Edward Lamar Bloodworth v. United States ( 2015 )


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  •             Case: 14-12292   Date Filed: 08/11/2015   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-12292
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:13-cv-00112-MTT
    EDWARD LAMAR BLOODWORTH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (August 11, 2015)
    Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Edward Lamar Bloodworth, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
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    appeals from the district court’s denial of his motions for leave to amend his
    complaint, its denial of his motion to compel, and its grant of summary judgment
    to the United States in his pro se civil action brought under the Federal Tort Claims
    Act (“FTCA”). First, Bloodworth argues that the Federal Protective Service
    (“FPS”) violated the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and his due process
    rights by not providing him sufficient space in Standard Form 95 to adequately
    explain his claim. Second, he claims that the district court abused its discretion by
    denying his motions for leave to amend his complaint on the ground that the
    proposed amendments were futile. Third, he contends that the district court abused
    its discretion in denying his motion to compel. Finally, he argues that the district
    court erred by granting the United States summary judgment.
    I.
    Normally, we review final agency actions under an arbitrary and capricious
    standard of review. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 
    85 F.3d 535
    , 541 (11th Cir.
    1996). We review questions of constitutional law de novo. Kentner v. City of
    Sanibel, 
    750 F.3d 1274
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 
    135 S.Ct. 950
     (2015).
    However, we generally will not consider an issue raised for the first time on
    appeal. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (11th Cir.
    2004). We are especially unlikely to consider a claim that is highly dependent on
    the factual circumstances. See 
    id. at 1331-32
    . We may consider an issue raised for
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    the first time on appeal if: (1) it is a pure question of law; (2) the appellant had no
    opportunity to raise his claim before the district court; (3) substantial justice is at
    stake; (4) the proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents
    significant questions of general impact or great public concern. 
    Id. at 1332
    .
    Bloodworth did not raise his claims that FPS’s use of Standard Form 95
    violated his due process rights or the APA to the district court in his complaint, his
    motions to amend the complaint, or his proposed amended complaint. These
    claims present none of the circumstances warranting review of a claim asserted for
    the first time on appeal. Therefore, we decline to consider these claims for the first
    time on appeal.
    II.
    We review the denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an abuse of
    discretion. Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 
    477 F.3d 1282
    , 1291
    (11th Cir. 2007).
    A party may amend his pleading as a matter of course within 21 days of
    service of the pleading or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or motion
    to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed. R. Civ. P.
    15(a)(1). Otherwise, a party may only amend the pleading with the opposing
    party’s written consent or leave from the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Leave to
    amend should be freely granted when justice so requires. 
    Id.
     A district court may
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    decline leave to amend a complaint on the basis of futility when the complaint is
    subject to dismissal as amended. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 
    169 F.3d 1310
    ,
    1320 (11th Cir. 1999). A district court may also decline leave to amend a
    complaint on the basis of futility if the newly-asserted claims would be barred by
    the applicable statute of limitations. Moore v. Baker, 
    989 F.2d 1129
    , 1131 (11th
    Cir. 1993).
    To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
    allegations of facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678, 
    129 S.Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009). A pleading does not meet this standard if it
    only recites the elements of a cause of action. 
    Id.
     In a Bivens 1 suit, a plaintiff must
    plead that each individual defendant committed a constitutional violation through
    his own individual actions. 
    Id. at 676
    , 
    129 S.Ct. at 1948
    .
    Federal law prohibits a conspiracy to deter a party or witness from attending
    a “court of the United States.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 1985
    (2). The phrase “court of the
    United States” refers to Article III courts and the courts specified in 
    28 U.S.C. § 451
    . McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 
    206 F.3d 1031
    , 1035 n.2 (11th Cir.
    2000) (en banc); see also 
    28 U.S.C. § 451
     (deeming the Court of International
    Trade and certain courts created by Congress as courts of the United States).
    Federal law also provides a cause of action against a person who neglectfully or
    1
    Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 1999
     (1971).
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    intentionally fails to prevent a violation of § 1985 if he has the power to prevent
    such a violation. 
    42 U.S.C. § 1986
    .
    In Bivens actions, we apply the statute of limitations for personal injury
    actions from the state in which the claim was brought. Kelly v. Serna, 
    87 F.3d 1235
    , 1238 (11th Cir. 1996). For Bivens actions brought in Georgia, the statute of
    limitations is two years. Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. When an amended
    pleading changes the name of a party against whom a claim is brought, it may
    relate back to the date of the original pleading if (1) the basic claim arises from the
    conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party
    who is brought into the suit received notice of the action such that it will not be
    prejudiced in defending the action on the merits; (3) the party who is brought in
    knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but
    for a mistake concerning its identity; and (4) the second and third requirements for
    relation back were fulfilled within the 120-day period for service of process. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C); see also Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
    961 F.2d 153
    , 155
    (11th Cir. 1992). A plaintiff’s amendment to identify parties previously designated
    as “John Doe” defendants in the complaint does not relate back to the filing of the
    original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 because the
    amendment is made to correct the plaintiff’s lack of knowledge about whom to
    sue, not a mistake by the defendant in identifying the proper party. Wayne v.
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    Jarvis, 
    197 F.3d 1098
    , 1103-04 (11th Cir. 1999), overruled in part on other
    grounds by Manders v. Lee, 
    338 F.3d 1304
    , 1328 n.52 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
    The district court correctly concluded that Bloodworth’s claims of a civil
    conspiracy, due process violations, and equal protection violations were subject to
    dismissal for failure to state a claim. The constitutional claims against the
    proposed individual defendants failed to state what actions each individual
    defendant took to violate Bloodworth’s constitutional rights, and thus, failed to
    state a Bivens claim. Ashcroft, 
    556 U.S. at 676
    , 
    129 S.Ct. at 1948
    . Bloodworth
    failed to state a civil conspiracy claim under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1985
     or § 1986 because
    he allegedly was denied entry to an immigration court, which is not a court of the
    United States. See McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1035 n.2. The district court correctly
    determined that the claims arising from actions in May 2011 and June 2011 were
    filed outside of the two-year statute of limitations and did not relate back to the
    original complaint because Bloodworth attempted to add parties to replace those
    designated as “John Doe” defendants in the original complaint, which was not a
    mistake concerning the identity of the proper party. Wayne, 197 F.3d at 1103-04.
    Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bloodworth
    leave to amend his complaint.
    III.
    We review the denial of a motion to compel discovery for an abuse of
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    discretion. Holloman v. Mail-Well Corp., 
    443 F.3d 832
    , 837 (11th Cir. 2006). We
    will not overturn the denial of a motion to compel unless the district court
    committed a clear error of judgment. 
    Id.
    A party may file a motion to compel against another party who fails to
    permit inspection of documents within its possession, control, or custody. See Fed.
    R. Civ. P. 34(a)(1), 37(a)(3)(B)(iv). A party does not have authority to compel the
    production of documents outside the possession, control, or custody of a party to
    the case through a motion to compel under Rule 37. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)
    (permitting a motion to compel a disclosure or a discovery response under Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 26(a), 30, 31, 33, or 34, but not permitting a motion to compel discovery
    under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45).
    The district court instructed the Government to file a privilege log when
    Bloodworth complained that it had redacted some information from a document. It
    correctly concluded that Bloodworth could not compel the Government to produce
    an FBI report because the report was not in the Government’s possession and was
    held by an agency who was not a party to the case. Bloodworth identified no other
    information or material that he wanted the court to compel from the Government.
    Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bloodworth’s
    motion to compel.
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    IV.
    We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying
    the same legal standard as the district court. Carter v. Three Springs Residential
    Treatment, 
    132 F.3d 635
    , 641 (11th Cir. 1998). We view the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the non-moving party. 
    Id.
     Summary judgment is appropriate if
    the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of
    material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
    
    Id.
    The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for certain
    torts committed by federal employees. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 
    510 U.S. 471
    , 475, 
    114 S.Ct. 996
    , 1000 (1994). Constitutional tort claims are not cognizable under the
    FTCA because a private person would not be liable for such conduct under state
    law, and thus, the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for such
    claims through the FTCA. 
    Id. at 477-78
    , 
    114 S.Ct. at 1001
    . Further, the United
    States is not liable for monetary damages caused by an employee’s negligent or
    wrongful act unless the claimant presents the claim to the proper agency in writing.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2675
    (a). A proper notice to the agency must give the agency sufficient
    written notice of the claim for the agency to investigate and provide a sum certain
    value for the claim. Tidd v. United States, 
    786 F.2d 1565
    , 1567 (11th Cir. 1986).
    A claim does not provide sufficient notice of the facts leading to the complaint
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    when it only provides the name of the claimant and a general statement about the
    nature of his injuries. 
    Id. at 1568
    .
    The district court correctly concluded that Bloodworth’s constitutional
    claims could not be brought against the United States because the FTCA did not
    waive the United States’s sovereign immunity for those claims. Meyer, 
    510 U.S. at 477-78
    ; 
    114 S.Ct. at 1001
    . Bloodworth’s state law tort claims could not be brought
    against the United States because his administrative claim provided no notice to
    FPS of those claims, as the claim only stated that Bloodworth suffered harm from
    constitutional violations and alleged no tort committed against him by federal
    employees. Therefore, the district court did not err by granting the United States
    summary judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
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