United States v. Paul Jenkins , 428 F. App'x 969 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-15451 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 8, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 6:09-cr-00245-MSS-KRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PAUL JENKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 8, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In January 2009, Paul Jenkins was sentenced in the Eastern District of New
York to 30 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.
He was released from prison on September 17, 2009, and on December 1, 2009,
jurisdiction of his supervised release was transferred to the Middle District of
Florida.
Jenkins was arrested on May 20, 2010 for violations of the conditions of his
supervised release. He admitted to five Grade C violations, including the use of
controlled substances and failure to submit to urinalysis. At the ensuing
revocation hearing, the district court found that Jenkins had indeed violated his
supervised release and revoked it. Then, determining that his Guidelines sentence
range called for 6 to 12 months’ confinement, it sentenced him to prison for 10
months to be followed by two years of supervised release.
Jenkins now appeals, arguing that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court (1) did not explain why it rejected his request for a lower
sentence and (2) failed to consider his argument in mitigation. He also argues that
his sentence is substantively unreasonable, in part because the district court almost
exclusively relied upon his criminal history in fashioning the sentence.
We review a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release for
procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.
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United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
674 (2010). The district court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote
respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal
conduct, protect the public from future crimes, and provide needed educational or
vocational training or medical care. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The court must also
consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the applicable
Guidelines sentence range, pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing
Commission, the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to
consider the § 3553(a) purposes or adequately explain why it imposed the chosen
sentence. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2008). The
court must set forth enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments
and had a reasoned basis for exercising its legal authority, but a lengthy
explanation of its sentence is not necessarily required where the court adheres to
the Guidelines. United States v. Agbai, 497 F.3d 1226, 1229-30 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Finally, it is not necessary that the court state on the record that it has explicitly
considered each of the § 3553(a) purposes, or to discuss each of them. United
States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). It is sufficient that the court
acknowledges that it considered the parties’s arguments and the § 3553(a)
purposes. Id. at 1329-30.
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if, after considering the totality of
the facts and circumstances, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that
the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a)
purposes so that the sentence falls outside the range of reasonable sentences as
dictated by the facts. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189-90 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc), cert. denied, (U.S. Apr. 4, 2011) (No. 10-727). Sentences that
fall within the applicable Guideline sentence range are ordinarily expected to be
reasonable. U.S. v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784,788 (11th Cir. 2005).
Jenkins’s sentence is procedurally reasonable. The district court
acknowledged Jenkins’s argument in mitigation and his allocution, and stated that
it had considered the § 3553(a) purposes and the applicable guideline. It explicitly
based its sentence on Jenkins’s criminal history and his background. Although the
district court prompted Jenkins’s attorney to conclude her arguments, the record
demonstrates that it fully considered the mitigating factors presented. The district
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court’s explanation of its sentence was sufficient, and it was not required to
explain in detail why it rejected Jenkins’s request for a lesser sentence.
His sentence is also substantively reasonable. The district court expressed
concern regarding Jenkins’s criminal history and background. It also heard and
considered arguments from Jenkins and his attorney, which implicated several
§ 3553(a) purposes. Jenkins received a within-Guidelines range sentence, and we
ordinarily expect sentences of such a type to be reasonable. Further, his sentence
of imprisonment was significantly less than the three-year statutory maximum term
that he faced. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances, Jenkins has
not shown that the district court committed a clear error of judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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