United States v. Robert Russell Matcovich ( 2013 )


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  •            Case: 12-15438   Date Filed: 07/03/2013   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-15438
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00007-JES-DNF-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    ROBERT RUSSELL MATCOVICH,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 3, 2013)
    Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 12-15438       Date Filed: 07/03/2013     Page: 2 of 6
    Robert Matcovich appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
    suppress inculpatory statements he made to federal agents, without receiving
    Miranda 1 warnings, during an allegedly custodial interrogation.2 The district court
    denied Matcovich’s motion on the ground that he was not in “custody” at the time
    he made the inculpatory statements and, therefore, the law enforcement officers did
    not have to give a Miranda warning. On appeal, Matcovich argues that this
    conclusion was error.
    We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed
    question of law and fact. United States v. Spoerke, 
    568 F.3d 1236
    , 1244 (11th Cir.
    2009). “Whether [a defendant] was ‘in custody’ and entitled to Miranda warnings
    is [also] a mixed question of law and fact.” United States v. Moya, 
    74 F.3d 1117
    ,
    1119 (11th Cir. 1996). We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions
    and we review its factual findings for clear error. Id.
    I.
    The Supreme Court in Miranda “established that custodial interrogation
    cannot occur before a suspect is warned of [his] rights against self-incrimination.”
    United States v. Newsome, 
    475 F.3d 1221
    , 1224 (11th Cir. 2007). Pre-custodial
    questioning, in contrast, does not require Miranda warnings. United States v.
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
     (1966).
    2
    After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Matcovich’s case proceeded to a bench
    trial during which he was found guilty of possession of child pornography and distribution of
    child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (a)(4)(B), (b)(1), (b)(2).
    2
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    Street, 
    472 F.3d 1298
    , 1309 (11th Cir. 2006). The “initial step” in determining
    whether a person was in “custody” under Miranda “is to ascertain whether, in light
    of the objective circumstances of the interrogation” and the totality of all the
    circumstances, “a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at
    liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes v. Fields, ___ U.S. ___,
    ___, 
    132 S. Ct. 1181
    , 1189 (2012) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). An
    interviewee’s “status as a suspect, and the coercive environment that exists in
    virtually every interview by a police officer of a crime suspect,” does not
    automatically create a custodial situation. United States v. Muegge, 
    225 F.3d 1267
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted).
    One of the factors a court should consider when determining whether the
    defendant was “in custody” is the location of questioning. See Howes, 132 S. Ct.
    at 1189. Although not dispositive, “courts are much less likely to find the
    circumstances custodial when the interrogation occurs in familiar or at least neutral
    surroundings, such as the suspect’s home.” United States v. Brown, 
    441 F.3d 1330
    , 1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Courts may
    also consider whether a defendant was “unambiguously advis[ed] . . . that he is free
    to leave and is not in custody.” Id. at 1347. This is a “powerful factor” that
    “generally will lead to the conclusion that the defendant is not in custody absent a
    finding of restraints that are so extensive that telling the suspect he was free to
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    leave could not cure the custodial aspect of the interview.” Id. (quotation marks
    omitted). Other relevant factors “includ[e] whether the officers brandished
    weapons, touched the suspect, or used language or a tone that indicated that
    compliance with the officers could be compelled,” Street, 472 F.3d at 1309
    (quotation marks omitted), as well as the duration of the questioning, statements
    made during the interview, the presence of physical restraints during questioning,
    and “the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning,” Howes, 132 S.
    Ct. at 1189.
    II.
    Considering the totality of the circumstances, the factors weigh in favor of
    finding Matcovich’s interrogation non-custodial. The Magistrate Judge3
    determined that Special Agent Cox told Matcovich that he was not under arrest and
    that immediately before questioning began, Special Agent Cramsey told Matcovich
    that “he was not under arrest, was free to leave, could begin to answer questions
    and then stop, and could answer only the questions he wished.” In addition, the
    Magistrate Judge found that Matcovich was interviewed in the place where he had
    lived for six years. Matcovich has not shown that these findings were clear error,
    and they strongly suggest that Matcovich’s interrogation was not custodial. See
    Brown, 441 F.3d 1347–48. Further, there is no indication that there were restraints
    3
    The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
    4
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    on Matcovich’s freedom of movement “that [were] so extensive that telling [him]
    he was free to leave could not cure the custodial aspect of the interview.” Id. at
    1347 (quotation marks omitted).
    There are also a number of factors that suggest the interview was custodial,
    even though explained as being necessary for security reasons. First, when law
    enforcement officers entered the boarding house where Matcovich lived in order to
    execute the search warrant, there was a “police-dominated atmosphere” with a
    number of officers handcuffing residents and bringing them to a central location.
    However, when cuffed the residents were told that “they were not under arrest, it
    was just for officer safety” and “shortly thereafter, the search warrant was
    announced, the handcuffs were removed, and the residents were told that they were
    not under arrest.” Second, Matcovich was not allowed to go to his bedroom to
    retrieve his cigarettes, rather, an agent retrieved the cigarettes for him. Special
    Agent Cramsey testified that this was out of precaution for the safety of the
    officers who were still searching Matcovich’s room pursuant to a search warrant.
    Third, Matcovich was required to leave the door slightly open when using the
    bathroom. Special Agent Cramsey testified that this was for his safety and
    Matcovich’s safety because by this point it had become clear to Special Agent
    Cramsey that Matcovich was “a perpetrator and offender.”
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    However, these facts standing alone do not render this a custodial
    interrogation when: (1) Matcovich was unambiguously told that he was free to
    leave, was not in custody, and did not have to answer questions, see Brown at
    1347; (2) he was “in the familiar and comfortable surroundings” of his home, see
    id. at 1349; (3) he was not physically restrained during questioning, see Howes,
    132 S. Ct. at 1189; (4) the agents’ weapons were holstered when they spoke with
    Matcovich, see United States v. Luna-Encinas, 
    603 F.3d 876
    , 881 (11th Cir. 2010);
    (5) “[a]lthough an officer accompanied [Matcovich] throughout the house for
    safety reasons, he was free to” go outside to smoke and move about the house to
    get dressed and make coffee, see Brown, 441 F.3d at 1348–49; (6) there is no
    evidence that Special Agent Cramsey conveyed his suspicion that Matcovich was a
    perpetrator to Matcovich, see Stansbury v. California, 
    511 U.S. 318
    , 325, 114 S.
    Ct. 1526, 1530 (1994); and (7) after the interview was over, Matcovich left
    voluntarily with an FBI polygrapher and was not arrested until a later time, cf.
    Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1189.
    For these reasons, we agree with the district court that Matcovich’s
    statements were not made during a custodial interrogation.
    AFFIRMED.
    6