” The district court granted the County’s
motion to dismiss without holding a hearing on the ground that the County and
County Commission both enjoyed legislative immunity under the purview of 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Clearly, legislative immunity is not applicable in this
case. As is plain from the title of Section 1915, that statute applies only to
proceedings in forma pauperis, which this suit was not. More importantly,
however, it is well settled that “immunity from suit under Section 1983 extends to
public servants only in their individual capacities,” but does not protect
governmental entities. Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 688, 677 n.
* (1996). In this case, the County Commissioners were not sued in their individual
capacities. Therefore, legislative immunity has no bearing on the complaint in this
case. The district court clearly erred in concluding that the County and County
Commission enjoyed any sort of legislative immunity from this suit.
The County concedes that the district court clearly erred in dismissing the
suit on this basis, but asks that we nonetheless affirm the dismissal because the
complaint fails to state claims of constitutional deprivations for which the County
is responsible under this Court’s en banc decision in Turquitt v. Jefferson County,
Ala., 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998). Alternatively, the County asks that we
affirm the dismissal because the complaint fails to allege that the County was on
13
notice of the constitutional deficiencies at the Jail.
Looking anew at the allegations in the complaint, we find that Marsh and
Owens alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against the County under Section
1983 for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm at the Butler
County Jail. It is true that the County may not be responsible for all of the
conditions at the Butler County Jail. The extent to which the County may be
considered to have caused conditions leading to a constitutional deprivation is
prescribed by the duties and responsibilities Alabama counties have with regard to
county jails. This Court has found that:
The duties of the counties with respect to the jails are limited to
funding the operation of the jail and to providing facilities to house
the jail. . . . The county commission is charged with erecting and
maintaining jails, and each county is required to maintain a jail of
sufficient size and strength to secure the prisoners. . . . In construing
these provisions, the Alabama courts have made it clear that the duty
of the county to erect and maintain a county jail pertains exclusively
to the physical plant of the jail. The duty to maintain a jail under
[Alabama Code] § 11-14-10 is merely the duty to keep the jail and all
equipment therein in a state of repair and to preserve it from failure or
decline.
Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285, 1289-90 (11th Cir. 1998) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Although these duties are
not as extensive as those owed by the Sheriff, there is in fact a nexus between the
County’s sphere of responsibility and the jail conditions alleged to have caused the
14
substantial risk of serious harm.
The complaint alleged that the risk of harm at the Jail stemmed in part from
the inmates’ ability to fashion weapons by vandalizing the dilapidated physical
structure of the Jail and by removing dangerous objects such as metal pipes and
broken glass from the ailing building. It is the County that is charged with the duty
of maintaining the physical structure of jails and keeping those structure and the
equipment therein in a state of repair. Marsh and Owens also alleged that inmates
were able to obtain weapons from outside the outdoor exercise area because the
perimeter fence was too low. The County was also charged with erecting and
maintaining a jail facility of sufficient size and strength to secure the inmates. The
complaint also charged that, because all the cell locks on the second floor were
broken for at least a year, jailers were afraid to supervise inmates adequately and
inmates were able to roam freely among different cells, which created a risk of
assault and intimidation. The lack of surveillance was exacerbated by the Jail’s
failure to use a video or audio surveillance system. Again, it is the responsibility
of the County to establish and maintain a jail that is in good repair and is
sufficiently secure. Finally, the Jail’s alleged under-staffing problems may have
been caused by insufficient funding. The County is responsible for funding the
operation of the jails.
15
Moreover, Marsh and Owens did in fact allege that the County was actually
aware of the dangerous conditions and did nothing to remedy the problems,
evidencing deliberate indifference to the risk of harm. We also find that the
complaint contained sufficient facts to allege a causal link both between the acts or
omissions of the County and the excessive risk of harm, and between the excessive
risk of violence and the injuries suffered by Marsh and Owens.
Because the complaint filed by Marsh and Owens alleged with sufficient
particularity all of the elements necessary to find municipal liability for a
constitutional deprivation under Section 1983, we find that the district court erred
in dismissing this case against Butler County and the Butler County Commission.
II. Claims against Sheriff Harris
In their complaint, Marsh and Owens alleged that Sheriff Harris, in both her
personal and her official capacity,4 was deliberately indifferent “to the substantial
risk of harm to inmates at the Butler County Jail.” In addition, Owens alleged that
4
Although the complaint states that “Diane Harris is sued in her official capacity as Sheriff of
Butler County,” the caption states that Harris is sued in her personal as well as her official
capacity. This Court has previously said that “the complaint itself, not the caption, controls the
identification of the parties and the capacity in which they are sued.” Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d
1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1995). We did so, however, in allowing a claim to go forward despite a
misleading caption. In this case, the caption is sufficient to put Harris on notice that she was
subject to suit under Section 1983. Because Harris is immune from suit against her in her
official capacity, we will consider all claims against her as against her in her personal capacity.
The district court, having addressed the issue of Harris’ qualified immunity, also treated the
complaint as naming Harris in her personal as well as her official capacity.
16
Sheriff Harris, in her personal capacity, was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs.5 In order to find that the district court erred in dismissing Marsh
and Owens’ claims against Sheriff Harris, we must find that they alleged sufficient
facts to demonstrate that Harris, acting within her discretionary functions, violated
their clearly established constitutional rights.
This Court has found that an Alabama sheriff “acts exclusively for the state
rather than for the county in operating a county jail.” Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1288.
Because she is an officer of the State, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes Harris
from being sued in her official capacity. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400
(11th Cir. 1986). Thus, the district court was correct in dismissing the claims
against Harris in her official capacity. In order to state a successful claim under
Section 1983 against a state official in her personal capacity, a plaintiff must first
overcome the protections of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects
government officials from civil suit when they have acted within their
discretionary functions in a manner that violates “no clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “Defendants are entitled to qualified
5
In the complaint, Owens asserts this claim against the “Defendants.” Because there is no
allegation anywhere else in the complaint to support a theory that the County showed deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, we will consider this claim as against Sheriff Harris
only.
17
immunity in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss only if the complaint fails to allege
facts that would show a violation of a clearly established constitutional [or federal
statutory] right.” Kyle K. v. Chapman, 208 F.3d 940, 942 (11th Cir. Apr. 5, 2000).
A. Marsh and Owens’ Claim of Deliberate Indifference to a Substantial
Risk of Serious Harm
1. Allegations in the Complaint
It is well settled law that a “prison official’s deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828. In order to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Complaint
in this case must have alleged that 1) inmates were subjected to a substantial risk of
serious harm, 2) Sheriff Harris was deliberately indifferent to that risk, 3) the
Sheriff’s deliberate indifference caused that risk, and 4) her deliberate indifference
caused the harm suffered by Marsh and Owens. See Zatler, 802 F.2d at 400-01. In
order to state the requisite causal connections, Marsh and Owens need not have
alleged that Harris was personally involved in the actions that violated their
constitutional rights. This Court has made clear that “[p]ersonal participation is
only one of several ways to establish the requisite causal connection. . . . An
official may also be liable where a policy or custom that [she] established or
utilized results in deliberate indifference to an inmate’s constitutional rights.”
18
Zatler, 802 F.2d at 401 (internal citations omitted).
Many of the complaint’s factual allegations that are outlined above also
implicate the Sheriff in the alleged constitutional deprivations. Marsh and Owens
alleged that inmates were able to acquire or fashion weapons due in part to both
inadequate supervision by prison personnel and a systematic failure to search
inmates when they returned from the exercise yard. They also alleged that jailers
failed to inspect cells and inmates on the second floor, and thus could not conduct
“counts” to ensure the health and safety of the inmates. They further alleged that
the personnel at the Jail were inadequately trained and that the Jail was routinely
“grossly understaffed.” They charged that the Jail did not have any system for
screening entering inmates, and “did not ask new inmates about their mental health
background or other medical conditions.” Nor did they ascertain whether
incoming inmates had any existing conflicts with persons already imprisoned at the
Jail. Moreover, they claimed that the Jail had no system for classifying or
separating inmates, instead housing violent offenders with non-violent offenders,
serious felons with misdemeanants, juveniles with adults, and mentally ill persons
with those in good mental health. Finally, Marsh and Owens alleged that the Jail
employed “[n]o system of discipline,” and “did not discipline or even segregate
inmates who cursed, flooded cells, broke windows, destroyed property, attempted
19
to escape, threatened jailers, or assaulted other inmates.” As a result of these
alleged failures in supervision, security, and other inmate-related policies, Marsh
and Owens alleged that the conditions at Butler County Jail created “an intolerably
high risk of intimidation, assault, and other abuse among inmates at the jail.”
Marsh and Owens also alleged that Sheriff Harris was aware of the problems
and conditions that led to the substantial risk to inmates, and, by failing to remedy
those problems, evidenced deliberate indifference to the risk of harm faced by
inmates. They alleged that the Jail Administrator had informed Sheriff Harris that
the Jail was understaffed, and that the three inmate escape attempts during the first
half of 1996 all occurred when only one jailer was on duty. They also contended
that the jail inspector for the Alabama Department of Corrections had informed the
Sheriff that the Jail was not reasonably secure, and that the Sheriff had received
numerous critical inspection reports and inmate complaints. Notwithstanding this
notice, Marsh and Owens alleged that the Sheriff did nothing to address the
problems in the Jail or to alleviate the substantial risk of harm.
Marsh and Owens alleged in their complaint that Sheriff Harris is
responsible under Alabama law for the general operation of the Jail, and thus acts
as final policy maker with respect to the operation of the Jail. They further alleged
that the substantial risk of harm they faced was a direct result of the staffing and
20
operational policies of the Jail. They alleged that the risk of harm arose from the
ability of the inmates to bring weapons from the exercise yard into the Jail, from
the inadequate supervision of inmates, from the Jail’s failure to classify and
segregate inmates, and from the Jail’s lack of a disciplinary system.
Finally, Marsh and Owens alleged that Sheriff Harris’ failure to remedy the
problems at the Jail – that is, her deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of
harm faced by the inmates – caused them to suffer injuries. Both Marsh and
Owens alleged that they were attacked by inmates who brandished weapons such
as a screwdriver that they may have acquired while outside in the exercise yard.
Both victims alleged that they were subjected to prolonged attacks because jailers
refused to come to their assistance. In the case of Owens, the only jailer on duty
refused to come to his assistance until other Jail personnel could accompany him.
After the four attacking inmates allegedly assaulted Marsh, they were not
disciplined, interrogated, or segregated, even after they were later heard plotting to
assault a female guard. Marsh and Owens alleged that those four inmates were left
to roam freely among the rooms on the second floor, where they later assaulted
Owens and again attacked Marsh with a fire extinguisher after he returned from the
emergency room. Indeed, it was the very day after Marsh was beaten that Owens
was extensively beaten while no jailer came to his aid. After being left in a pool of
21
his own blood, Owens was finally removed from the second floor and taken to the
emergency room. Owens was treated at the hospital, after which the deputies once
again took him into their custody, agreeing to monitor his injuries and his health.
Nonetheless, the deputies left him without shoes or supervision by the side of an
interstate.
Owens further alleged that he was injured partly as a result of the fact that
the Jail did not have any system for screening or segregating inmates. He alleged
that he has suffered from mental illness since at least 1979, has been diagnosed as a
paranoid schizophrenic with borderline intellectual functioning, and has been
institutionalized in a number of mental health facilities. He alleged that the
affidavit upon which his arrest warrant was based in July 1996 stated that Owens
was a “mental patient” and that he was “talking nonsense.” When Owens arrived
at the Jail, nobody asked him about his mental illness, and he was placed in the
general population on the back side of the second floor. While he was incarcerated
at the Jail, Owens alleged that his mental health problems were obvious as he
allegedly proclaimed that he was a prophet of God. Another inmate informed a
jailer that Owens should be moved because he was “not right in the head” and was
aggravating other inmates. Some inmates complained about Owens’ hygiene and
harassed him, forcing him to move from cell to cell. Owens requested that he be
22
placed in a cell by himself, but his request was refused.
2. District Court’s Ruling
The district court found that Marsh and Owens had failed to state a claim of
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm against Sheriff Harris
because they had stated insufficient facts to overcome her qualified immunity. In
so holding, the court concluded that Marsh and Owens had failed to allege that
Harris had crossed a “bright line” into violations of clearly established law.
In order to state a claim that Harris violated clearly established law by
displaying deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates,
Marsh and Owens needed to allege 1) that they were “incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and 2) that prison officials –
in this case Sheriff Harris – demonstrated “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate
health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Marsh and Owens clearly did so in this
case. In Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582-84 (11th Cir. 1995), this
Court found that an inmate alleged sufficient facts to survive the jailer defendants’
motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The inmate plaintiff
in that case complained that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm from
inmate-on-inmate violence, and had in fact been assaulted by other inmates, due in
part to the jail’s failure to segregate inmates, the jail’s under-staffing, the
23
inadequate training of jailers, and the jailers’ inadequate supervision and
monitoring of inmates. The district court in this case stated that, although Marsh
and Owens “have asserted essentially the same claims as the inmates in the Hale
case,” this case is distinguishable because Marsh and Owens had failed to allege
that “inmate-on-inmate violence occurred regularly when the jail was over-
crowded,” as was the case in Hale. We do not find that fact to be distinguishing.
Marsh and Owens do not need to allege that previous incidents of violence
occurred at the Jail in order to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that the
standard for demonstrating deliberate indifference “does not require a prisoner
seeking ‘a remedy for unsafe conditions [to] await a tragic event [such as] an
actua[l] assaul[t] before obtaining relief.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845 (quoting
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-34 (1993) (alterations in original)).
The conditions at the jail in Hale that gave rise to the history of inmate-on-
inmate violence are substantially similar to the conditions alleged in this case to
have created the substantial risk of serious harm at Butler County Jail. Indeed, the
living conditions at Butler County Jail are a good deal worse than were the
conditions in Hale. Butler County inmates were forced to endure squalid
conditions that in fact put prisoners in harm’s way rather than securing their safety.
24
Although the “Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ . . . neither
does it permit inhumane ones.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). Rather, prison officials have a duty to
provide humane conditions of confinement and to protect prisoners from violence
at the hands of other prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. “Having incarcerated
‘persons [with] demonstrated proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often
violent, conduct,” . . . having stripped them of virtually every means of self-
protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the government and its
officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id. (quoting Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). Marsh and Owens alleged that armed
inmates were permitted to roam freely and unsupervised among second floor
rooms, which housed all classes of detainees. Moreover, the jailers themselves
were afraid to perform health and safety checks on the second floor because they
were unable to lock down the inmates. These allegations are sufficient to state a
claim that inmates at Butler County Jail faced a substantial risk of serious harm at
the hands of other inmates. Moreover, the allegations are sufficient to state a claim
that Sheriff Harris, as final policy maker for Butler County Jail, violated clearly
established laws by creating the conditions at the Jail that gave rise to the threat of
danger.
25
Marsh and Owens also alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that Sheriff
Harris was deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm at the Jail. “Whether a
prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of fact
subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial
evidence, . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at
841. Marsh and Owens alleged both that Sheriff Harris had been put on notice by
numerous sources that the Jail was understaffed and that it was “not reasonably
secure,” and that she had failed to take any steps to alleviate the risk of harm.
Allegations that “the defendant-official being sued had been exposed to
information concerning the risk and thus ‘must have known’ about it . . . could be
sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the defendant-official had actual
knowledge of the risk.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43. Marsh and Owens alleged
sufficient facts in their complaint to state a claim that Sheriff Harris was
deliberately indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm at the Butler County
Jail.
Because Marsh and Owens alleged all of the elements necessary for a
successful claim against a state official in her personal capacity under Section 1983
for deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm, and because they
26
alleged those elements with sufficient specificity to put Sheriff Harris on notice of
the grounds upon which their claim rested, we find that the district court erred in
dismissing their claim.
B. Owens’ Claim of Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs
1. Allegations in the Complaint
We now turn to Owens’ claim against Harris for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, which must meet criteria similar to that of the serious
harm claim in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The Supreme Court has
held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes
the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). In order to state such a claim, an inmate must
allege more than negligence; he must “allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at
105.
In order to survive Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint in this case must
have alleged that 1) Owens suffered from a serious medical need, 2) Sheriff Harris
was deliberately indifferent to that need, and 3) Harris’ deliberate indifference
caused Owens to suffer harm. See McElligot v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254-55
27
(11th Cir. 1999).
Owens has alleged that he suffered from “serious medical needs” after being
released from the hospital following his assault at the Jail. He claims that the
hospital staff “instructed the Sheriff’s Department to follow specific procedures to
care for Owens’s head wounds and other injuries. It instructed them to monitor his
level of consciousness, pupils, vision, and coordination, and to call the hospital
immediately if any change occurred.” His condition was diagnosed by a physician
as mandating treatment and monitoring, and he was in a great deal of pain.
Owens also contended that the Sheriff’s Department was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. Rather than adhering to the written
instructions they received when they signed Owens out of the hospital, the officers
released Owens, instructing him to sign his own bond, and dropped him off near an
interstate outside of a motel. Owens was barefoot, wearing bloodied clothing, and
was severely swollen and bruised. When he stepped out of the officer’s car, the
officer drove away. Owens was unable to secure a room at that motel, and, after
walking dazedly across the interstate, he was also denied entrance to a restaurant.
At that point, a city police officer picked him up and ordered a clerk at a Holiday
Inn to rent a room to Owens.
Owens did not allege that Sheriff Harris was personally involved in these
28
events. He did, however, allege that the deliberate indifference shown by the
officers was pursuant to an official policy of the Sheriff’s Department. Owens
claimed that the acts allegedly constituting deliberate indifference occurred when
the officers of the Sheriff’s Department dropped him on the side of the road
without administering the medical care the hospital had instructed them to deliver.
Owens also alleged that the officers released him in such a manner pursuant to a
“policy and custom of releasing sick or injured inmates.”
Finally, Owens also alleged that, when he awoke alone on the day following
the assault, he was in a great deal of pain and had to be taken back to the hospital
in an ambulance. He also alleged that he had to be readmitted to the hospital
several days later and that he still experiences pain and limited mobility in his right
shoulder as well as uncontrollable shaking in his right arm.
2. District Court’s Ruling
The District Court dismissed Owens’ claim against Sheriff Harris for
deliberate indifference to serious medical need on the ground that she enjoyed
qualified immunity. The district court concluded that Owens did not “show that
the sheriff was personally involved in the acts or omissions that resulted in the
constitutional deprivation,” and that he therefore failed to establish a constitutional
violation. In order to overcome the defense of qualified immunity in a Section
29
1983 claim for civil damages from a government official performing discretionary
functions, a plaintiff must show that the official has violated “clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982). In assessing such Section 1983 claims, the
Supreme Court has recently stated that “a court must first determine whether the
plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so,
proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). See County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841, n. 5 (1998) (criticizing the district court
for granting summary judgment based on qualified immunity to a government
official in a Section 1983 case, without first deciding that a substantive due process
violation had taken place, on the ground that the law was not clearly established at
the time of the alleged violation); Siegart v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)
(stating that “a necessary concomitant to the determination of whether the
constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the
defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a
violation of a constitutional right at all,” and that courts should not “assum[e],
without deciding, this preliminary issue”).
As noted above, this was a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. Therefore we look to
30
the complaint to see if Owens has alleged the violation of a federal right. In order
to state a claim for a violation of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,6 the
complaint must allege that Sheriff Harris was not merely negligent but that she
committed “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs” and caused Owens to suffer harm. Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106; McElligot v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999). We
have defined a “serious medical need” as “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Hill, 40 F.3d at
1187.
The condition Owens alleges he was in when he was released by the
hospital into the care of the Sheriff’s Department qualifies at this initial stage of the
proceedings as a “serious medical need.” Moreover, by alleging that the officers of
the Sheriff’s Department failed to follow the instructions given to them at the
6
Owens was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged constitutional violations. “Eighth
Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment do not apply to pretrial
detainees.” Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 n. 3 (11th Cir.1994) (en
banc) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n. 40, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1412-13 n. 40, 51
L.Ed.2d 711 (1977)). However, this Court has held that “in regard to providing pretrial
detainees with such basic necessities as food, living space, and medical care the minimum
standard allowed by the due process clause is the same as that allowed by the eighth amendment
for convicted persons.” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994),
(quoting Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11th Cir.1985); accord Tittle, 10 F.3d
at 1539; Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274 (11th Cir.1989). Accordingly, we analyze
Owens’ claims under the same standard as applied to Marsh.
31
hospital for caring for Owens’ medical needs, and instead left him barefoot by the
side of the road, Owens has alleged that they were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs.
In order to state a claim against Harris, however, Owens must do more than
allege that her employees were deliberately indifferent. Owens must allege
sufficient facts to adequately establish that Sheriff Harris’ was personally
responsible for her employees’ actions. The district court held that because the
Sheriff was not personally involved at the time of the deputy’s actions, she could
not be held personally liable. However, as this Court has previously held,
“[p]ersonal participation is only one of several ways to establish the requisite
causal connection. . . . An official may also be liable where a policy or custom
that [she] established or utilized results in deliberate indifference to an inmate’s
constitutional rights.” Zatler, 802 F.2d at 401 (internal citations omitted). Owens
did allege that the officers of the Sheriff’s Department acted pursuant to a “policy
and custom of releasing sick and injured inmates” when they acted with deliberate
indifference. Because Sheriff Harris is the final policy maker of Butler County
Jail, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim that she acted with deliberate
indifference to Owens’ serious medical needs.
Because the complaint has alleged the necessary elements to demonstrate
32
that Harris was deliberately indifferent to Owens’ serious medical needs, it has also
sufficiently alleged that Harris is not entitled to qualified immunity. As we noted
in Hill v. Dekalb Regional Youth Detention Center, “a finding of deliberate
indifference necessarily precludes a finding of qualified immunity; prison officials
who deliberately ignore the serious medical needs of inmates cannot claim that it
was not apparent to a reasonable person that such actions violated the law.” 40
F.3d 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062,
1066 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Albers v. Whitley, 743 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.
1984), rev’d on other grounds, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).7
7
We note that in Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 327-28 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth
Circuit analyzed the qualified immunity claims in that case and did not decide whether the
plaintiff had established deliberate indifference. Hare was reviewing a denial of summary
judgment, and the court determined that the undisputed facts of the case revealed that the actions
taken by corrections officers were not unreasonable in the light of the circumstances and that
therefore the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. We also note, however, that under the
facts in Hare, the plaintiff would likewise not have met the test for deliberate indifference, as the
court concluded that officials had acted reasonably under the circumstances. “Whether one puts
it in terms of duty or deliberate indifference, prison officials who act reasonably cannot be found
liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 845. The
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he infliction of pain in the course of a prison security
measure . . . does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in
retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable,
and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Thus a
finding that a plaintiff has alleged deliberate indifference sufficiently to survive a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not rule out the possibility that facts may later come to light indicating
that the defendant behaved reasonably in the circumstances and thus was not deliberately
indifferent. However, the Supreme Court has also held that deliberate indifference to prisoners’
serious medical needs constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle, 429
U.S. at 104. Once a court has found that a prison official has unnecessarily and wantonly
inflicted pain on inmates, it cannot find that conduct to be objectively reasonable. Although
facts may later come to light indicating that Harris behaved reasonably in the circumstances and
33
Owens has also alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was injured by
Harris’ deliberate indifference. When he awoke alone the day following the
assault, he was “in terrible pain” and had to be taken back to the hospital in an
ambulance. He returned to the hospital several days later for further treatment.
Because we find that Owens alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Sheriff
Harris under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, we
conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
thus was not deliberately indifferent, the allegations in Owens’ complaint suffice to survive a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to allege a cause of action and to dismiss on the grounds of
qualified immunity.
34