Krystal Lucado v. Hugh D. Coherd ( 2014 )

Case: 14-10299 Date Filed: 10/03/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-10299
Non-Argument Calendar
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D. C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03176-RWS
KRYSTAL LUCADO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HUGH D. COHERD,
PATRICIA KOMAREK COHERD,
Defendants-Appellees,
JOHN DOES 1-3,
Defendants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(October 3, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Krystal Lucado appeals the district court’s dismissal of her claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The district court relied on the domestic relations
exemption, concluding that it “should abstain from deciding issues that may
interfere with the decisions of the state court which is better positioned” to decide
“core” matters regarding support obligations of Hugh Coherd. We conclude that
Lucado’s action is a tort claim that does not require delving “into the parties’
domestic affairs” to resolve, so the district court should have retained jurisdiction.
Lucado brings this action alleging that Hugh Coherd unlawfully transferred
assets to his current wife, Patricia Coherd, to avoid paying support obligations.
Lucado obtained a Writ of Fieri Facias totaling $411,323.11 pursuant to a 2006
judgment entered in Fulton County Superior Court. Since 2006, Hugh Coherd has
failed to pay the support sums, and the superior court has entered subsequent orders
on contempt.
This Court reviews the district court’s ruling on motion to dismiss de novo.
S.E.C. v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 408 F.3d 737, 741 (11th Cir. 2005). The issue on
appeal is the district court’s application of the domestic relations exemption from
diversity jurisdiction.1 “Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is subject to
a judicially created exemption for domestic relations and probate cases.” Rash v.
1
We posed a question about diversity of the parties to Lucado pursuant to Mallory &
Evans Contractors & Engineers, LLC v. Tuskeegee University, 663 F.3d 1304, 1304-05 (11th Cir.
2011). With leave of this Court, Lucado filed an amended complaint in which she pleads that she
is a citizen of Maryland and the Coherds are citizens of Georgia. The parties are diverse.
2
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Rash, 173 F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). The exemption applies to “cases
involving divorce and alimony, child custody, visitations rights, establishment of
paternity, child support, and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still
subject to state court modification.” Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th
Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted). “But the exception is narrowly confined; it
is not an absolute rule . . . . The court should abstain only when hearing the claim
would require the court to delve into the parties’ domestic affairs.” Rash, 173 F.3d
at 1380.
The claims at hand require the factfinder to determine if Hugh Coherd
transferred assets to Patricia Coherd for the purpose of defrauding Lucado.
O.C.G.A. § 18-2-74. The judgment in this case happens to come from a dispute
regarding child support, but “[p]rimarily, this case is a dispute over assets . . . and
only secondarily of domestic differences.” Rash, 173 F.3d at 1380.
The Coherds argue, and the district court recognized, that child support sums
are subject to adjustment by the state court. In fact, as recently as 2012, the
superior court entered an interim order on contempt. But these ongoing state
proceedings relate to Hugh Coherd’s failure to pay his child support and the
prospect of his incarceration if he does not pay arrearages. This action “stripped of
its verbiage” is about locating viable assets. Jagiella v. Jagiella, 647 F.2d 561, 565
(5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (quoting Bacon v. Bacon, 365 F. Supp. 1019, 1020 (D. Or.
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1973)). Lucado holds a liquidated judgment upon which she may collect, and when
the arrearages in question may be calculated solely from the records of a court
clerk, a district court should exercise diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 564 (“Since the
arrearages here in question were calculable solely from the records of the Clerk of
the Florida Circuit Court and involved no litigation of questions regarding the
parties’ marital relationship, we conclude that the district court properly exercised
jurisdiction.”).
We acknowledge the district court’s reluctance to retain jurisdiction over the
case given the divorce proceedings’ “very tortured past,” but we must reverse given
the discrete issue separate from the domestic dispute. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
504 U.S. 689, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2215 (1992) (“By concluding, as we do, that the
domestic relations exception encompasses only cases involving the issuance of a
divorce, alimony, or child custody decree, we necessarily find that the Court of
Appeals erred by affirming the District Court’s invocation of this exception.”).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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