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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-11383
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:16-cv-00158-JRH-GRS
WASEEM DAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
SCOTT L. POFF,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(August 7, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Waseem Daker, a Georgia prisoner, appeals pro se the dismissal of his
complaint that a federal official violated his civil rights,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the
denial of his motion for recusal. After a magistrate judge denied Daker’s motion
for recusal, the district court dismissed Daker’s complaint with prejudice after
determining that he was ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis with three actions
or appeals that counted as strikes against him under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). We affirm the denial of Daker’s motion for recusal and
the dismissal of his complaint. But because a prisoner disqualified from proceeding
as a pauper under section 1915(g) should have his complaint dismissed without
prejudice, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand with instructions for the
district court to dismiss Daker’s complaint without prejudice.
Daker waived his right to challenge the denial of his motion for recusal of
every district court judge in the Southern District of Georgia. After the magistrate
judge denied Daker’s motion for recusal on July 25, 2016, see
28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A), Daker had 14 days, or until August 8, 2016, to object to the
decision, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Because Daker did not object until August 11,
2016, he waived his right to appeal the adverse ruling. See Smith v. Sch. Bd. of
Orange Cnty.,
487 F.3d 1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2007). It matters not that Daker filed
a motion to reconsider on August 3, 2016, because that motion challenged the
docketing of his motion for recusal, not its denial.
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The district court did not err by dismissing Daker’s complaint on the ground
that he was ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis. The Prison Litigation Reform
Act bars a prisoner from proceeding as an indigent if he “has, on 3 or more prior
occasions, while incarcerated . . ., brought an action or appeal . . . that was
dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.”
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Three of the five actions
and appeals relied on by the district court—Daker v. Nat’l Broad. Co., No. 15-330
(2d Cir. May 22, 2015); Daker v. Warren, No. 13-11630 (11th Cir. Mar. 4, 2014);
and Daker v. Mokwa, No. 14-cv-395 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2014)—qualified as
strikes. In National Broadcasting, the Second Circuit dismissed Daker’s appeal on
the ground that “it ‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’ Neitzke v.
Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989),” which is the definition the Neitzke Court
gave “a complaint . . . [that] is frivolous,”
id. In Warren, we expressly dismissed
Daker’s interlocutory appeal on a “find[ing] that [it] [was] frivolous.” And in
Mokwa, the district court dismissed Daker’s “amended complaint . . . as frivolous
and for failure to state a claim,” after which the Ninth Circuit dismissed Daker’s
“appeal [a]s frivolous,” Daker v. Mokwa, No. 14-55653 (June 11, 2014). Although
the dismissal without prejudice of two civil actions that Daker filed in the Northern
District of Georgia—Daker v. Robinson, No. 12-cv-00118, and Daker v. Dawes,
No. 12-cv-00119—did not count as strikes because they were dismissed for failure
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to pay a filing fee, Daker already had accumulated the requisite three strikes to
deny his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
Daker argues that he is entitled to proceed as an indigent under the exception
for a “prisoner [who] is under imminent danger of serious physical injury,”
id., but
we disagree. Daker never alleged in his complaint that he faced “a present
imminent danger to proceed under section 1915(g) . . . .” Brown v. Johnson,
387
F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004). Daker alleged that the Clerk for the Southern
District of Georgia violated his rights by returning his civil complaint on the basis
that venue was incorrect. One year later, Daker moved to amend his complaint to
add a claim of imminent danger in response to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation to dismiss Daker’s complaint. Daker did not seek written consent
from the Clerk or request leave to amend his pleading, and the district court did not
consider Daker’s motion to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). And Daker failed to
allege “a present imminent danger” in his proposed amended complaint. Daker
alleged that he had been exposed to fecal matter, received inadequate dental care,
and had been denied outdoor exercise, but those hardships did not endanger Daker.
Daker’s allegation that using unsanitary and damaged clippers on his beard might
increase his risk of contracting an infectious disease was too speculative to
constitute imminent harm. And Daker’s allegations that he had been denied
medication and treatment for nerve damage and weight issues related to events in
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the past, which do not qualify for the imminent danger exception. See Medberry v.
Butler,
185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 1999).
Daker challenges the constitutionality of section 1915(g), but his arguments
fail. Section 1915(g) does not infringe on a prisoner’s freedom of speech under the
First Amendment because denying a prisoner the right to proceed in forma
pauperis does not censor what issues he can litigate. Daker argues that section
1915(g) violates his right to access the courts under the First Amendment and his
right to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, but those arguments are
foreclosed by Rivera v. Allin,
144 F.3d 719 (11th Cir. 1998), abrogated in part on
different grounds by Jones v. Bock,
549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion). In Rivera,
we held that section 1915(g) does not thwart prisoners from having “adequate,
effective, and meaningful” access to the courts “to prevent grave bodily harm,” id.
at 724, or violate a prisoner’s right to equal protection because requiring the
payment of a reasonable filing fee bears a rational relation to the legitimate
governmental interest of deterring frivolous litigation, id. at 727–28. Rivera does
not conflict with Procup v. Strickland,
792 F.2d 1069, 1071, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986),
in which we held that a district court could not prohibit a prisoner from filing a pro
se complaint, or with Cofield v. Alabama Public Service Commission,
936 F.2d
512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991), in which we held that a district court could not deny a
prisoner in forma pauperis status prospectively.
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The district court erred by dismissing Daker’s complaint with prejudice.
“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the complaint without
prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant
to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).” Dupree v. Palmer,
284 F.3d 1234,
1236 (11th Cir. 2002). That error requires us to vacate the order of dismissal and to
remand the case for the district court to dismiss Daker’s complaint without
prejudice.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Daker’s complaint, but we VACATE the
order of dismissal and REMAND with instructions for the district court to dismiss
the complaint without prejudice.
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