United States v. Danyel Megal Black ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 20-14280      Date Filed: 01/05/2022   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-14280
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DANYEL MEGAL BLACK,
    a.k.a. Daniel Black,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cr-00376-JSM-SPF-1
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280             Date Filed: 01/05/2022         Page: 2 of 8
    2                          Opinion of the Court                       20-14280
    Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Danyel Black appeals the district court’s denial of a motion
    to suppress evidence, his conviction for possession of a firearm by
    a convicted felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1), and his sen-
    tence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e). After review, 1 we affirm Black’s conviction and sentence.
    I. DISCUSSION
    A. Motion to Suppress
    Black contends the district court erred when it denied his
    motion to suppress evidence because his probation order did not
    consent to warrantless searches of his apartment, there was no rea-
    sonable suspicion to search his apartment, and the search warrant
    1“A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
    of law and fact,” which is reviewed de novo. United States v. Zapata, 
    180 F.3d 1237
    , 1240 (11th Cir. 1999). We review the denial of a motion for a judgment
    of acquittal de novo. United States v. Maher, 
    955 F.3d 880
    , 884 (11th Cir.
    2020). Moreover, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a con-
    viction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the gov-
    ernment and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor
    of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Rodriguez, 
    218 F.3d 1243
    , 1244 (11th Cir.
    2000). We review whether a conviction qualifies as a “serious drug offense”
    under the ACCA de novo. United States v. White, 
    837 F.3d 1225
    , 1228 (11th
    Cir. 2016).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280        Date Filed: 01/05/2022     Page: 3 of 8
    20-14280               Opinion of the Court                        3
    obtained by local law enforcement did not have probable cause
    without the evidence collected from the probation officer’s war-
    rantless search, so all evidence collected was fruit of the poisonous
    tree.
    The Fourth Amendment provides individuals with the right
    to be secure in their person, home, papers, and effects against un-
    reasonable searches and seizures and provides that warrants may
    only be issued for probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A pro-
    bationer’s home is protected by the Fourth Amendment in that
    searches require reasonable suspicion, but they may be conducted
    without a warrant if there are reasonable grounds for the search of
    their home because searches are necessary to promote legitimate
    governmental interests of integrating probationers back into the
    community and preventing recidivism. United States v. Knights,
    
    534 U.S. 112
    , 119-22 (2001). In Knights, the Supreme Court devel-
    oped a balancing test to determine if a probationary search is con-
    stitutional, whereby the court must weigh the degree to which a
    search intrudes upon a probationer’s privacy and the degree to
    which the search is necessary to promote legitimate governmental
    interests. 
    Id. at 118-19
    .
    Probationers are not subject to reasonable suspicion
    searches solely because they are on probation. United States v.
    Carter, 
    566 F.3d 970
    , 973 (11th Cir. 2009). However, reasonable
    suspicion may be enough to support a warrantless search of a pro-
    bationer’s house when the Knights balancing test is applied. 
    Id.
     In
    Carter, we held that, though the probationer’s terms of probation
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280        Date Filed: 01/05/2022     Page: 4 of 8
    4                      Opinion of the Court                20-14280
    did not include a consent to warrantless home searches, his expec-
    tation of privacy was reduced by the term of his probation that al-
    lowed home visits by his probation officer, and when weighed
    against the government’s high interest in preventing drug and vio-
    lence-related crimes, the warrantless search of his home based on
    reasonable suspicion alone was sufficient. 
    Id. at 974-95
    ; see also
    Griffin v. Wisconsin, 
    483 U.S. 868
    , 871-72, 875-76 (1987) (upholding
    the denial of a motion to suppress because the probation officer
    had reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search when law
    enforcement received a tip that the defendant, a probationer, pos-
    sessed firearms in his apartment).
    The district court did not err when it denied Black’s motion
    to suppress because his expectation of privacy in his home was di-
    minished when he received probation instructions that granted his
    probation officer the right to search his home, and, when balanced
    against the Government’s interest in preventing drug and violence-
    related crimes, the warrantless search of his apartment by his pro-
    bation officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Black re-
    ceived probation instructions with his probation order that gave
    him notice probation officers would conduct routine home verifi-
    cations and had the right to search his residence. Black signed these
    probation instructions and certified he understood them. There-
    fore, his expectation of privacy in his home was diminished. See
    Knights, 
    534 U.S. at 119
    . Moreover, days before the probation of-
    ficer searched Black’s home, Black conceded the ATF received a tip
    that he possessed a firearm and was distributing illegal narcotics.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280         Date Filed: 01/05/2022      Page: 5 of 8
    20-14280                Opinion of the Court                          5
    See Griffin, 
    483 U.S. at 871-72
    . Since the Government has a high
    interest in preventing drug and violence-related crimes, under the
    Knights balancing test, the Government had a legitimate interest in
    preventing those crimes. See Griffin, 
    483 U.S. at 871
    ; Carter, 
    566 F.3d at 974-75
    . Therefore, the Government’s interest in preventing
    drug and violence related crimes coupled with Black’s already-di-
    minished expectation of privacy while he was on probation, sup-
    ports that the probation officer’s initial warrantless search of
    Black’s home did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Knights,
    
    534 U.S. at 119
    .
    In turn, the subsequent basis for a search warrant was not
    violative of the Fourth Amendment because there was probable
    cause to issue a search warrant based upon the probation officer’s
    discovery of illegal narcotics and ammunition in Black’s apartment,
    so the evidence collected by law enforcement was not “fruit of the
    poisonous tree.” See Segura v. United States, 
    468 U.S. 796
    , 804
    (1984) (explaining an unconstitutional search or seizure extends
    from primary evidence obtained illegally to any other evidence ob-
    tained as a direct result of the illegal search with the latter evidence
    termed, “fruit of the poisonous tree”). Accordingly, the district
    court did not err when it determined Black’s Fourth Amendment
    rights were not violated and it denied the motion to suppress the
    evidence.
    B. Judgment of Acquittal
    Black also asserts the district court erred in denying his mo-
    tion for judgment of acquittal because he did not have dominion
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280         Date Filed: 01/05/2022      Page: 6 of 8
    6                       Opinion of the Court                  20-14280
    and control over his children’s bedroom where the firearm was lo-
    cated, and his girlfriend testified the firearm was hers.
    In United States v. Ochoa, we upheld a conviction for pos-
    session of a firearm or ammunition by a felon in violation of
    § 922(g)(1) where the government presented evidence that the de-
    fendant constructively possessed the ammunition that was found
    in his bedroom along with official documentation listing his per-
    sonal information and his driver’s license listed the address as his
    residence. See United States v. Ochoa, 
    941 F.3d 1074
    , 1105 (11th
    Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 
    140 S. Ct. 2553
     (2020). There, we held a
    reasonable jury could find the defendant exercised dominion or
    control over the bedroom he resided in, which was sufficient for a
    finding of constructive possession of the ammunition found
    therein. 
    Id.
    Black only contests he possessed the firearm. Since he did
    not raise possession of the ammunition as an issue on appeal, he
    has waived the argument that he did not possess the ammunition.
    See United States v. Pilati, 
    627 F.3d 1360
    , 1364 (11th Cir. 2010) (stat-
    ing when a defendant fails to raise an issue on appeal, that argu-
    ment is deemed waived). Trial testimony supports that Black lived
    in the apartment law enforcement searched in February 2019 with
    his girlfriend Mercedes Cheaves and their two children, and he ex-
    ercised dominion and control over the bedroom in which he slept.
    Thus, the Government presented sufficient evidence at trial to al-
    low a finder of fact to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that
    Black possessed, at the very least, the 9 mm ammunition found in
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280            Date Filed: 01/05/2022         Page: 7 of 8
    20-14280                  Opinion of the Court                               7
    the linen closet in his bedroom. See Ochoa, 941 F.3d at 1105. Since
    possession of ammunition as a convicted felon is sufficient to ob-
    tain a conviction under § 922(g), 2 the district court did not err in
    denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g). Accordingly, we affirm Black’s conviction under
    § 922(g)(1).
    C. ACCA
    Finally, Black argues the district court erred in classifying
    him as an armed career criminal when it determined his prior 2001
    Florida conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell,
    in violation of 
    Fla. Stat. § 893.13
    , was a “serious drug offense” under
    the ACCA because it does not have a mens rea requirement.
    We are precluded from reviewing invited errors. United
    States v. Silvestri, 
    409 F.3d 1311
    , 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). The invited-
    error doctrine applies to this issue. See United States v. Brannan,
    
    562 F.3d 1300
    , 1306 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining the invited-error
    doctrine applies where a defendant induced or invited the district
    court’s error). Black acquiesced at his sentencing hearing that his
    2001 conviction was a “serious drug offense” under the ACCA, and
    thus he is precluded from arguing the opposite here.
    2 As such it is not necessary for this Court to analyze whether Black construc-
    tively possessed the firearm that was in his children’s bedroom, or whether he
    exercised dominion and control over his children’s bedroom.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14280       Date Filed: 01/05/2022    Page: 8 of 8
    8                     Opinion of the Court                20-14280
    II. CONCLUSION
    The district court did not err in denying Black’s motion to
    suppress evidence because, on balance, his expectation of privacy
    in his home was outweighed by the Government’s interest in pre-
    venting drug and violence related crimes, so the searches did not
    violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Further, the district court
    did not err when it denied Black’s motion for judgment of acquit-
    tal because the evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury
    to find Black exercised dominion and control over his bedroom
    where the ammunition was found, and possession of ammunition
    alone was sufficient to convict him under § 922(g)(1). Finally,
    Black is precluded from arguing the district court erred when it
    classified his 2001 drug conviction in Florida under 
    Fla. Stat. § 893.13
     as a “serious drug offense” under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e) be-
    cause the invited error doctrine applies.
    AFFIRMED.