Sheila Dennis v. City of North Miami ( 2010 )


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  •                                                       [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________          FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-13843         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    DECEMBER 14, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 07-22126-CV-JAL
    SHEILA DENNIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, FL,
    JOHN DOE,
    Police Supervisor,
    MIZJIAH,
    badge #369,
    WALDEN,
    badge #345,
    TENENT HEALTHCARE CORPORATION, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees,
    DR. RODRIQUEZ PEDRO, et al.,
    Defendants.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (December 14, 2010)
    Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Sheila Dennis, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of her
    Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief from judgment. Dennis filed the Rule 60(b)(6)
    motion to challenge the district court’s earlier order dismissing her § 1983
    complaint for failure to state a claim.
    I.
    Dennis contends that the district court erred in denying her Rule 60(b)(6)
    motion for relief from judgment. “We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for
    abuse of discretion.” Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 
    242 F.3d 1017
    , 1019 (11th
    Cir. 2001). “Rule 60(b)(6), the catchall provision of the Rule, authorizes relief for
    ‘any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.’” Cano v.
    Baker, 
    435 F.3d 1337
    , 1342 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)).
    “[R]elief under this clause is an extraordinary remedy which may be invoked only
    upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.” Crapp, 242 F.3d at 1020
    2
    (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted); see also Griffin v. Swim-Tech
    Corp., 
    722 F.2d 677
    , 680 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The party seeking relief has the burden
    of showing that absent such relief, an ‘extreme’ and ‘unexpected’ hardship will
    result.” (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 
    286 U.S. 106
    , 119, 
    52 S. Ct. 460
    ,
    464 (1932))).
    No “exceptional circumstances” are present in this case that lead us to
    conclude that the district court abused its discretion under Rule 60(b)(6). Dennis
    argues that the district court erred in denying her Rule 60(b)(6) motion because her
    complaint had merit. That argument falls outside the scope of our review. See
    Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    996 F.2d 1111
    , 1115 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining
    that a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used as a substitute for a proper and timely
    appeal of the district court’s judgment); Glass v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 
    714 F.2d 1107
    , 1109 (11th Cir. 1983) (stating that an appeal from the denial of a Rule
    60(b) motion “does not bring up the underlying judgment for review”). Because
    Dennis has failed to show exceptional circumstances, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    3