United States v. Marquis Vonterre Jones , 581 F. App'x 807 ( 2014 )

Case: 14-10469 Date Filed: 10/02/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10469
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:13-cr-80044-KAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARQUIS VONTERRE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(October 2, 2014)
Before WILSON, HILL and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Marquis Vonterre Jones appeals the district court’s imposition of his total
70-month sentence following his conviction on 4 counts of bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On appeal, Jones argues that his sentence is
unreasonable because the district court failed to give proper consideration to the
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when electing to run 52 months of his sentence
concurrent to his then-anticipated state court sentence on unrelated charges, with
the remaining 18 months to be served consecutively. 1 Jones contends that the
sentence was much higher than necessary to comply with the purposes of the
sentencing, and that a number of the § 3553(a) factors support a more concurrent
sentence with his state court sentence.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse of discretion
standard. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). In
reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we determine first whether the district
court committed any “significant procedural error,” and second whether the
sentence was “substantively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.”
United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566, 573 (11th Cir. 2010). The party challenging
the sentence has the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable. Id.
A district court is not required “to state on the record that it has explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a)
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Jones since was sentenced in state court to 12 years’ imprisonment.
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factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). An
acknowledgment that the court considered the defendant’s arguments and the
§ 3553(a) factors is adequate. Id. at 1330. Additionally, the weight given to each
factor is “a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United
States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
Federal law prefers consecutive sentencing when imprisonment terms are
imposed at different times. United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1506 (11th Cir.
1993); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (providing that “[m]ultiple terms of
imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless the court orders
that the terms are to run concurrently”). However, district courts generally have
the discretion to decide whether or not a sentence will run concurrently or
consecutively to other state sentences that are anticipated but not yet imposed.
Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1468, 182 L. Ed. 2d 455
(2012); see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (backg’d) (2013) (providing that
sentencing courts have discretion to run a federal sentence concurrently or
consecutively to anticipated state sentences, but only after considering the
§ 3553(a) factors, any applicable guidelines, and any relevant policy statements by
the U.S. Sentencing Commission). The district courts have discretion to impose a
federal sentence consecutive to an unrelated state sentence not yet imposed for
pending state charges. Ballard, 6 F.3d at 1510; see also United States v. Andrews,
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330 F.3d 1305, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2003) (reaffirming Ballard’s holding that the
district court has the authority to impose a consecutive sentence to an unimposed
future state sentence). Likewise, a district court is authorized to make a federal
sentence concurrent to a state sentence not yet imposed for pending state charges.
United States v. McDaniel, 338 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir. 2003). This discretion
is predicated, however, on the court’s consideration of the factors set forth in
§ 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, comment. (backg’d) (2013).
Upon review of the record and after consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
The imposition of Jones’s sentence was reasonable. The district court
properly considered the § 3553(a) factors, and did not abuse its discretion by
giving significant weight to the aggravating factors, in electing not to run Jones’s
sentence fully concurrent to his state sentence. It was within the district court’s
discretion to decide how much of his federal sentence should be imposed partially
consecutive to his then-anticipated state court sentence, and the sentence met the
goals encompassed within § 3553(a).
AFFIRMED.
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