Allison Landsman v. Officer Fletcher McClellan , 621 F. App'x 559 ( 2015 )

Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-15074
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-14375-DLG
ALLISON LANDSMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF VERO BEACH,
a political subdivision, et al.,
Defendants,
OFFICER FLETCHER MCCLELLAN,
in his individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 10, 2015)
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 2 of 11
Before HULL, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Fletcher McClellan, a police officer with the City of Vero Beach, Florida
(the City), appeals the district court’s order denying McClellan qualified immunity
with regard to claims brought against McClellan in his individual capacity by
Allison Landsman, an individual, in Landsman’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the
City, the former and current police chiefs for the City, and McClellan (collectively,
Defendants).
Landsman filed suit against Defendants for injuries sustained when
McClellan used force—specifically, a “modified arm-bar takedown”—to detain
her on suspicion of driving under the influence and a possible hit-and-run.
Landsman alleged that, as a result of McClellan’s alleged physical assault (the
details of which she cannot recall), she suffered severe injuries to her face and
head. Landsman subsequently brought claims for excessive force and state law
battery against McClellan. McClellan contended that he used only that force
necessary to take Landsman into custody. The parties eventually filed cross
motions for summary judgment, with McClellan moving for summary judgment on
the basis of qualified immunity. 1
1
The other parties’ motions for summary judgment and the district court’s decisions on
those motions are not before us.
2
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 3 of 11
In an amended order, the district court denied McClellan’s motion. The
court summarized each party’s version of the facts before addressing the two
claims against McClellan. The district court concluded that “the existence of
genuine issues of material facts, regarding the nature and extent of force that was
used, and the necessity for using it,” precluded summary judgment on Landsman’s
excessive force claim. According to the court, “a reasonable jury could find that,
given the circumstances and resulting injuries, McClellan’s use of the arm bar
maneuver to subdue Landsman was excessive.”
McClellan appeals the district court’s order, arguing again that he used only
that force necessary to take Landsman into custody and that the law had not clearly
established at the time of the incident that such force was excessive. Having
carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, we agree with the
district court and affirm its denial of McClellan’s motion for summary judgment
for the reasons set forth below.
I.
As an initial matter, we note that a district court’s order denying a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is
immediately appealable despite there being disputed issues of fact, unless the only
issue on appeal is the “sufficiency of the evidence relative to a predicate factual
element of the underlying constitutional tort.” Koch v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1296
3
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 4 of 11
(11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he Supreme Court . . .
narrowly defined the proscribed class of cases as those where a defendant merely
contests the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying action.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d
1281, 1294 n.19 (11th Cir. 2009). We are not presented with such a case.
McClellan advances an appealable issue—namely, whether his use of the arm-bar
takedown violated Landsman’s clearly established rights. Accordingly, we have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s legal determination that McClellan is not
entitled to qualified immunity, even though the district court noted that material
issues of fact remain. 2 See Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484–85 (11th Cir.
1996).
II.
There are a number of facts in dispute due, in no small part, to Landsman’s
inability to recall the specifics of her arrest. However, “[i]n conducting de novo
review of the district court’s disposition of a summary judgment motion based on
qualified immunity,” we, like the district court, “are required to resolve all issues
of material fact in favor of the plaintiff.” Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190
2
Whether McClellan is entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged use of excessive
force is an inquiry distinct from the merits of Landsman’s excessive force claims. See Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 204–06, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2158–59 (2001) (“The inquiries for qualified
immunity and excessive force remain distinct . . . .”), receded from on other grounds by Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). Still, “in the course of deciding an
interlocutory appeal, we have authority to decide those evidentiary sufficiency issues that are
part and parcel of the core qualified immunity issues.” Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1329
(11th Cir. 2008).
4
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 5 of 11
(11th Cir. 2002). “[W]e approach the facts from the plaintiff’s perspective because
the issues appealed here concern not which facts the parties might be able to prove,
but, rather, whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly
established law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, the
record supports the following factual account.
On the night in question, McClellan responded to a report of a hit-and-run
accident involving a car that had backed into a light post in a residential
community. A bystander gave McClellan a description of the car involved and its
license plate number. The car was registered to Landsman. Another officer, Craig
Urbanczyk, heard the report over the radio. Hoping to locate the car involved,
Urbanczyk drove towards Landsman’s known address. While en route, Urbanczyk
observed a car driving erratically, which car had noticeable rear-bumper damage
commensurate with the reported hit-and-run. The license plate number on the car
was a match, and Landsman was the driver. Urbanczyk followed Landsman into
her apartment complex and, once clear of the complex’s security gate, Urbanczyk
activated his emergency lights.
Landsman pulled over inside the complex, and Urbanczyk approached her
car. When Landsman lowered her window, Urbanczyk noticed the smell of
5
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 6 of 11
alcohol. 3 Urbanczyk asked Landsman if she was alright and informed her that
other officers were on their way. Landsman told Urbanczyk that she needed to go
home to use the bathroom. McClellan then arrived on the scene, parking his
vehicle behind Landsman’s car. While Urbanczyk and McClellan conversed,
Landsman rolled up her window, pulled away “slowly,” and drove further into the
complex towards her apartment. According to Landsman, Urbanczyk never told
her why she was pulled over and neither officer told her that she could not leave
after she was initially stopped. 4 McClellan followed in his vehicle, and Urbanczyk
gave chase on foot. Landsman parked her car and proceeded to her apartment.
Landsman recalls walking to the front door of her apartment and attempting
to put her key in the lock. She states that she was unaware that she was being
pursued, while McClellan contends that he yelled at Landsman to stop. Landsman
remembers feeling someone “pull on her shoulders,” and her next recollection is
waking up in a hospital emergency room. She cannot remember any other details
of the incident. McClellan states that Landsman shrugged his hands off of her
shoulders while attempting to enter her apartment, leading McClellan, who is 6’1,
3
Landsman does not challenge the constitutionality of the charges subsequently filed
against her, which include driving under the influence and leaving the scene of a hit-and-run with
minor property damage.
4
There is some dispute between the parties as to whether Urbanczyk informed Landsman
that she was not free to leave until instructed to do so. However, at this stage in the proceedings,
we “are required to resolve all issues of material fact in favor of [Landsman],” Lee, 284 F.3d at
1190, and she asserts that she was not informed as to why she was stopped and was not told that
she was not free to leave.
6
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 7 of 11
to perform a modified arm-bar takedown on Landsman, who is 5’4, sending both
Landsman and McClellan to the ground.
McClellan became aware of Landsman’s injuries while placing an
unconscious Landsman in handcuffs while she lay on the ground. Landsman was
transported to a hospital, where she was diagnosed with a subarachnoid bleed, a
nasal fracture, a hematoma to her left eye, an edema to the upper lip, an injury to
her left ankle, a near-full thickness rotator cuff tendon tear, and small partial tears
of the subscapularis tendon. Landsman continues to suffer from shoulder pain.
III.
The doctrine of qualified immunity will protect officers engaged in
discretionary functions from civil liability and from suit so long as the officers’
actions do “not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). Because McClellan was engaged in the
apprehension of a possibly intoxicated subject, he was “clearly engaged in a
discretionary capacity.” See Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1156
(11th Cir. 2005). As such, the burden shifts to Landsman to establish that
McClellan is not entitled to qualified immunity by showing that the facts alleged
by Landsman make out a violation of a constitutional right and that the alleged
7
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 8 of 11
constitutional right was clearly established at the time of McClellan’s conduct. See
Hadley, 526 F.3d at 1329. We find that Landsman met her burden here.
The right to be free from excessive force is grounded in the Fourth
Amendment. See Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1156. “Whether a specific use of force is
excessive turns on factors such as the severity of the crime, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat, and whether the suspect is resisting or fleeing.” Post v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559 (11th Cir. 1993) (citing Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1871 (1989)), modified, 14 F.3d 583(11th Cir. 1994). 5 The overarching inquiry is whether a reasonable officer in the
same situation would have believed that the level of force used was necessary. See
Mercado, 407 F.3d at 1157. As we have explained, “qualified immunity applies
unless application of [this] standard would inevitably lead every reasonable officer
in the position of the defendant officer to conclude the force was unlawful.” Nolin,
207 F.3d at 1255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
5
In evaluating the applicability of the principle of “de minimis force,” we look at the
need for force, the relationship between the need and amount of force used, and the extent of the
injury inflicted. See Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255–57 (11th Cir. 2000); see also Lee, 284
F.3d at 1198 n.7 (noting only subjective prong of four-part test in Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d
1533 (11th Cir. 1986), is invalid after Graham). Here, the amount of force applied by McClellan
combined with Landsman’s serious and well-documented injuries foreclose any de minimis
argument by McClellan. Cf. Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1255, 1258 & n.4 (“Appellee had minor bruising
which quickly disappeared without treatment.”); Post, 7 F.3d at 1559–60 (“[The arrestee] was in
a choke hold for about ‘five seconds’ and . . . sought no medical treatment until almost three
years after the arrest.”).
8
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 9 of 11
McClellan contends that he used only that force necessary to take Landsman
into custody. “[S]ome use of force by a police officer when making a custodial
arrest is necessary and altogether lawful, regardless of the severity of the alleged
offense.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351 F.3d 1080, 1094 (11th Cir. 2003). But “the
force used by a police officer in carrying out an arrest must be reasonably
proportionate to the need for that force,” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198, and that reasonable
proportionality is missing here. First, the amount of force employed by McClellan
does not mirror the offense for which McClellan was stopped—namely, backing
into a wall at a condominium complex. See id. Second, it is abundantly clear from
the record that Landsman did not pose an immediate threat of serious harm to
McClellan or to anyone else. Finally, when the facts are construed in the light
most favorable to Landsman, there is no indication that Landsman “actively
resisted or attempted to flee.” See id. On this record, we agree with the district
court that a reasonable jury could find McClellan’s use of force “unnecessary and
disproportionate,” id., and thus excessive. See, e.g., Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d
1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000).
We next ask whether McClellan “is nonetheless entitled to qualified
immunity on the ground that the law had not clearly established at the time of the
incident that such force was excessive.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198. There are three
ways in which a plaintiff can show that a right is clearly established: “(1) case law
9
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 10 of 11
with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad
statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly
establishes a constitutional right; or (3) conduct so egregious that a constitutional
right was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.” Lewis v. City of
W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). As noted above, qualified immunity will apply “unless
application of the standard would inevitably lead every reasonable officer in
[McClellan’s position] to conclude the force was unlawful.” Nolin, 207 F.3d at
1255 (internal quotation marks omitted).
There is a broad statement of principle ensconced in our case law that clearly
establishes that the use of force against an arrestee who, inter alia, is not a threat,
has not exhibited aggressive behavior, and has not actively resisted arrest is
excessive. See Lee, 284 F.3d at 1198–1200; Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla.,
208 F.3d 919, 927 (11th Cir. 2000).6 Such are the facts of the instant case. The
officers did not inform Landsman as to why she was stopped and never told her
that she was not free to leave. In line with her statement to Urbanczyk that she
needed to go home to the bathroom, she simply left the officers, drove to her
apartment, parked her car, and headed to her front door. Landsman was neither
6
See also Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1418, 1420 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)
(denying qualified immunity to officer who broke arm of individual who “docilely submitted” to
request to “get down,” even though individual had previously resisted (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
10
Case: 14-15074 Date Filed: 07/10/2015 Page: 11 of 11
agitated nor uncooperative; she was neither physically nor verbally aggressive; she
did not attempt to flee the apartment complex; and she did not drive away from the
officers quickly. Given the lack of any sort of threat, physical aggression, or
manifest resistance on Landsman’s part, “no reasonable officer could have had a
mistaken understanding as to whether the particular amount of force was legal in
the circumstances.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On this record, Landsman carries the day. This does not mean, however,
that McClellan will not ultimately be entitled to immunity. The jury’s subsequent
findings as to the nature and extent of McClellan’s use of force may lead the
district court to revisit the issue of whether such force was “patently
unreasonable.” Smith, 127 F.3d at 1420 (citing Stone v. Peacock, 968 F.2d 1163,
1166 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (noting that district court may grant qualified
immunity based on jury’s fact-findings following a full trial)). But we cannot,
within the bounds of summary judgment review, hold as a matter of law that the
force used by McClellan against Landsman was not obviously unreasonable. See
id. Therefore, the district court’s order denying McClellan’s motion for summary
judgment is AFFIRMED.
11